Evolution, Bounded Rationality and Institutions by Buckenmaier, Johannes
Evolution, Bounded Rationality
and Institutions
Inauguraldissertation
zur
Erlangung des Doktorgrades
der
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät
der
Universität zu Köln
2017
vorgelegt
von
Dipl. Math. Johannes Buckenmaier
aus
Balingen
Referent: Prof. Dr. Carlos Alós-Ferrer
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Larbi Alaoui
Tag der Promotion: 06. November 2017
For Manuela
Table of Contents
List of Tables v
List of Figures vi
Introduction and Summary vi
1 Trader Matching and the Selection of Market Institutions 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.1 Matching and Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.2 Behavioral Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.3 Learning Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.1 Absorbing States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.2 Stochastic Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4.3 The Stability of Centralized Institutions . . . . . . . . 22
1.4.4 Matching-Eﬃcient Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.5 Optimism, Pessimism, and Decentralized Institutions . 25
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix 1.A: Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2 Cournot vs. Walras: A Reappraisal through Simulations 36
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.2 Existing Theoretical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
i
2.2.1 The Discrete Cournot Oligopoly . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2.2 Imitation with Bounded Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3 The Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3.1 Simulation Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3.2 The Simulation Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4 Computational Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4.1 Cournot, Walras, or Both? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4.2 The Shape of the Invariant Distribution . . . . . . . . 56
2.4.3 Regression Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3 Cognitive Sophistication and Deliberation Times 71
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.2.1 Related Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.3.1 The Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.3.2 Design and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4.1 Results for the Beauty Contest Game . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4.2 Results for the 11-20 Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.4.3 Eﬀect of Incentives in the 11-20 Game . . . . . . . . . 93
3.5 Additional Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.5.1 Other Level-0 Speciﬁcations in the 11-20 Game . . . . 98
3.5.2 A Social Preference Variant - SOCP . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Appendix 3.A: Sequence of Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Appendix 3.B: Behavior in the 11-20 Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4 Institutional History, Leniency and Collusive Tax Evasion 106
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.2 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.2.1 The Bribery Game with and without Leniency . . . . . 110
ii
4.2.2 Treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.2.3 Experimental Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.3.1 Collusive Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.3.2 What Are the Drivers of Collusion? . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.3.3 Eﬀects on Tax Evasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Appendix 4.A: Theoretical Analysis of the Bribery Game . . . . . . 133
Appendix 4.B: Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Appendix 4.C: Additional Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5 Timing, Uncertainty and Institutional Deterrence 138
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.2 Theoretical and Empirical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.3 Design and Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.3.1 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.3.2 Experimental Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.3.3 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.5 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Appendix 5.A: Overview Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
iii
List of Tables
2.1 Inverse-demand functions used in the simulations. . . . . . . . 50
2.2 Cost functions used in the simulations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3 Range of parameters used in the simulations. . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.4 Pseudo-code of the N -player learning model. . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.5 Overview average and minimum fraction of time spent within
the interval [qC , qW ]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.6 Overview average quantity and median quantity. . . . . . . . . 61
2.7 Linear regressions on average and median quantity. . . . . . . 64
2.8 Fractional logit regressions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.1 Linear regressions on log DT for the beauty contest game. . . 87
3.2 Random eﬀects log DT regressions on level (full sample). . . . 89
3.3 Random eﬀects log DT regressions on level. . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.4 Random eﬀects log DT regressions with controls for the payoﬀ
structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.5 Random eﬀects Tobit regressions of level with controls for
bonus and cost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.6 Random eﬀects log DT regressions with interaction of level
and bonus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.7 Random eﬀects panel log DT regressions with interaction of
level and cost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.8 Lower bounds on p0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.9 Pseudo-randomized sequences of the 11-20 games used in the
experiment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.1 Overview over the treatments and number of subjects assigned
to each treatment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
iv
4.2 Summary statistics across treatments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.3 Logistic panel regression with random eﬀects of acceptance on
bribe size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.1 Overview of timing of resolution of uncertainty and punish-
ment in the diﬀerent treatments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.2 Total Cheating using GLS Random Eﬀects Regressions . . . . 153
5.3 Conditional Cheating using OLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.4 Predictions for Total Cheating under DEU . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.5 Predictions for Total Cheating under UAE . . . . . . . . . . . 159
v
List of Figures
2.1 Eﬀect of strict concavity of P and strict convexity of C. . . . . 58
2.2 Eﬀect of memory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.3 Eﬀect of number of ﬁrms N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.4 Eﬀect of noise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.1 Generalized 11-20 game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.2 Payoﬀ structure for the diﬀerent variants with low cost. . . . . 81
3.3 Payoﬀ structure for the diﬀerent variants with high cost. . . . 83
3.4 Choices and deliberation times in the beauty contest game. . . 86
3.5 Payoﬀ structure for SOCP in the low (top panel) and high
(bottom panel) cost version. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.6 Distribution of choices in the 11-20 games. . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.1 Representation of the bribery game (with leniency). . . . . . . 111
4.2 Average collusion in NoLEN and LEN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.3 Average collusion in NoL-L and L-NoL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.4 Frequency of bribes oﬀered and bribe acceptance rate in NoLEN
and LEN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.5 Frequency of bribes oﬀered and bribe acceptance rate in NoL-
L and L-NoL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.6 Bribe size over rounds across treatments. . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.7 Amount of taxes ﬁnally paid over rounds and across treatments.130
5.1 Timeline of the experiment for each treatment. . . . . . . . . . 144
5.2 Average Total Cheating. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.3 Conditional Cheating. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
vi
Introduction and Summary
This dissertation consists of ﬁve self-contained research papers that cover
theoretical work, simulation-based research, and experimental studies. My
research interests are mainly focused on two interrelated areas within eco-
nomics. One area is concerned with the economic consequences as well as
the foundations of boundedly rational behavior. The other area is more spe-
ciﬁc and concerns the design of institutions and how they can be used to
shape behavior and align incentives. The ﬁrst chapter belongs to both areas,
Chapters 2 and 3 cover topics from the former area, whereas the last two
chapters contribute to the latter area. Chapter 1 concerns the role of trader
matching with regard to the selection of market institutions by boundedly
rational traders. Chapter 2 presents results on the stability of the Cournot-
Nash and the Walrasian equilibrium under imitative behavior. Chapter 3
presents a model linking response times and iterative thinking and provides
experimental evidence regarding the underlying processes of iterative think-
ing. Chapter 4 investigates the eﬀects of a leniency mechanism on collusive
bribery and tax evasion. Chapter 5 asks how the timing of punishment and
the timing of the resolution of uncertainty aﬀect deterrence of illicit behav-
ior. In the remainder of this section I present a brief introduction for each
chapter and summarize the main ﬁndings.
Chapter 1 is the result of joint work with Carlos Alós-Ferrer (University
of Cologne) and has been published under the title “Trader Matching and
the Selection of Market Institutions” in the Journal of Mathematical Eco-
nomics. We analyze a stochastic dynamic learning model with boundedly
rational traders who can choose among trading institutions with diﬀerent
matching characteristics. The framework allows for institutions featuring
multiple prices (per good), thus violating the “law of one price.” We ﬁnd
that centralized institutions are stochastically stable for a broad class of dy-
namics and behavioral rules, independently of which other institutions are
available. However, some decentralized institutions featuring multiple prices
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can also survive in the long run, depending on speciﬁc characteristics of the
underlying learning dynamics such as fast transitions or optimistic behav-
ior. Work on this paper was shared among the authors as follows: Carlos
Alós-Ferrer 50%, Johannes Buckenmaier 50%.
Chapter 2 is the result of joint work with Carlos Alós-Ferrer (University
of Cologne) and has been published under the title “Cournot vs. Walras:
A Reappraisal through Simulations” in the Journal of Economic Dynam-
ics and Control. Best-reply behavior in Cournot oligopolies generally leads
to Cournot-Nash equilibrium, but imitative behavior selects the Walrasian
equilibrium as the unique stochastically stable state. Previous work (Alós-
Ferrer, 2004) showed that in the presence of memory, imitative behavior
leads to a non-trivial dynamics selecting all quantities between the Cournot
and Walrasian outcomes. However, the scope of previous results was limited
to speciﬁc assumptions on demand and cost functions, and did not provide
information on the shape of the distribution of outcomes. We use computa-
tional simulations to address these limitations. We show that the selection
result for non-trivial memory holds beyond the set of well-behaved Cournot
games previously analyzed. Further, we ﬁnd that, in Cournot games, the
limit distribution of long-run outcomes is highly skewed towards the Wal-
rasian quantity. Although longer memory increases the importance of the
Cournot equilibrium, the competitive outcome remains the dominant predic-
tion. Work on this paper was shared among the authors as follows: Carlos
Alós-Ferrer 50%, Johannes Buckenmaier 50%.
Chapter 3, entitled “Cognitive Sophistication and Deliberation Times,”
is the result of joint work with Carlos Alós-Ferrer (University of Cologne).
Cognitive capacities diﬀer among individuals. Models of iterative thinking
put forward heterogeneity in the depth of reasoning as a source of individ-
ual diﬀerences in behavior. So far there has been little direct evidence that
sophistication (depth of reasoning) corresponds to cognitive eﬀort. Choice
data alone cannot provide such evidence, hence additional evidence is neces-
sary. We argue that deliberation times can provide such evidence. We pro-
vide a simple model linking cognitive sophistication and deliberation times,
taking into account stylized facts from the psychophysiological literature on
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response times. The key assumption is that deliberation time is a decreas-
ing function of the hypothetical gain from conducting an additional step of
reasoning. We then test the predictions in an experiment. We ﬁnd longer
deliberation times for choices commonly associated with more steps of rea-
soning in games where iterative thinking is salient, conﬁrming the prediction
of our model that deliberation time is increasing in cognitive sophistication.
However, this relation breaks down when iterative thinking is not natural or
when there is a conﬂict between alternative decision rules. Further, we ﬁnd
that larger incentives decrease the time required to perform a single step of
reasoning, which, in line with our predictions, is consistent with a closeness-
to-indiﬀerence eﬀect. If the underlying processes are clearly identiﬁed, we
observe a strong link between deliberation times and steps of reasoning sup-
porting level-k thinking. Additionally, however, deliberation times also allow
us to detect when other elements enter the picture, and hence are also helpful
for further theory development. Work on this paper was shared among the
authors as follows: Carlos Alós-Ferrer 50%, Johannes Buckenmaier 50%.
Chapter 4, entitled “Institutional History, Leniency and Collusive Tax
Evasion,” is the result of joint work with Eugen Dimant (University of Penn-
sylvania) and Luigi Mittone (University of Trento). We investigate the eﬀects
of an institutional mechanism, that incentivizes tax payers to blow the whistle
through a leniency program, on collusive corruption and tax compliance. In
our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework.
We not only study how the presence of such a mechanism aﬀects behavior,
but also investigate the role of institutional changes, that is, the dynamic ef-
fect caused by the introduction and the removal of leniency. We ﬁnd that in
the presence of a leniency mechanism subjects collude less, accept less bribes
and pay more taxes, while we ﬁnd no evidence that it encourages bribe of-
fers. Further, our results show that the introduction of the opportunity to
blow the whistle decreases collusion, decreases the bribe acceptance rate, and
increases the tax yield collected, while not encouraging bribe oﬀers. In con-
trast, the removal of the institutional mechanism does not cause eﬀects in
the opposite direction, suggesting a positive spillover eﬀect of leniency that
persists even after the mechanism has been removed. Work on this paper
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was shared among authors as follows: Johannes Buckenmaier 33%, Eugen
Dimant 33%, Luigi Mittone 33%.
Chapter 5, entitled “Timing, Uncertainty and Institutional Deterrence,”
is the result of joint work with Eugen Dimant (University of Pennsylvania),
Ann-Christin Posten (University of Cologne) and Ulrich Schmidt (Univer-
sity of Kiel). Reducing criminal acts in society is a crucial duty of gov-
ernments. Establishing punishment structures to attain this goal involves
high costs. Typically, both theorists and practitioners resort to the adjust-
ment of severity and/or certainty of punishment as eﬀective deterrents of
criminal behavior. One more cost eﬀective, but scientiﬁcally understudied
mechanism for eﬀective deterrence is the swiftness or celerity of punishment.
We carry out a controlled economic experiment to study the eﬀectiveness of
swiftness of punishment along the following two dimensions: the timing of
punishment and the timing of the resolution of uncertainty (regarding the
punishment). Our results indicate an inverted U-shaped relation between
the delay of punishment, the delay of uncertainty resolution regarding the
detection of deviant behavior, and any resulting deterrence. In fact, insti-
tutions that either reveal detection and impose punishment immediately or
maintain uncertainty about the state of detection and impose punishment
suﬃciently late deter individuals at equal rates. Further, we ﬁnd that the
same institutional settings that are capable of reducing recidivism are also
the ones deterring deviant behavior in the ﬁrst place. Our results yield pol-
icy implications for designing eﬀective institutions in mitigating misconduct
and reducing recidivism. Work on this paper was shared among the authors
as follows: Johannes Buckenmaier 25%, Eugen Dimant 25%, Ann-Christin
Posten 25%, Ulrich Schmidt 25%.
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Chapter 1
Trader Matching and the Selection of Market Institutions
1.1 Introduction
Market institutions come in many ﬂavors. In many markets, institutions
with diﬀerent characteristics exist, even for the same good. Those can be
formal, as e.g. speciﬁc Business-to-Business (B2B) or Business-to-Consumer
platforms, middlemen agencies, or local markets for perishable products (ﬁsh
and produce), or informal, as e.g. exchange arrangements, black markets, or
the set of particular conventions surrounding real-estate and rental markets
in certain countries (group-tenant vs. individual visits). The characteristics
of such market institutions in turn inﬂuence market outcomes in terms of
eﬃciency, surplus distribution and convergence to market-clearing outcomes.
It is hence important to understand what promotes coordination on a speciﬁc
institution.
In this work, we build upon the evolutionary approach to the selection
of trading institutions, and in particular on Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger
(2010, 2015) and Alós-Ferrer et al. (2010). The essence of the approach is
the study of long-run stability. Suppose a host of alternative institutions are
present in a market, whatever their origin might be. Are there any partic-
ular institutions whose survival is more likely in the long run? To answer
these questions, we analyze the selection and stability of market institutions
when boundedly rational traders employ certain “rules of thumb” to decide
at which competing institution to trade. The assumption of bounded ra-
tionality seems reasonable since, due to the complexity of the evaluation of
institutional characteristics, rational learning is rather implausible. Follow-
ing the evolutionary approach, we will concentrate on the long-run outcomes
of the discrete-time, stochastic dynamical system which results when traders
revise their institution choices over time on the basis of the behavioral rules.
5
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We use the notion of stochastic stability in a dynamic learning framework
with vanishing mistakes (Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993; Blume, 1993;
Ellison, 2000) to determine which institutions survive in the long run.
For practical purposes, a market institution can be deﬁned as a set of trad-
ing rules and conventions which determine the matching and price formation
process, i.e. who trades with whom and at what price. As most of the existing
literature, Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger (2010, 2015), and Alós-Ferrer et al.
(2010) focused on the price-formation part, analyzing market selection when
institutions generate possibly biased prices (implying rationing) but feature a
single price (per good) only. However, institutions also inﬂuence who trades
with whom. This paper takes the next natural step and concentrates on
the trader matching process. Speciﬁcally, we study whether traders learn to
coordinate on centralized, market-clearing institutions or whether other in-
stitutions can survive in the long run, in a framework where institutions are
solely characterized by a matching mechanism. Hence, we allow for violations
of the law of one price, that is, we study the stability of general institutions
including decentralized non-market clearing ones where a single good might
be traded at diﬀerent prices within a single institution. In order to isolate
the eﬀects of matching, however, we concentrate on the eﬀects arising from
diﬀerences in the matching mechanisms and abstract away from any other
complications. In particular, and unlike in the works cited above, institutions
will be characterized by market clearing (within each institution), excluding
both rationing and price biases. Further, we exclude trader heterogeneity
and consider a model with homogeneous buyers and sellers.
We hence identify each institution with a certain matching pattern for
the traders who choose to use it. Examples include the “bazaar” where buy-
ers and sellers are randomly matched, auction houses where each good is
oﬀered to a subgroup of buyers, and of course centralized markets. Our ﬁrst
result is that centralized institutions are always stable in the long run. This
clear-cut result is conceptually in line with the stability of market-clearing
institutions in Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger (2010, 2015). It is a rather strong
result, because it holds independently of the number and properties of other
available institutions, of the characteristics of trader demand and supply, of
6
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the behavioral rules within the general class we consider, and of the exact
speciﬁcation of revision opportunities (and hence speed) in the dynamics.
Stochastic stability, however, only means long-run survival, and not nec-
essarily the identiﬁcation of a unique prediction. It turns out that other
decentralized institutions can also survive in the long run. Unlike in the case
of a centralized institution, we also show that their survival depends on, e.g.,
the characteristics of the behavioral rules and the speciﬁcation of the dynam-
ics. In keeping with our aim for generality, we ask ourselves whether general
conditions can be identiﬁed without specifying concrete examples of behav-
ioral rules, dynamics, and market characteristics. Our second main result
identiﬁes a general necessary condition for stochastic stability, which we term
matching-efficiency. Informally speaking, a trading institution is matching-
eﬃcient if it leaves no unmatched trader when all or almost all traders have
already coordinated on it. Although many institutions are matching-eﬃcient,
many others, as e.g. a bazaar deﬁned merely by random matching, are not,
and hence the condition does have cutting power.
Interestingly, under a strengthening of our assumptions on revision op-
portunities (requiring the dynamics to be fast enough), matching-eﬃciency
fully characterizes the set of stochastically stable institutions. However, we
also show that without this strengthening, matching-eﬃcient institutions can
fail to be stochastically stable in general. Hence, the take-home message is
that, while full centralization ensures stochastic stability, other institutions
might also survive, and a full characterization thereof for speciﬁc markets
will require active market design, in the sense that institutions will need
to be tailored to the speciﬁcs of trader behavior and other relevant market
characteristics.
The article is structured as follows. Section 1.2 brieﬂy reviews the re-
lated literature. Section 1.3 describes the elements of the model, i.e. the
characteristics of market institutions, the behavioral assumptions underlying
institution choice by (boundedly rational) traders, and the actual (discrete-
time, stochastic) learning dynamics. Section 1.4 contains the results, start-
ing with an analysis of the stochastic stability of centralized institutions and
proceeding to the conditions under which decentralized institutions might be
7
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stochastically stable. Proofs are relegated to Appendix 1.A.
1.2 Related Literature
This article belongs to a line of research started in Alós-Ferrer and Kirch-
steiger (2010), which studied the selection of alternative market institutions
in a multi-good, general equilibrium setting, and continued in Alós-Ferrer
and Kirchsteiger (2015), in a partial equilibrium buyers-sellers model. The
main result of those works is that, even if alternative (biased) market institu-
tions exist, market-clearing (unbiased) institutions are always stochastically
stable. However, other, alternative institutions might also be stochastically
stable and hence survive in the long run, giving rise to a multiplicity of insti-
tutions. Which other institutions survive depends on many factors, ranging
from the elasticity of individual demands and the heterogeneity of the traders
to the speed of the particular dynamics considered. Since this implies that
the design of institutions becomes meaningful, Alós-Ferrer et al. (2010) con-
sidered fully rational market designers who actively design alternative mar-
ket platforms, which are then chosen by boundedly rational traders.1 The
present contribution diﬀers from Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger (2010, 2015),
and Alós-Ferrer et al. (2010) in that we allow for violations of the law of one
price and study the eﬀects of diﬀerent trader matching within an institution,
but we exclude the possibility of price biases and rationing.
The analysis here and in Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger (2010) is also re-
lated to the literature on the stability properties of perfectly competitive
behavior in learning models with boundedly rational agents. Those works
(Alós-Ferrer and Ania, 2005; Mandel and Gintis, 2014) provide a learning-
based foundation for perfectly competitive behavior when the market insti-
tution is ﬁxed. In contrast, we do not consider the stability of outcomes
by themselves, but rather the stability of market institutions which chan-
nel those outcomes. Hence, one of our aims is to examine the stability of
1Hence that work built a bridge to the “asymmetric rationality program” where rational
ﬁrms are confronted with boundedly rational consumers (Ellison, 2006; Spiegler, 2006;
Gabaix and Laibson, 2006). See also Shi (2015).
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“Walrasian,” centralized institutions allowing for full market clearing.
Conceptually, the current paper bridges the strand of the literature de-
scribed above and the literature on evolutionary dynamics and surplus divi-
sion. The latter asks how cooperative game solutions can be implemented
via learning processes, either for bilateral trading (Nax and Pradelski, 2015;
Klaus and Newton, 2016) or for general cooperative games modeling surplus
sharing among more than two players (Agastya, 1999; Newton, 2012). Our
work is complementary to those in that we examine the evolution of institu-
tions as characterized by matching mechanisms, and, hence, the evolution of
the matching process itself. However, there are also similarities in the results.
The works just mentioned typically select outcomes within the core. Here
and in Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger (2010, 2015), we obtain that states where
all traders coordinate on a single centralized institution are stable, a result
which can be related to the core as no coalition of traders could improve (in
the sense of increasing overall eﬃciency) by moving away.
1.3 The Model
There is a single homogeneous good to be traded by a ﬁnite population of
traders consisting of buyers and sellers. We consider a buyers-sellers model
with a ﬁxed set B of n ≥ 2 homogeneous buyers and a ﬁxed set S of m ≥ 2
homogeneous sellers, where traders’ roles are ﬁxed and predetermined. We
view this setup as reasonably general while ensuring tractability.
Our model has three components, which will be discussed in three sepa-
rate subsections below. First, we need to specify the characteristics of market
institutions and how trade is conducted within an institution. Second, we will
detail the behavioral assumptions underlying institution choice by (bound-
edly rational) traders. Third, we will describe the actual (discrete-time,
stochastic) learning dynamics.
1.3.1 Matching and Institutions
Buyers and sellers can trade the good at diﬀerent market institutions. We
assume that there is a set of N + 1 diﬀerent institutions Z = {z0, . . . , zN},
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and traders can choose at which institution they want to trade. For our
purposes, the important part of a market institution is how the matching
process is structured within it, and how the trading prices are determined;
in other words, who can trade with whom and at what price. That is, we
identify an institution with a trading rule that speciﬁes the matching and
price formation process. When modeling the matching process we rely on
the following notion of a matching.
Definition 1. A matching for two (possibly empty) sets X and Y is
• a partition of X, {X0, X1, . . . , Xℓ}, and
• a partition of Y , {Y0, Y1, . . . , Yℓ},
such that Xi 6= ∅ 6= Yi for all i = 1, . . . , ℓ. A matching is non-trivial if ℓ ≥ 1,
or, equivalently, X0 ( X and Y0 ( Y .
The interpretation is as follows. Given a set of buyers X and a set of
sellers Y , all of them present at the same institution, a matching partitions
all traders into matching groups or sub-markets (Xi, Yi) for i = 1, . . . , ℓ, while
possibly leaving a subset of buyers X0 and a subset of sellers Y0 unmatched.
Unmatched traders do not trade at all. Buyers in Xi can potentially trade
with sellers in Yi, and vice versa, at a price to be determined by a speciﬁc
price formation process that depends solely on Xi and Yi. That is, within
each matching group there will be a unique trading price, but the prices
within a single institution can diﬀer across matching groups.
The simplest market institutions could now be deﬁned by assigning a
ﬁxed matching to each potential pair of sets (buyers and sellers). Market
institutions, however, are rarely fully deterministic. Hence, an institution
will rather be deﬁned by a distribution over potential matchings, together
with a speciﬁc price formation process that determines prices within matching
groups. We formally deﬁne an institution as follows.
Definition 2. Given a set of buyers B and a set of sellers S, an institution
z is characterized by a matching function Mz which, for any two subsets
Bz ⊆ B and Sz ⊆ S speciﬁes a probability distribution Mz(Bz, Sz) over all
10
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matchings for Bz and Sz. An institution is non-trivial if suppMz(Bz, Sz)
contains at least one non-trivial matching whenever Bz 6= ∅ and Sz 6= ∅.
For given subsets Bz ⊆ B and Sz ⊆ S of traders and sellers at an in-
stitution z, a realization of the distribution Mz(Bz, Sz) is hence a matching
(Bzi , S
z
i )
ℓz
i=0 in the support of Mz(Bz, Sz).
We endow buyers with a common demand function d and sellers with a
common supply function s. Demand and supply functions satisfy standard
properties as captured by the following assumptions.2
M1. The demand function d : R+ −→ R+ ∪ {∞} is continuous and strictly
decreasing in p, with d(p) > 0 for all p ≥ 0 and limp−→∞ d(p) = 0.
M2. The supply function s : R+ −→ R+ is continuous and (weakly) increas-
ing in p, with s(0) = 0 and s(p) > 0 for all p > 0.
For any realized matching (Bzi , S
z
i )
ℓz
i=0 , prices p
z
1, . . . , p
z
lz
at z are deter-
mined by local market clearing, i.e.
|Bzi | d(p
z
i ) = |S
z
i | s(p
z
i ) for i = 1, . . . , ℓz. (LMC)
Since all buyers are identical (and characterized by the demand function
d) and all sellers are identical (and characterized by the supply function s),
given the matching, condition (LMC) is enough to describe the results of
trading. Under M1 and M2 there always exists a unique, strictly positive
price pzi solving (LMC) for i = 1, . . . , ℓz, which yields demand and supply
strictly above zero. Further, the price pzi only depends on the buyer-seller
ratio rzi = |B
z
i |/|S
z
i | within the respective matching group (B
z
i , S
z
i ), and of
course on the shape of the supply and demand functions, which we assume
to be ﬁxed. Given a ratio r, we denote the corresponding price by p(r). Note
also that p(r) is strictly increasing in r.
Assume buyers Bz ⊆ B and sellers Sz ⊆ S want to trade at institution z.
The matching function Mz determines all the matchings which occur with
positive probability for Bz and Sz, namely the support of Mz(Bz, Sz) (the
2
M1 and M2 correspond to M1’ and M2’ in Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger (2015).
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exact probability is not important for our results). After matching groups
have been realized trade takes place in the matching groups at the price
speciﬁed by (LMC) at group level. Note that under (LMC) traders are not
rationed.3
We will assume that z0 ∈ Z is always a centralized market-clearing in-
stitution as follows, i.e., an institution of this type is always available. This
is an institution where all traders are matched in a single group (no trader
remains unmatched) and hence trade at the same price. The (single) price at
the centralized institution depends only on the number of buyers and sellers
that wish to trade there.
Example 1. A centralized institution, denoted z0, matches traders ac-
cording to a ﬁxed matching with ℓ0 = 1, B
z0
0 = S
z0
0 = ∅, B
z0
1 = Bz0 and
Sz01 = Sz0 (whenever Bz0 6= ∅ 6= Sz0). Thus z0 always features a single price
p0 = p(r0) with r0 = |Bz0 |/|Sz0|.
Our deﬁnition of market institution, however, is rather general. It in-
cludes “classical,” centralized market-clearing institutions as above, but also
many others. The following is an example of a diﬀerent institution that leaves
some traders unmatched but still features a unique trading price.
Example 2. A bazaar is any institution zB that matches buyers and sellers
in pairs and leaves the remaining traders unmatched.
If the number of buyers and sellers at a bazaar are not identical, then
this institution leaves some traders unmatched. In this symmetric setting, if
trade occurs it does so in many sub-markets (each consisting of one buyer and
one seller) but at the same single price given by p(1). There are, however,
also institutions that violate the law of one price, as the following, rather
stylized, example shows.
Example 3. A double one-to-many institution is an institution zD that
always selects a single buyer and a single seller (provided at least two traders
3For example, Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger (2015) study institutions characterized by
a rationing parameter.
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of each type are present) and matches all remaining sellers to the singled-
out buyer and all remaining buyers to the singled-out seller. Hence the
institution selects both a random monopolist and a random monopsonist. If
there is only a single buyer (seller), it matches all sellers (buyers) to that
single buyer (seller). This institution features at most two matching groups
and hence at most two prices. Denote them by p
D
≤ pD. If there are at least
3 sellers and at least 3 buyers at zD, then we have pD < p(1) < pD and the
institution fails the law of one price.
The double one-to-many institution is, in a sense, as far away from a
centralized market-clearing institution as possible. Most of the time zD will
feature two prices, thus violating the law of one price. In sharp contrast to
centralization, the spread between the realized prices will often be large.
1.3.2 Behavioral Assumptions
Traders select an institution where they want to trade from the set of feasible
institutions Z = {z0, z1, . . . , zN}. The state of the learning dynamics is
completely determined by the choices of traders. Recall that there are n
buyers andm sellers, therefore the state space Ω is given by Zn+m. We denote
by ω(k) ∈ Z the institution chosen by trader k in state ω ∈ Ω. For a state
ω ∈ Ω, we write Bz(ω) = {i ∈ B | ω(i) = z} and Sz(ω) = {j ∈ S | ω(j) = z}
for the sets of buyers and sellers currently at z, respectively. The number
of buyers and sellers at z is given by nz(ω) = |Bz(ω)| and mz(ω) = |Sz(ω)|,
respectively. We will also denote nz(ω), mz(ω) by nz, mz if no confusion can
arise.
Given ω, the sets Bz(ω) and Sz(ω), z ∈ Z, determine the distribution of
traders among the available institutions. For each institution z, a potential
matching realization is an element γz = (B
z
i , S
z
i )
ℓz
i=0 ∈ suppMz(Bz, Sz). Let
Γ(ω) = {(γz)z∈Z | γz ∈ suppMz(Bz(ω), Sz(ω)) ∀z ∈ Z}
be the set of vectors of potential realizations with typical element γ ∈ Γ(ω).
We then call Ω = {(ω, γ) | γ ∈ Γ(ω)} the set of (potential) state-matching
pairs.
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For a given state-matching pair (ω, γ) we say that an institution z is
active if γz is non-trivial, and inactive otherwise. Denote by A(ω, γ) the
set of active institutions at (ω, γ). Further, for each institution z ∈ A(ω, γ),
let Tz(ω, γ) = {p
z
1, . . . , p
z
ℓz
} be the set of realized prices at z for (ω, γ).
We assume that traders observe the prices at all institutions. From the
point of view of an individual trader k, the relevant market outcome at (ω, γ)
is given by the pair (p(k), q(k)) containing the price at which he trades and
the quantity he can trade. In our setting, however, if a trader trades at
price p he can trade exactly the quantity he desires (that is, either d(p) or
s(p), depending on his role). Thus, traders are never rationed. Hence, it is
reasonable to base traders’ behavior on the observation of prices only, since
demand and supply given a price will always be fulﬁlled. Note that prices at a
given institution are directly linked to the ratio of buyers to sellers within the
institution’s sub-markets through the local market-clearing condition (LMC).
Speciﬁcally, traders’ behavior in our model is based on the following two
main (and minimalistic) assumptions. First, traders prefer trade over no
trade. Second, buyers prefer lower prices and sellers prefer higher prices. Of
course, these assumptions could be obtained from ﬁrst principles by postu-
lating appropriate utility and proﬁt functions compatible with the supply
and demand functions, or alternatively by deriving decisions from consumer
and producer surplus. We follow here Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger (2010,
2015) and Alós-Ferrer et al. (2010) and base our behavioral model on these
properties only.
We assume that agents look at observed, actually realized outcomes to
(myopically) select an institution in the subsequent period. Traders’ be-
havior is captured by discrete-time, stochastic behavioral rules, which are
mappings specifying the probability of choosing each available institution
given the previous market outcome. We will keep the approach as general as
possible. In particular, the exact choice probabilities will not be important;
rather, the key property of a behavioral rule will be which institutions can
be selected with positive probability. Hence, it will be enough for our anal-
ysis to specify (families of) behavioral rules through the set Sk(ω, γ) ⊆ Z
of institutions which can be chosen with positive probability in the next pe-
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riod if the current state-matching pair is (ω, γ). That is, if (ω, γ) occurs at
time t, trader k will choose some institution in Sk(ω, γ) in t + 1, each one
with positive probability. A similar approach was adopted in Alós-Ferrer and
Weidenholzer (2014).
An example of a behavioral rule is the Imitate-the-Best-Max (IBM) rule
used in Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger (2015). Essentially, for a trader k this
rule is speciﬁed by deﬁning Sk(ω, γ) to be the set of active institutions that are
evaluated best according to some evaluation function reﬂecting the behavioral
fundamentals of the model (e.g., an indirect utility function). While rules of
this type will be an example allowed in our analysis, we adopt a more general
approach.
Our speciﬁcation through the sets Sk(ω, γ) already focuses on families of
behavioral rules, since the exact choice probabilities might vary from rule
to rule without aﬀecting our results. We allow for even larger classes of be-
havioral rules and use an “axiomatic” approach. In other words, rather than
focusing on a speciﬁc behavioral rule, we allow traders to use any behavioral
rule satisfying two general assumptions.
Our ﬁrst behavioral assumption is that traders prefer trade over no trade,
hence traders never switch to inactive institutions if alternative active insti-
tutions are available. Recall that A(ω, γ) denotes the set of active institutions
for a state-matching pair (ω, γ).
ACT. Consider an arbitrary trader k and a state-matching pair (ω, γ). If
k is matched, or if k is unmatched but there is an active institution
z 6= ω(k), then Sk(ω, γ) ⊆ A(ω, γ).
Matched traders are those currently active, i.e. matched and hence al-
lowed to trade. In our setting, matched traders trade positive quantities,
hence a switch to an inactive institution will never be beneﬁcial for the trader
(at least from his myopic perspective). Under ACT traders never switch to
institutions that are inactive at the current state-matching pair as long as
there is at least one alternative active institution available. For unmatched
traders, ACT only applies if there is actually some active institution other
than the one the trader is currently at. The reason is that, if a trader is
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unmatched but all other institutions are inactive, there is no clear (myopic)
advantage to staying in the only active institution for the trader, and requir-
ing to stay in the current institution would be unnecessarily restrictive.
For each trader k denote the price at which he trades by p(k) (if he does
trade); we abuse notation here by dropping the obvious dependence on (ω, γ).
In the absence of rationing, any sensible model based on ﬁrst principles will
lead to the conclusion that buyers prefer low prices and sellers prefer high
prices. Following this logic an institution z is “attractive” for a trader k if all
the prices realized at z are weakly better for k than p(k), the price at which
he currently trades. In this case, a myopic trader will expect not to be worse
oﬀ at z.
Definition 3. Consider an arbitrary trader k and an institution z 6= ω(k)
with set of realized prices Tz at (ω, γ).
• For a matched trader k trading at price p(k), we say z is attractive
for k at (ω, γ) if Tz 6= ∅ and all p ∈ Tz are weakly better than p(k) for
k (that is, p(k) ≤ p ∀ p ∈ Tz if k is a seller, p(k) ≥ p ∀ p ∈ Tz if k is a
buyer).
• For an unmatched trader k, we say that z is attractive for trader k
at (ω, γ) if z is active.
Our second main behavioral assumption states that if an institution z
is attractive to some trader in the sense described above this trader will (at
least with some positive probability) leave his current institution, for instance
(but not necessarily) towards z.4
SELF. Consider an arbitrary trader k and a state-matching pair (ω, γ). If
there exists an institution other than ω(k) that is attractive for k, then
with positive probability k switches to some active institution z 6= ω(k),
that is, (Sk(ω, γ) \ {ω(k)}) ∩ A(ω, γ) 6= ∅. If k is unmatched and all
4Requiring the trader to move to z with positive probability whenever z is attractive
would be unnecessarily restrictive. For instance, it would exclude all rules of the Imitate-
the-Best-Max type, where the best institution according to some criterion is the only one
selected even if there are several attractive ones.
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institutions other than ω(k) are inactive, then Sk(ω, γ) = Z, i.e. k has
positive probability of switching to every institution.
On the one hand, SELF is quite conservative in evaluating other insti-
tutions because it just requires a trader to leave his current institution with
positive probability only if there exists another institution where all prices
are “better” for the trader. It is, however, less conservative regarding the eval-
uation of the current institution because only the price at which the trader
is actually trading is used for comparison purposes (in the sense of Deﬁni-
tion 3). That is, the condition incorporates a form of self bias because the
trader’s actual decision might occasionally be triggered by the comparison of
his own price (outcome) with the outcomes at another institution, neglect-
ing outcomes of other traders at his own institution. Note, however, that
SELF is just a suﬃcient condition for switching institutions with positive
probability, but not a necessary one. That is, it only requires that traders
do not stay with probability one if an attractive institution exists, but not
that they always switch. The probability with which they leave can be very
small. That is, SELF still allows for rationalistic rules where traders take
all prices into account and perform complex computations to determine their
next move, but with some small probability bolt into action if they see that
their own price at the current institution is unsatisfactory.
For example, the following behavioral rule would fulﬁll both ACT and
SELF. Compute the average price at each active institution, taking all prices
into account, and move to the one with the best average (largest for sellers,
smallest for buyers). In case the current institution is the best according to
this criterion, but there exists an attractive institution (in the sense of Deﬁ-
nition 3), switch there with a ﬁxed (small) probability δ. If k is unmatched
and all institutions other than ω(k) are inactive, then randomize uniformly
among all institutions.
1.3.3 Learning Dynamics
We study a dynamic learning model where traders interact repeatedly in
discrete time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . In each period traders observe all prices realized
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at all institutions in the previous period. Based on this information each
trader k chooses an institution to trade at according to a behavioral rule Sk
(possibly diﬀerent across traders). Following traders’ institutional choices,
matchings and prices are determined at all institutions and demand and
supply are realized. At the end of each period the proceeds of trade are
consumed. Next period, demand and supply functions are reset, i.e. the
game is played recurrently.
Agents are potentially allowed to revise their decisions (choice of institu-
tion) in any period, but might uphold their decisions (inertia) in some. The
speciﬁcation of how and when revision opportunities arise is an integral part
of evolutionary dynamics. Results that are fragile with respect to minor vari-
ations regarding the speciﬁcations of the revision process could be criticized
as lacking robustness (see, e.g., Alós-Ferrer and Netzer, 2015). We therefore
refrain from imposing a speciﬁc form of how revision opportunities arise, but
rather consider a general class of random revision processes that satisfy cer-
tain “minimal” assumptions, following Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger (2015).
Denote by E(k, ω) the event that agent k receives revision opportunity in
state ω, and by E∗(k, ω) the event that agent k is the only agent of his type
with revision opportunity at ω. We allow for any speciﬁcation of revision
opportunities that satisfy the following two assumptions. For every trader k
and state ω,
D1. Pr(E∗(k, ω)) > 0.
D2. either Pr(E∗(k, ω)
⋂
E∗(k′, ω)) > 0 for any trader k′ of the other type,
or Pr(E∗(k, ω)
⋂
E(k′, ω)) = 0 for all such k′.
The ﬁrst condition ensures that in any state any trader has positive prob-
ability of being able to revise. Further, it requires that there is always a small
probability that only one trader is allowed to revise. The second condition
implies some form of independence of revision opportunities between buyers
and sellers. Speciﬁcally, the assumption implies that there is no correlation
in the presence of revision opportunities as there would be if, e.g., a pair
formed by one buyer and one seller would always receive them together.
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One could also consider stronger conditions on the dynamics, at the ex-
pense of generality. In particular, consider the following additional assump-
tion on revision opportunities.
D3. Pr
(⋂
k∈B E(k, ω)
)
> 0 and Pr
(⋂
k∈S E(k, ω)
)
> 0.
Condition D3 requires that there is always some positive probability that
all buyers (respectively all sellers) revise simultaneously. Intuitively, this
makes the dynamics relatively quick, since a whole market side might switch
in a single period. Dynamics with independent inertia (meaning that in any
period every agent has a positive, independent probability of not being able
to adjust) satisfy D3, but dynamics with asynchronous learning (meaning
that each period a single agent is randomly chosen and only that agent is
allowed to revise) not. We will not assume D3, but we will return to this
condition later for a particular result.
1.4 Analysis
1.4.1 Absorbing States
We consider a family of learning processes satisfying the assumptions laid out
above, that is, a behavioral rule satisfying ACT and SELF together with a
revision process satisfyingD1 andD2. Given two states ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, denote by
P 0(ω, ω′) the probability of transition from ω to ω′ in one period for a ﬁxed
learning process, which we will refer to as the unperturbed dynamics.5
The transition matrix is given by P 0 = [P 0(ω, ω′)]ω,ω′∈Ω. An absorbing set of
the unperturbed dynamics is a minimal subset of states which, once entered,
is never abandoned. An absorbing state is an element which forms a singleton
absorbing set, i.e. P 0(ω, ω) = 1.
We ﬁrst introduce some terminology. A state ω determines the sets of
buyers Bz and sellers Sz at each institution z ∈ Z. Thus (Mz(Sz, Bz))z∈Z
induces a probability distribution over vectors of realizations Γ(ω). In what
5Of course the actual transition probabilities depend on the speciﬁc behavioral rule,
but in what follows we drop this dependence to increase readability.
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follows we adopt the notation Pr(Bz0 = ∅ | ω) to denote the probability
(conditional on the state ω) of the set of matchings of the form γ = (γz)z∈Z
with γz = (B
z
i , S
z
i )
ℓz
i=0 such that B
z
0 = ∅. Other expressions of this type are
deﬁned analogously. Last, we say an institution z matches all traders at
ω if Pr(Bz0 ∪ S
z
0 = ∅ | ω) = 1, i.e. there is no state-matching pair (ω, γ)
with unmatched traders at z (analogously, we will also speak of institutions
“matching all buyers” or “all sellers”).
A particular class of states will be of speciﬁc interest. Given an arbitrary
institution z, the monomorphic state ωz is the state where Bz = B and
Sz = S, i.e. all traders are at z. Monomorphic states are absorbing states,
provided the institution manages not to leave traders unmatched when all
traders choose that institution. The reason is simple. Since all traders are
at z, all other institutions are inactive. If all traders at z are matched, by
ACT they will stay at z.
Lemma 1. Let Z be an arbitrary set of institutions. Assume ACT. For
every institution z that matches all traders at ωz, the monomorphic state ωz
is an absorbing state.
This result already indicates that in general there will be a multiplicity of
absorbing states, at least one per each institution which avoids unmatched
traders in case of full coordination. Additionally, in general there might be
non-singleton absorbing sets. Absorbing sets and states, however, are just
an intermediate and not always necessary step of the analysis, as we are
interested in the long-run stability of outcomes. To study the latter, it is not
always necessary to characterize the former, especially if techniques along
the lines of Ellison (2000) are used.
1.4.2 Stochastic Stability
Our analysis of the learning dynamics follows a stochastic stability approach
using methods and concepts introduced by Kandori et al. (1993) and Young
(1993). Detailed overviews can be found, e.g., in Samuelson (1997), Fuden-
berg and Levine (1998), Young (1998), and Sandholm (2010). In our context,
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we aim to analyze the stability of situations where traders coordinate on par-
ticular trading institutions. To this purpose, the dynamics is enriched with
a perturbation in the form of experiments (or mistakes) in the following way.
With an independent, small probability ε > 0, each agent, in each period,
might discard the prescriptions of his behavioral rule and experiment (or
make a mistake, or “mutate”). In that case, the trader simply picks an insti-
tution at random, independently of other considerations, with all institutions
having positive probability.
The dynamics with experimentation is called the perturbed dynamics.
Its transition matrix is denoted by P ε. Since experiments make transitions
between any two states possible, the perturbed process has a single absorbing
set formed by the whole state space (i.e., the process is irreducible). There
is a unique probability distribution over states µε ∈ ∆(Ω) which, if taken as
initial condition, would be reproduced in probabilistic terms after updating
(more precisely, µεP
ε = µε). This µε is called the invariant distribution
of P ε. For the perturbed dynamics P ε the limit invariant distribution
µ∗ = limε→0 µε exists and is an invariant distribution of the unperturbed
dynamics P 0 (see e.g. Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993; Ellison, 2000).
The states in the support of µ∗, i.e. {ω ∈ Ω | µ∗(ω) > 0} are the stochas-
tically stable states or long-run equilibria. Standard results (see e.g.
Ellison, 2000, Theorem 1) then imply that the set of stochastically stable
states is a union of some absorbing sets of the original, unperturbed chain
(ε = 0). In other words, stochastic stability selects among the absorbing sets
of the unperturbed dynamics.6
To simplify terminology, we will say that a institution z is stochasti-
cally stable if ωz is stochastically stable. Note, however, that the set of
stochastically stable states might not be a singleton, for example if several
market institutions are stochastically stable.
6In the following, whenever we say absorbing sets or states, we refer to the unperturbed
dynamics. Since the perturbed dynamics is irreducible, no confusion should arise.
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1.4.3 The Stability of Centralized Institutions
The centralized, market-clearing institution z0 always matches all traders
and features a unique price (recall Example 1). Our ﬁrst result is that this
institution is always stochastically stable, independently of how many and
which other institutions are also available.
The proof of this result proceeds in two steps. Let ω0 be the monomorphic
state with full coordination at z0. First, the following lemma, whose proof is
in Appendix 1.A, shows that from any state (monomorphic or not) where z0
is active, there is a dynamic pressure towards coordination on this institution.
This results in a positive probability path towards the monomorphic state
where all agents are at z0.
Lemma 2. Let Z be an arbitrary set of institutions with z0 ∈ Z. Under D1,
D2, ACT, and SELF, for any state-matching pair (ω, γ) where z0 is active,
there is a positive-probability path (of the unperturbed dynamics) leading to
ω0.
Intuitively, Lemma 2 makes use of the fact that z0 satisﬁes the law of one
price featuring always a single price p only. For a given alternative institution
z, p is then either larger than all prices at z, making z0 attractive for all
sellers, or smaller than all prices at z, making z0 attractive for all buyers, or
there exist prices at this institution that are both larger and smaller than p,
making z0 attractive for at least one buyer and one seller. This property can
then be used iteratively to construct a path towards full-coordination on z0
as stated in Lemma 2.
The last step relies on standard results from the stochastic stability liter-
ature (see Appendix 1.A). Essentially, the intuition is as follows. From any
state, a few traders experimenting with z0 suﬃce to make this institution
active. In view of Lemma 2, it is hence easy to construct a path towards
ω0. This strong property allows us to complete the analysis without needing,
for instance, a full characterization of the absorbing sets of the unperturbed
dynamics, because they can all be easily destabilized independently of their
particular characteristics (except for the singleton {ω0}). However, in order
to destabilize ω0 (which is absorbing by Lemma 1), it is necessary to have
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a large number of traders experimenting away, so that z0 becomes inactive;
else, by Lemma 2 again, the dynamics will lead back to ω0 with positive
probability and without further experiments.
Theorem 1. Let Z be an arbitrary set of institutions with z0 ∈ Z. Under
D1, D2, ACT, and SELF, the centralized institution z0 is stochastically
stable.
We conclude that centralized market clearing displays rather strong sta-
bility properties, in the sense that such institutions will survive in the long
run independently of what other trading coordination opportunities are avail-
able. Indeed, Theorem 1 holds independently of how many other institutions
are available and what their characteristics are. Further, the result holds
independently of trader characteristics, as captured by demand and supply
functions, and independently of the exact details of the behavioral rules and
the speciﬁcation of the dynamics as long as our basic conditions hold.
Note that there might very well be several centralized institutions avail-
able, and by Theorem 1 any such institution is then stochastically stable.
In general, other institutions might also be stable, and their stability might
depend on trader characteristics and the speciﬁcation of the dynamics. The
following subsections illustrate which and when other institutions are and
are not stochastically stable.
1.4.4 Matching-Eﬃcient Institutions
In the next step we seek to establish that many institutions are always
stochastically unstable in our setting. In fact, a necessary condition for
stochastic stability of an institution is that at or near full coordination on
that institution, there should be no unmatched traders. This is captured by
the following concept (recall that the number of buyers and sellers at z is
given by nz(ω) = |Bz(ω)| and mz(ω) = |Sz(ω)|, respectively).
Definition 4. An institution z is matching-efficient if the following three
conditions hold.
• z matches all traders at ωz;
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• at every state ω with (nz(ω), mz(ω)) = (n,m−1), z matches all buyers
with probability one; and
• at every state ω with (nz(ω), mz(ω)) = (n− 1, m), z matches all sellers
with probability one.
Proposition 1. Let Z be an arbitrary set of institutions with z0 ∈ Z. As-
sume D1, D2, ACT, and SELF. If an institution z ∈ Z is stochastically
stable, then it must be matching-efficient.
To illustrate the intuition behind Proposition 1, consider an institution
z that does not match all traders at ωz, i.e. the ﬁrst condition in Deﬁnition
4 fails. There is at least one unmatched trader k ∈ Sz ∪ Bz at ωz. As all
other institutions are inactive, by SELF there is positive probability that
k switches to any other institution, for instance to z0. We thus reach a
state where a trader is at z0. From this state, a single mutation (a trader
of the other type switching to z0) is enough for z0 to become active. By
Lemma 2, the process then drifts to ω0 with positive probability. However,
reaching ωz from ω0 requires destabilizing ω0, which as commented above is
not easy. It follows that ωz is easier to leave than to reach. Standard results
in stochastic stability (Ellison, 2000) are then enough to establish that ωz is
not stochastically stable.
Proposition 1 states that matching all traders at states where “almost
all” traders are at a given institution is a necessary condition for stochastic
stability. As a consequence, many institutions are unstable. The following
example shows that the bazaar is one of them.
Example 4. Consider the bazaar of Example 2, zB, and let ωB be the corre-
sponding monomorphic state. If n 6= m, there must be an unmatched trader
at ωB. If n = m, then there is no unmatched trader at ωB, but at any
state with (nz, mz) = (n,m− 1) a buyer is unmatched and at any state with
(nz, mz) = (n − 1, m) a seller is unmatched. Therefore, the bazaar is not
matching-eﬃcient and can never be stochastically stable.
This is natural in our setting, because since we concentrate exclusively on
matchings and not, say, price biases, the bazaar is just the institution which
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matches traders in pairs, all of them obtaining the same price. This aspect
of the bazaar (matching groups as pairs) leads to instability. Actually, the
argument above can be generalized to show that no institution with ﬁxed
group size can be stochastically stable.
Strikingly, under the additional assumptionD3 on revision opportunities,
we obtain a full characterization of stochastically stable, non-trivial institu-
tions, because the necessary condition to be matching-eﬃcient becomes also
suﬃcient.
Theorem 2. Let Z be an arbitrary set of institutions with z0 ∈ Z. Assume
D1–D3, ACT, and SELF. A non-trivial institution z ∈ Z is stochastically
stable if and only if it is matching-efficient.
Since matching-eﬃciency is a relatively weak condition, Theorem 2 reveals
that a large class of institutions is stochastically stable for quick dynamics.
This should not be overinterpreted, though. The results of Theorem 2 depend
heavily on the speed of the dynamics since a quick enough dynamics allows
the process to “jump over” unstable states. As we will show below, this result
fails for slower dynamics.
Further, as already commented above, matching-eﬃciency does exclude
a relatively large number of potential institutions. For instance, consider
one-sided institutions which try to implement price biases in favor of only
one side. The only way to implement such an outcome is to leave traders
unmatched, in particular in the case of full coordination.
1.4.5 Optimism, Pessimism, and Decentralized Institutions
To better understand the scope of the results, it is worth brieﬂy exploring
the behavioral assumptions, and in particular SELF. Remember that this
assumption states that, if all the prices realized at an institution z are weakly
better for a trader k than the price p(k) at which that trader is currently
trading, there is some positive probability that k leaves his current institu-
tion to some active one, for instance to z. One natural possibility yielding
alternative assumptions is to capture more optimistic or pessimistic behavior.
Consider the following possibility.
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OPT. Consider an arbitrary trader k and a state-matching pair (ω, γ). If
k is matched and there is an institution z 6= ω(k) that features some
price that is weakly better than p(k) (larger for k ∈ S, smaller for
k ∈ B), then there is positive probability that k switches to some active
institution other than ω(k). If k is unmatched, then k has positive
probability of switching to every institution.
Under this (extreme) assumption, a trader can be interpreted as being
optimistic because he focuses on the better prices at z, ignoring the ones
worse than p(k). For instance, if he actually switches to z, one interpretation
is that after switching the trader believes that he will be able to achieve the
best observed outcome at the new institution even if, in the previous period,
it was only obtained by some traders there. Obviously, OPT implies SELF
and the results derived above hold. In particular, in the presence of D3, the
characterization of stochastically stable institutions identiﬁed in Proposition
2 remains unchanged.
For general dynamics (in the absence ofD3), Theorem 1 shows that, given
ACT and SELF, a centralized institution is stochastically stable indepen-
dently of the details of the dynamics, of which other institutions are avail-
able and of what their speciﬁc characteristics are. If SELF is strengthened
to OPT, it can be shown that all other matching-eﬃcient but decentralized
institutions are stochastically stable for all possible dynamics and alternative
institutions. That is, a characterization as that in Theorem 2 holds.
Proposition 2. Let Z be an arbitrary set of institutions with z0 ∈ Z. Under
D1, D2, ACT, and OPT a non-trivial institution z ∈ Z is stochastically
stable if and only if it is matching-efficient.
To gain some quick intuition, consider for example the double one-to-
many institution zD (recall Example 3). This institution usually features two
prices which are highly asymmetric (a monopolistic price and a monopsonistic
one). Hence, zD is rarely attractive for conservative traders as they require
both prices to be better than the one they trade at. However, for optimistic
traders this asymmetry makes zD always appealing for at least one market
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side. Thus OPT facilitates a transition towards the double one-to-many
institution rendering it a long-run equilibrium for general learning dynamics.
The result above is instructive for the general research agenda, since it
does not rely on restrictions on the dynamics but rather concentrates on
a subclass of behavioral rules. For instance, as long as behavioral rules
fulﬁlling OPT are considered reasonable, Proposition 2 shows that there is
no reasonable strengthening of the current assumptions which would render
centralized institutions uniquely stochastically stable.
Results as Proposition 2 are of course less robust than Theorem 1, as they
hinge on more restrictive assumptions. One can conceive other behavioral
rules or dynamics for which the alternative institutions fail to be stable in
the long run. Consider, for instance, a pessimistic behavioral rule as follows.
PES. Consider an arbitrary trader k and a state-matching pair (ω, γ). If
there exists an institution other than ω(k) that is attractive for k, then
k switches to an institution z 6= ω(k) with positive probability if and
only if z is attractive for k. If k is unmatched and all institutions other
than ω(k) are inactive, then k has positive probability of switching to
every institution.
Obviously, if a behavioral rule satisﬁes PES, it also fulﬁlls SELF, but it
must violateOPT (note that PES also implies ACT). A trader fulﬁlling this
assumption can be interpreted as being overly cautious, since he will never
switch to an institution where some realized price is worse than the one he is
currently trading at. Since the double one-to-many institution is matching-
eﬃcient it follows from Theorem 2 that it is also stochastically stable under
PES, provided the dynamics fulﬁlls D3. However, under slower dynamics,
this result is not true any more.
Proposition 3. Let Z = {z0, zD} and n,m > 3. Assume PES. Under asyn-
chronous learning, the double one-to-many institution zD is not stochastically
stable.
In general, the intuition is that for slow dynamics and pessimistic (or
cautious) behavioral rules, the attractiveness of the double one-to-many in-
stitution vanishes and this institution fails to be stochastically stable. Again,
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this result is instructive. While for fast dynamics (fulﬁlling D3) a full, simple
characterization of the class of stochastically stable institutions is feasible (as
given by Theorem 2), the results above prove that for general dynamics such
a simple characterization is impossible. Institutions as the double one-to-
many example are stochastically stable for all dynamics and certain types of
behavioral rules fulﬁlling SELF, but stop being stochastically stable for the
same dynamics and other types of behavioral rules which, however, do fulﬁll
SELF. Hence, there simply exists no characterization in the absence of as-
sumptions on the speed of the dynamics beyond D1–D2 and in the absence
of stronger assumptions on the behavioral rules.
1.5 Conclusion
This contribution is a parsimonious step in the study of the selection of
market institutions by boundedly rational traders. Our results have been
obtained in a setting which is as general as possible in some dimensions
(dynamics, trader behavior) but remains necessarily stylized in others. Ac-
cordingly, they pave the way for a number of possible extensions which are
currently in our research agenda. First, the basic result can be used to study
market design under asymmetric rationality as in Alós-Ferrer et al. (2010).
Second, combining the results here with Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger (2015)
should allow to study more realistic institutions which combine restrictions
on trader matching and price biases (rationing). Third, trader heterogeneity
and multiple goods can be incorporated, either in buyer-seller models or in
general equilibrium settings along the lines of Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger
(2010).
Appendix 1.A: Proofs
We start with some preliminary results. Given two absorbing sets A and B,
denote by c(A,B) the minimal number of mistakes required for a transition
from A to B, called the transition cost from A to B. Note that any transition
along a path that has positive probability under the unperturbed dynamics
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has a cost of zero; we refer to such paths as positive-probability paths. To
show stochastic stability we use the following result, which is a straightfor-
ward adaptation of results in Ellison (2000, Theorem 3) (see also Alós-Ferrer
and Kirchsteiger, 2010, Lemma 2).7
Lemma 3. Let A be an absorbing set and define the Radius of A by
R(A) = min{c(A,B) | B is an absorbing set , B 6= A}
and the Coradius of A by
CR(A) = max{c(B,A) | B is an absorbing set, B 6= A}
Then
(a) If R(A) ≥ CR(A), the states in A are stochastically stable.
(b) If R(A) > CR(A), the only stochastically stable states are those in A.
(c) If the states in an absorbing set B are stochastically stable and R(A) =
c(B,A), the states in A are also stochastically stable.
(d) If B is an absorbing set with c(B,A) < R(A), then B is not stochasti-
cally stable.
We say that an institution z is a single-price institution if the set of
realized prices Tz is a singleton at any (ω, γ) such that z is active. We
now prove a preliminary result for single-price institutions. Lemma 4 shows
that if active, a single-price institution is always attractive for at least some
traders.8
Lemma 4. Consider a state-matching pair (ω, γ) where both a single-price
institution z and another institution z′ 6= z are active. Then (at least) one
of the following cases holds.
7Ellison (2000) credits Evans (1993) with the introduction of the radius-coradius con-
cept.
8This does not hold for an arbitrary decentralized institution. For example, suppose
there are two active institutions z and z′ with p
z
< p
z′
< pz < pz′ . Then none of the cases
from Lemma 4 applies. The crucial part of Lemma 4 is that, given a ﬁxed, single-price
institution z, it can be applied to z and any other institution z′.
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(i) z is attractive for all buyers at z′ (and z′ is attractive for all sellers
at z),
(ii) z is attractive for all sellers at z′ (and z′ is attractive for all buyers
at z), or
(iii) there exist a buyer i and seller j at z′ such that z is attractive for
both i and j.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let z be a single-price institution. Fix a state-matching
pair (ω, γ) with z, z′ ∈ A(ω, γ) and let p be the (unique) price at z. Clearly
Tz′ 6= ∅ as z
′ is active. Further, p is larger than all prices in Tz′ (resulting
in case (i)), or p is smaller than all prices in Tz′ (resulting in case (ii)), or p
lies (weakly) between two prices at z′, i.e. there exists p′, p′ ∈ Tz′ such that
p′ ≤ p ≤ p′. In the latter case, there is a buyer at z′ trading at price p′ that
is (weakly) lower than p, and a seller at z′ trading at price p′ that is (weakly)
higher than p, hence we are in case (iii). 
We now prove the results in Subsection 1.4.3. Note that a centralized
institution is also a single-price institution, hence Lemma 4 applies. The
proof of Lemma 2 makes use of Lemma 4 in an iterative fashion.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let z0 ∈ Z. Fix a state-matching pair (ω, γ) where z0 is
active. If z0 is the only active institution, then all traders currently not at
z0 are unmatched. Thus z0 is attractive for all these unmatched traders. By
SELF, given revision opportunity any such trader leaves his current insti-
tution with positive probability towards some active institution, i.e. towards
z0. On the other hand, by ACT no trader leaves z0 as all are matched and
there is no other active institution. As a consequence we reach a state where
all traders are at z0, which yields a positive probability path to ω0 from any
state where only z0 is active.
Now suppose that another institution z 6= z0 is active at (ω, γ). By
Lemma 4, there are three cases to consider.
Case (i). z0 is attractive for all k ∈ Bz (and z is attractive for all k ∈ Sz0).
Let j ∈ Bz be a buyer. Since z0 is attractive for j, by SELF there is
positive probability that, given revision opportunity, j will leave z to some
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active institution zˆ 6= z. By D1, with positive probability j is the only trader
of his type revising this period. Further, by D2 either no seller gets revision
opportunity, or there is positive probability that only j and some i ∈ Sz get
revision opportunity. Hence, with positive probability the process reaches a
new state with strictly less traders at z.
Case (ii). z0 is attractive for all k ∈ Sz (and z is attractive for all k ∈ Bz0).
This case is analogous to case (i).
Case (iii). There exist traders j ∈ Bz and i ∈ Sz such that z0 is attractive
for i and j.
By SELF there is positive probability that given revision opportunity i
and j leave z to some active institution zˆ 6= z. Moreover, by D1 and D2
there is positive probability that either only i, or only j, or only i and j are
allowed to revise this period. Hence, with positive probability the process
reaches a new state with strictly less traders at z.
Our goal is to iteratively construct a positive-probability path from ω
to a state ω′ where z0 is the only active institution. We have just shown
that in all possible cases there is a positive-probability transition from ω to
a new state ω1 with strictly less traders at z, in which no empty institution,
i.e. an institution with zero buyers and zero sellers, has become non-empty
(as traders only leave z towards active institutions). If z is still active we
can apply exactly the same reasoning to this new state ω1 to construct a
positive-probability path to a state ω2 with strictly less traders at z than in
ω1. Continuing in this fashion, after a ﬁnite number of steps we eventually
reach a state where either no buyer or no seller remains active at z, thus we
have reached a state where z is inactive. In particular, all remaining traders
at z are unmatched and by SELF leave z towards an active institution if
given revision opportunity, hence we can reach a state ωr where z is empty,
hence inactive. In particular, the number of non-empty institutions is strictly
smaller. If there is another active institution z′ at (ωr, γr), we can repeat
the whole argument and thus obtain a positive-probability path to a state
where also z′ is empty. Proceeding iteratively in this fashion, we can ﬁnally
construct a positive-probability path to a state ω′ where z0 is the only active
institution. This completes the proof. 
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Proof of Theorem 1. Let z0 ∈ Z. We ﬁrst observe that {ω0} is absorbing by
Lemma 1 since z0 always matches all traders, in particular at ω0. From any
given absorbing set two mutations (a buyer and a seller) suﬃce to reach a
state where z0 is active. By Lemma 2 the state ω0 can then be reached from
this state without further mutations. Hence CR({ω0}) ≤ 2.
On the other hand, by ACT the state ω0 cannot be left with just one
mutation. It follows that R({ω0}) ≥ 2. Hence applying Lemma 3(a), it
follows that ω0 is stochastically stable. 
We now turn to the proofs of results in Subsections 1.4.4 and 1.4.5.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let z0 ∈ Z. Consider a matching-ineﬃcient institu-
tion z. One of the following conditions holds.
• z does not match all traders at ωz.
• At some state with (nz, mz) = (n,m− 1), z leaves a buyer unmatched
with positive probability.
• At some state with (nz, mz) = (n − 1, m), z leaves a seller unmatched
with positive probability.
In the ﬁrst case, there exists a state-matching pair (ωz, γ) with k ∈ Sz∪Bz
unmatched. Then every institution other than z is inactive, hence, by SELF
k will switch to any institution, in particular z0, with positive probability.
Now one mutation from a trader k′ ∈ Sz ∪ Bz of the other market side is
suﬃcient to make z0 active.
For the other two cases, a state ω with (nz, mz) ∈ {(n,m−1), (n−1, m)}
can be reached by one mutation towards z0. Now there exists a state-
matching pair (ω, γ) with an unmatched buyer k ∈ Bz, respectively an un-
matched seller k ∈ Sz, and by SELF the unmatched buyer, respectively
seller, switches to z0 with positive probability so that z0 becomes active.
In any case, one mutation from ωz suﬃces to reach a state from which, by
Lemma 2, ω0 can be reached without further mutations. Hence c(ωz, ω0) =
1 < 2 ≤ R(ω0) and by Lemma 3(d) it follows that ωz is not stochastically
stable. 
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Proof of Theorem 2. Let z0 ∈ Z. Any stochastically stable institution must
be matching-eﬃcient by Proposition 1. To see the converse, let z ∈ Z be a
non-trivial institution that is matching-eﬃcient. Suppose we are in ω0 and a
single buyer j and seller i mutate switching to z so that it becomes active.
In this new state ω there is only one buyer and one seller at z, hence they
must be matched with positive probability by non-triviality of z and we have
Tz(ω, γ) = {p(1)} for some (ω, γ).
Let p0(ω) be the price at z0 in state ω. If p0(ω) ≤ p(1) (p0(ω) ≥ p(1)),
then z is attractive for all k ∈ Sz0 (k ∈ Bz0) and A(ω, γ) \ {z0} = {z},
hence by SELF every member of the respective market side at z0 will switch
to z (the only active institution) with positive probability, given revision
opportunity. ByD3, with positive probability all members of the appropriate
market side revise simultaneously, leading to a state with either nz = n or
mz = m; hence, z0 becomes inactive. In particular, no other institution
can become active and z is active by non-triviality, hence z is the only active
institution. If after this transition there are still traders at z0, again by SELF
all remaining members of the other market side (they are all unmatched)
follow with positive probability if given revision opportunity, which happens
with positive probability by D3. We hence reach the state ωz. Since ω0
cannot be left with less than two mutations we obtain c(ω0, ωz) = 2.
On the other hand, by ACT ωz cannot be left with less than two muta-
tions as it is matching-eﬃcient, while two mutations suﬃce for a transition
towards ω0 (as in the proof of Theorem 1), hence R(ωz) = 2. Thus ωz is
stochastically stable by Lemma 3(c). 
Proof of Proposition 2. First note that, by Proposition 1, and since OPT
implies SELF, every non-trivial, stochastically stable institution must be
matching-eﬃcient. Hence we only need to prove the converse.
By Theorem 1, z0 is stochastically stable. Let z ∈ Z be a matching-
eﬃcient, non-trivial institution, z 6= z0. To show that z is also stochastically
stable, by Lemma 3(c) it suﬃces to show that c(ω0, ωz) = R(ωz). By Lemma
1, ωz is an absorbing state because, by matching eﬃciency, it matches all
traders at ωz. By ACT, ωz cannot be left with less than two mutations.
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However, two mutations suﬃce to leave ωz towards ω0 (recall Lemma 2). It
follows that R(ωz) = 2.
Next, we show that ωz can be reached from ω0 with two mutations. Start-
ing at ω0, two mutations (a buyer and a seller) are suﬃcient to reach a state
ω where z is active. We now iteratively construct a path from ω to ωz.
Consider a state ω′ where z0 and z are active, and all other institutions are
empty. Let p0 be the (unique) price at z0 and consider a price p ∈ Tz. Then
p ≤ p0 or p0 ≤ p, hence it is either weakly better for buyers at z0 or weakly
better for sellers at z0. By OPT any member k of the respective market
side at z0 will switch to z (as it is the only active institution other than z0)
with positive probability, given revision opportunity. By D1, with positive
probability k is the only trader of his type revising this period. Further,
by D2 either with positive probability k is the only trader with revision
opportunity, or with positive probability only k and some k′ of the other
market side who is currently at z0 receive revision opportunities. Hence, we
can reach a new state with strictly more traders at z (at least k switches
to z) where no other institution than z0 and z is active (by ACT k
′ either
switches to z or stays at z0).
Applying this argument iteratively yields a positive-probability path from
ω to a state where all buyers or all sellers are at z, hence z0 is inactive. All
remaining traders at z0 (if there are any) are unmatched, hence switch to the
only active institution z by OPT, given revision opportunity. We have thus
constructed a positive-probability path leading to ωz that requires only two
mutations. This shows that c(ω0, ωz) = 2 and completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let Z = {z0, zD} and assume n,m > 3. Since only z0
and zD are available, R(ω0) = c(ω0, ωD). Thus, by Lemma 3(d), it suﬃces to
show that c(ωD, ω0) < c(ω0, ωD). As in the proof of Theorem 1, c(ωD, ω0) = 2.
We have to show that a transition from ω0 to ωD requires at least three
mutations. By contradiction, suppose there is a path from ω0 to ωD that
requires at most two mutations. Under asynchronous learning in any transi-
tion along the path at most one trader can switch institutions at the same
time. Along this path zD has to become active, but by ACT no trader at z0
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can switch to zD as long as it is inactive, which is the case at ω0. Hence the
path has to involve two mutations (a buyer and a seller) from ω0 to the ﬁrst
state in the path where zD is active. Note that, since n,m > 3 and only two
mutations are possible, these transitions do not render z0 inactive.
Hence, the path from ω0 to ωD cannot involve any further mutation.
At some point along this path, z0 has to become inactive, hence the path
needs to contain a transition (without mutation) from a state ω where z0 is
active to a state ω′ where z0 is inactive. If zD were inactive at ω, it would
not be attractive for any trader at z0 (as z0 is active at ω), hence by PES
the transition from ω to ω′ could only occur via an additional mistake, a
contradiction. Hence zD must be active at ω.
The transition from ω to ω′ involves a single trader switching from z0 to
zD. Suppose this trader is a buyer (the case of a seller is symmetric). That
is, n0(ω) = 1, n0(ω
′) = 0, and m0(ω
′) = m0(ω) ≥ 1. By PES, zD must be
attractive at ω for the buyer switching from z0 to zD, that is, p0 ≥ p for all
p ∈ TzD(ω).
As zD is active at ω it either features a single price pD = p(n − 1) (for
mD(ω) = 1), or it features two prices pD ≤ pD with pD = p(n − 2) (for
mD(ω) > 1). Since n ≥ 4 and p(r) is strictly increasing in r, it follows that
pD ≥ p(2) and pD ≥ p(2). On the other hand, the single price p0 at z0
in state ω is given by p0 = p(
1
m0(ω)
) ≤ p(1) as m0(ω) ≥ 1. It follows that
p0 ≤ p(1) < p(2) ≤ min{pD, pD}, a contradiction to p0 ≥ p for all p ∈ TzD(ω).
We have thus shown that a transition from ω to ω′ requires at least three
mutations. Therefore c(ω0, ωD) ≥ 3, implying that zD is not stochastically
stable.

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Cournot vs. Walras: A Reappraisal through Simulations
2.1 Introduction
One of the main objectives of industrial organization is to determine to which
extent do market outcomes deviate from the competitive, welfare-maximizing
ideal. Both theoretical predictions and empirically estimated outcomes are
measured against the perfectly competitive benchmark. The study of mar-
ket outcomes, however, cannot be disentangled from individual behavior.
Consider the case of quantity competition in oligopolistic markets (Cournot
oligopolies). Perfectly competitive outcomes (Walrasian equilibria) obtain if
individual behavior aims to maximize individual proﬁts under the constraint
that market prices are taken as given (which is a form of bounded ratio-
nality). In contrast, best-reply behavior underlies Cournot-Nash equilibria,
where consumer welfare is lower and industry proﬁts are larger than in the
Walrasian case. Joint proﬁt maximization leads to collusive outcomes, the
mere suspicion of which might trigger market-regulation interventions.
Firm managers are often motivated by relative-performance concerns,
that is, the comparison with the competition’s outcomes. It is well-known
that such concerns go hand-in-glove with imitative behavior, that is, mim-
icking the behavior of the best performers. In a seminal paper Vega-Redondo
(1997) showed that imitative behavior in a noisy evolutionary Cournot oligopoly
leads to the selection of the perfectly competitive Walrasian outcome where
price equals marginal cost. Formally, in a discrete-time, ﬁnite-population
stochastic dynamics where ﬁrms imitate best performers and make occa-
sional mistakes, the long-run distribution of outcomes concentrates on the
Walrasian outcome as the probability of mistakes vanishes: the selected out-
come is called stochastically stable (for an introduction to stochastic stability
models, see, e.g., Blume, 1993; Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993; Samuel-
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son, 1997; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). This striking result, which can be
generalized to the class of aggregative games (Alós-Ferrer and Ania, 2005), is
driven by the so-called spite eﬀect (Hamilton, 1970; Schaﬀer, 1989): a devi-
ation from the Cournot equilibrium to the Walrasian solution is detrimental
in that it decreases one’s payoﬀ, but at the same time it decreases the payoﬀs
of the other ﬁrms even more, hence making the deviating ﬁrm better oﬀ in
relative terms. As a result imitation of highest proﬁts quickly leads ﬁrms to
choose the perfectly competitive quantity. This result is important, because
it represents a counterpart to the concerns on reduced market-outcome com-
petitiveness and points out that relative-performance concerns and (bound-
edly rational) imitative behavior might actually increase the competitiveness
of those outcomes.
The analysis of Vega-Redondo (1997) exhibited a clear-cut but highly
stylized result, which rests on some sharp behavioral assumptions. First and
foremost among those is the length of memory. The selection of the Walrasian
outcome under imitative behavior crucially depends on the assumption that
previous (potentially more proﬁtable) outcomes are immediately forgotten
and as a consequence only relative payoﬀs matter. This is in stark contrast
with the prediction of collusive outcomes arising when market competition
is modeled as an inﬁnitely repeated game, which hinges on the players’ ca-
pability to condition on possibly distant past events (in order to sustain
a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the inﬁnitely repeated game). This limi-
tation of Vega-Redondo (1997) was addressed in Alós-Ferrer (2004), which
introduced bounded but possibly long memory into the dynamic model of
Vega-Redondo (1997). Interestingly, even if imitative behavior is assumed,
the assumption of non-negligible memory opens the door for intertemporal
payoﬀ comparisons and better-reply behavior. For, when ﬁrms can imitate
whatever output level delivered the highest proﬁts in memory, intertemporal
comparisons allow to evaluate deviations from a given proﬁle. For example,
if a ﬁrm deviates away from the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, imitation will
lead the ﬁrm to correct this “mistake”, because the pre-deviation payoﬀs are
larger than the post-deviation ones. This holds even if by a spite eﬀect after
deviation that ﬁrm is better oﬀ than the competition, because the remem-
37
Chapter 2 Cournot vs. Walras: A Reappraisal through Simulations
bered payoﬀs are even higher. Non-negligible memory hence creates a tension
between actions leading to relative-payoﬀ advantages and those leading to ad-
vantages in terms of absolute payoﬀs. The main result in Alós-Ferrer (2004)
was that for well-behaved Cournot oligopolies and non-trivial memory (one
round suﬃces) a non-trivial dynamics arises and all quantities between the
Cournot and Walrasian outcomes are long-run equilibria. That is, all such
states are stochastically stable, implying that the long-run distribution of
outcomes does not concentrate on a single outcome and, as the probability
of mistakes becomes small but positive, the dynamics is concentrated on out-
comes between the Cournot and the Walrasian ones, but remains non-trivial.
Of course, for the memoryless case convergence to the Walrasian outcome
obtains (Alós-Ferrer and Shi, 2012 further showed that the latter result also
holds if some ﬁrms are memoryless). This demonstrates the importance
of memory with regard to outcome selection in Cournot oligopolies. Also,
this result qualiﬁes the original insight of Vega-Redondo (1997) and points
to a richer (and possibly more realistic) dynamics, with the Walrasian and
Cournot-Nash outcomes as stylized bounds of predicted market outcomes.
The main result of Alós-Ferrer (2004) has two practical limitations. First,
the proof applies to a large but still speciﬁc class of Cournot oligopolies, as
it relies on stronger assumptions on the structure of the underlying Cournot
game compared to Vega-Redondo (1997). Essentially, the result is proven un-
der the additional requirements that the inverse-demand function is strictly
concave and the cost function is strictly convex. Second, the fact that all
outcomes between the Walrasian and the Cournot-Nash ones are stochas-
tically stable does not mean that they are all “alternative equilibria” in a
classical sense. The reason is that stochastic stability refers to the limit as
behavioral noise (the probability of mistakes) vanishes. The result has to be
interpreted in terms of the dynamics for a positive but small noise level. The
actual prediction is that the dynamics will quickly converge towards the in-
terval of quantities between the Walrasian and Cournot-Nash outcomes, and
then a rich, non-trivial dynamics within this interval is to be expected. How
much time the system will spend at each output level compared to others
is measured by the (limit) invariant distribution of the stochastic process.
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Unfortunately, the stochastic stability techniques on which Vega-Redondo
(1997), Alós-Ferrer (2004), and many other works are based do not allow for
an estimation of that distribution, merely for an analysis of its support (the
stochastically stable states). Hence, if one wishes to analyze how far apart
from the Cournot (or Walras) prediction the system will be, one needs to de-
termine the shape of the invariant distribution. Although this is analytically
not feasible, a direct application of the Ergodic Theorem (e.g., Karlin and
Taylor, 1975) shows that simulations can provide a sharp estimation of that
shape.
The logic is simple. The Ergodic Theorem implies that, for almost all
realizations of the dynamical system, in the long run the weights of individual
outcomes in the invariant distribution correspond exactly to the percentage
of time that the system spends in that outcome. Hence, the proportion of
time spent in individual outcomes, averaged across (long enough) simulations,
becomes a numerical estimate of the weights in the invariant distribution. As
a consequence, extensive numerical simulations become an eﬃcient tool for
the systematic study of the characteristics of long-run predictions, and are
particularly valuable when (as in Alós-Ferrer, 2004) the prediction is not a
single outcome. For instance, the stochastic stability result quoted above
cannot discriminate between outcomes where almost all weight is placed on
or near the Walrasian quantity and outcomes where that weight is on or near
the Cournot-Nash quantity. Systematic simulations then become invaluable
to discriminate among such possibilities.
Our objective in this paper is twofold: On the one hand, we want to better
understand the exact shape of the invariant distribution and hence whether
the prediction is closer to the perfectly competitive outcome or rather to
the classical Cournot-Nash outcome. On the other hand, we seek to in-
vestigate whether the main result in Alós-Ferrer (2004) holds beyond the
limitations just described, that is, whether it extends to less well-behaved
Cournot oligopolies. To those ends, we will rely on computational simula-
tions to approximate the invariant distribution, systematically varying the
speciﬁcations of the underlying Cournot oligopoly and the dynamical system.
This article is also linked to the literature studying convergence in Cournot
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oligopoly games where learning of boundedly rational agents is modeled
through evolutionary algorithms (EA). An important factor determining the
outcome the EA converges to is the type of learning it is based on. The
literature mainly distinguishes between two types: individual learning exclu-
sively from own past performance (i.e. in the absence of spite and imitation of
others, when ﬁrms only learn through introspection) and social learning from
own as well as others’ past performance (i.e. imitation of others as consid-
ered in Vega-Redondo, 1997 and Alós-Ferrer, 2004). An early contribution
in this line was provided by the simulations of Vriend (2000), who found
convergence to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium when learning was individual
(closer to myopic best-reply), but to the Walrasian outcome in the presence
of social learning (closer to imitation). This is a natural observation in view
of the fact that best-reply behavior underlies Nash equilibria and imitative
behavior leads to Walrasian outcomes. Individual learning focuses on the
own experience, while information about the performance of others is either
not available or ignored. Hence there is no room for relative payoﬀ compar-
isons and only absolute payoﬀs matter, which can, of course, drive behavior
away from the competitive outcome. In a formal-analytical study relying
on stochastic stability, Bergin and Bernhardt (2004) examined imitation dy-
namics and introspective dynamics in isolation and found that individual
agents (which in a Cournot setting means ﬁrms, excluding consumer wel-
fare) are worse oﬀ in a world of imitators than in a world where agents
learn via introspection. In a similar framework Riechmann (2006) showed
using EA simulations that even individual learning can lead to either Walras
or Cournot, depending on the analytical sophistication of players and their
degree of knowledge of the game. Individual learning mechanisms leading
to the Cournot equilibrium require a sizable degree of knowledge and ana-
lytical sophistication, while simpler behavior might lead towards Walrasian
outcomes.
The simulation results of Vriend (2000) were in contrast to Arifovic (1994),
who found that both social and individual learning converge to the Walrasian
outcome. However, this earlier work relies on an EA which is not based on
best-reply or imitation (of actual past-performance) but rather takes ele-
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ments from both. Firms behave as price-takers, but compute and compare
hypothetical payoﬀs in a way similar to myopic best-reply considerations,
hence the underlying behavior cannot be directly compared to the models
described above. Arifovic and Maschek (2006) argued that Vriend’s (2000) re-
sult of convergence to the Cournot outcome under individual learning hinged
upon a very speciﬁc cost structure and particular EA implementation. Val-
lée and Yıldızoğlu (2009) analyzed the diﬀerences between the underlying
mechanisms that lead to those diverging results. Using computational ex-
periments, they conﬁrmed that expectation-based learning (Arifovic, 1994)
cannot converge to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, while this is possible under
the repetition-based learning model employed by Vriend (2000). The main
reason for this diﬀerence is that the latter model belongs to a completely
diﬀerent family. For instance, trading strategies are tried out for 100 periods
and the EA (actually, a genetic algorithm including recombination) acts only
after each 100-periods block, on the basis of average proﬁts. Hence, the EA
acts only occasionally, which allows individuals to discover the decreasing re-
lationship between market price and quantity. On the other hand, in the case
of social learning the computational results in Vallée and Yıldızoğlu (2009)
are in line with the theoretical prediction of Vega-Redondo (1997) driven by
the spite eﬀect.
Vallée and Yıldızoğlu (2013) use computational experiments to investigate
the role of memory under both social and individual learning in the possi-
ble convergence to outcomes more collusive than the Cournot equilibrium.
Their results for social learning are (up to a signiﬁcant level of noise) in line
with Alós-Ferrer (2004).1 For speciﬁc types of individual learning mecha-
nisms they ﬁnd convergence towards quantities that are close to the collusive
1Vallée and Yıldızoğlu (2013) conduct simulations with high levels of noise and large
probability of inertia (that is, infrequent strategy adjustments). Unsurprisingly, their
results include distributions with long tails, which arise exclusively due to the levels of
noise. Stochastic stability analyzes the limit as noise vanishes, modeled as the probability
ε of behavioral mistakes. The key insight of the literature is that this limit diﬀers from the
heavily path-dependent behavior when there is no noise at all. Of course, for large ε the
prediction is simply a high level of noise, from which little can be learned. Computational
tests of stochastic-stability results need to concentrate on small but positive values of ε.
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outcome.2 However, although the social learning dynamic they study is,
as ours, based on random experiments, imitation, and memory, the imple-
mentation is very diﬀerent from the model studied here and in Alós-Ferrer
(2004). First, agents are equipped with ﬁnite memory but only occasionally
use it and thus agents act in a “memoryless” way most of the time. As a
consequence, the results of Alós-Ferrer (2004) do not directly apply to their
setting (a better comparison would be to Alós-Ferrer and Shi, 2012). Sec-
ond, they consider imitation (of the best outcome in the previous period, i.e.
with trivial memory) and the act of “using memory” (that is, imitation of
the best outcome within the remembered time frame) as two distinct, inde-
pendent events. Third, Vallée and Yıldızoğlu (2013) use an ad hoc notion of
“convergence” which, regrettably, does not fully exploit the properties of the
actual stochastic system. They simply compare the population distribution
in the last (of many) periods in the simulation to the predicted theoretical
limit distribution. For a single simulation, if the invariant distribution has
a non-trivial support (multiplicity of stochastically stable states), this crite-
rion produces essentially random results, especially if the simulation is too
short. Averaging over simulations but relying only on the last period of each
one is an appeal to the Fundamental Theorem of Markov chains (see, e.g.,
Karlin and Taylor, 1975), which states that the long-run probability of each
individual state is numerically equal to its probability under the invariant
distribution. Vallée and Yıldızoğlu (2013) average over only 500 runs of only
10, 000 periods each. It is unclear whether, with such a short length of the
simulations, this relatively small number of simulations suﬃces to obtain an
approximation through the Fundamental Theorem. The Ergodic Theorem
(see also Section 2.3), however, provides a better approach, which relies on
the whole simulation instead of just the last period. The key is that time
averages, that is, the fraction of time spent at each state as time goes to
inﬁnity, converges to the invariant distribution, and hence empirical time
2This result requires “selective” memory, where agents can only remember the latest
payoﬀ associated with a given quantity and forget the payoﬀs associated with earlier,
possibly more proﬁtable instances where the same quantity was chosen. This dynamics is
similar to trial and error learning as studied in Huck et al. (2004) (both analytically and
through simulations).
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averages approximate the invariant distribution.
At a conceptual level, the inconsistencies among the works quoted above
arise because the diﬀerent simulations they study diﬀer in a relatively large
number of dimensions (and convergence criteria), and it is not clear which of
them are purely technical and which deﬁne qualitatively diﬀerent classes of
learning dynamics. In turn, this is made possible because those simulations
are exploratory in nature (which is of course valuable) but are not, in general,
conceived as a systematic test of the long-run outcomes of a well-deﬁned class
of dynamics. In contrast our research agenda starts with a clearly formulated
theoretical framework (stochastic stability models where agents are endowed
with behavioral rules) and builds upon existing analytical results, exploring
their boundaries.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the discrete-time
Cournot oligopoly and the imitation-based learning dynamic with memory.
The main result of Alós-Ferrer (2004) in that framework is that if ﬁrms
have positive memory then all quantities between the Walrasian and the
Cournot ones are stochastically stable. Section 2.3 describes the simulation
protocol and the simulation parameters used to generate our computational
results. Section 2.4 contains the main results, starting with an analysis of the
generality of the full support prediction for positive memory and proceeding
to factors that inﬂuence the shape of the limit distribution, in particular the
relative weights of the Cournot-Nash and Walrasian outcomes. Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 Existing Theoretical Results
In this section we brieﬂy review the discrete-time dynamic Cournot oligopoly
studied in Vega-Redondo (1997), introduce the imitation-based learning dy-
namic with bounded memory studied in Alós-Ferrer (2004), state the main
selection result with bounded memory obtained in that work, and discuss its
limitations (which motivate the present work).
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2.2.1 The Discrete Cournot Oligopoly
Consider an N -player, symmetric Cournot oligopoly with inverse-demand
function P : R+ −→ R+ and cost function C : R+ −→ R+. Let P be
twice-diﬀerentiable on [0, qmax] with P
′ < 0 and P ′′ < 0 in this interval
(hence P is strictly decreasing and strictly concave). Further, assume that
P (0) = Pmax > 0 and P (q) = 0 ∀q ≥ qmax. Let C be twice diﬀerentiable with
C ′ > 0 and C ′′ > 0 (hence C is strictly increasing and strictly convex), and
assume C ′(0) < Pmax. Call such a Cournot oligopoly well-behaved.
The Walrasian quantity qW is deﬁned by
P (NqW )qW − C(qW ) ≥ P (NqW )q − C(q) ∀q,
and it is unique under the assumptions given above. It is well-known that
this quantity is optimal with respect to relative-payoﬀ considerations (see,
e.g., Alós-Ferrer and Ania, 2005). In contrast, the Cournot quantity qC is
optimal with respect to absolute payoﬀs, since it fulﬁlls that
P (NqC)qC − C(qC) ≥ P ((N − 1)qC + q)q − C(q) ∀q.
Alós-Ferrer (2004) analyzes the (discrete-time) Cournot oligopoly de-
scribed above within a dynamic context with memory. The model without
memory was ﬁrst studied in the seminal paper Vega-Redondo (1997). Firms
play the Cournot game repeatedly in discrete time t = 0, 1, 2 . . . . Each pe-
riod ﬁrms observe quantities chosen and proﬁts realized by all ﬁrms in that
period. In addition, ﬁrms remember the outcomes, i.e. quantities and proﬁts,
from the last K ≥ 0 periods in addition to the current one. Based on this
information ﬁrms subsequently choose a quantity for the next period, taken
from a ﬁnite grid Γ = {0, δ, 2δ, . . . , νδ} with step size δ > 0 where νδ = qmax.
For concreteness, we assume that both qW as well as qC belong to Γ.
The state of the learning process for a given period is entirely determined
by a vector (q1, . . . , qN) ∈ Γ
N , therefore the state space for the model with
memory K ≥ 0 is given by ΓN(K+1). The dynamics is based on imitation
of strategies that performed best within the remembered time frame and
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occasional experimentation (also called mutation). More precisely, for each
period and every ﬁrm, there is a small probability ε > 0 that instead of
imitating the ﬁrm experiments with a new quantity at random according
to a probability distribution with full support on Γ. With the remaining
probability (1−ε) the ﬁrm imitates a quantity that yielded the highest proﬁt
in memory, i.e. within the last K periods (including the current period).
Formally, let qi(t) be the quantity chosen by ﬁrm i in period t and q−i(t) the
quantities of its N − 1 competitors. Then the set of quantities chosen with
positive probability in the next period for a state ω = (q(k))tk=t−K ∈ Γ
N(K+1)
is given by
BKt (ω) ={qi(k) | i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, k ∈ {t−K, . . . , t} and Πi(k) ≥ Πj(k
′)
∀j = 1, . . . , N, ∀k′ = t−K, . . . , t} (2.1)
where Πi(t) = P (Q(t))qi(t)− C(qi(t)) and Q(t) =
∑N
i=1 qi(t).
This behavioral rule is often referred to as Imitate-the-Best-Max (IBM)
rule in this literature.3 Imitation and experimentation are events that hap-
pen independently from each other across ﬁrms and time. The learning
dynamics (with imitation and experimentation) deﬁnes a stationary Markov
chain on the state space ΓN(K+1) that is analyzed using standard tools in-
troduced by Blume (1993), Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993). One
seeks to identify the stochastically stable states, which are those in the sup-
port of the limit invariant distribution of the process as the probability of
experimentation vanishes. Given a quantity q ∈ Γ, denote by mon(q) the
quantity vector where all ﬁrms choose q. More generally, for K ≥ 0 we de-
note mon(q,K) = ((q, . . . , q), . . . , (q, . . . , q)) ∈ ΓN(K+1). These states, where
the same quantity has been produced by all ﬁrms as long as it is remembered,
are called monomorphic. For imitation-based learning dynamics it is well-
known that the absorbing states are exactly the monomorphic states, and as
3Another reasonable behavioral rule is the so-called Imitate-the-Best-Average (IBA)
rule, however, this rule leads to completely diﬀerent results. Bergin and Bernhardt (2009)
have shown that IBA together with long enough memory leads to cooperative outcomes in
the long-run, in particular in a Cournot oligopoly context the unique long-run prediction
is the state where all ﬁrms choose the collusive quantity.
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an easy consequence only those can be stochastically stable (see Alós-Ferrer,
2004 or Alós-Ferrer and Shi, 2012 for details).
2.2.2 Imitation with Bounded Memory
For the model without memory, i.e. K = 0, Vega-Redondo (1997) has shown
that the unique stochastically stable state is the one where all ﬁrms choose
the Walrasian quantity qW , that is, the monomorphic state mon(qW ). The
main result in Alós-Ferrer (2004) is that for positive memory (K ≥ 1) every
quantity q in the interval [qC , qW ] corresponds to a stochastically stable state,
namely to the monomorphic state mon(q,K). Further, those states are the
only stochastically stable states.
Theorem 1 (Alós-Ferrer, 2004). Consider a well-behaved N-player Cournot
oligopoly with memory K on the grid Γ with step size δ (qC , qW ∈ Γ). For
any K ≥ 1, N ≥ 2, and δ small enough, the set of stochastically stable states
is {mon(q,K) | q ∈ [qC , qW ] ∩ Γ}.
This result is in stark contrast to Vega-Redondo (1997) where the com-
petitive equilibrium is the unique prediction. Allowing for positive memory,
however, introduces another force driving selection that acts alongside the
relative payoﬀ comparisons that favor the Walrasian quantity. Memory in-
creases the importance of absolute payoﬀs through intertemporal compar-
isons, which favor the Cournot quantity.
The selection result for the model with bounded memory has two limita-
tions. First, stochastic stability techniques aim at identifying the stochasti-
cally stable states, but in case of multiplicity of stable states are generally
not able to identify the shape of the limit distribution. With memory all
quantities between the Walrasian and Cournot outcomes are stable under an
imitation dynamics. However, this only implies that coordination on each
of those outcomes will be observed a positive fraction of time in the long-
run. Results based on stochastic stability techniques do not provide further
information about the exact shape of the limit distribution, and as a conse-
quence, we do not know whether those fractions of time are large or small.
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Second, the result in Alós-Ferrer (2004) makes strong structural assump-
tions compared to Vega-Redondo (1997) (well-behaved oligopolies). These
assumptions, however, mainly serve a technical purpose enabling the fairly
involved construction on which the proof of the main result is based. The
technical diﬃculty is that destabilizing the Walrasian quantity “downwards”
is costly in terms of the number of mutations required. The proof proceeds
through a series of transitions passing through quantities outside the stable
region [qC , qW ] above qW from where a transition to a quantity below qW is
comparably cheap because both forces, relative and absolute payoﬀ improve-
ments, are aligned. The proof, partially based on diﬀerential calculus, is
not entirely intuitive and proceeds through a series of intermediate lemmata.
These lemmata make intensive use of the assumptions on the structure of the
game, speciﬁcally of the strict concavity of the inverse-demand function and
the strict convexity of the cost function. Hence it is not feasible to general-
ize the proof so that it still applies with weaker assumptions (or at least we
have failed to do so). Besides these technical considerations we hypothesize
that the general logic driving the stability of the complete range of outcomes
between qC and qW still holds in less well-behaved environments. In partic-
ular, we aim to examine oligopoly games with non-concave inverse-demand
functions and cost functions that are not necessarily strictly convex.
In view of the overall motivation, the analysis of the invariant distribu-
tion translates into a series of more speciﬁc questions. What are the relative
weights on the Walrasian and Cournot quantities, respectively? What is the
exact shape of this distribution and how is it aﬀected by the speciﬁc struc-
ture of the oligopoly, i.e. the speciﬁc demand and cost functions chosen?
What are the eﬀects of memory length on the limit distribution? The use of
computational simulations allows us to shed light on these questions. Simu-
lations deliver data on the complete distribution and are an eﬀective means
to explore the validity of the full support prediction beyond the structural
assumptions made in Alós-Ferrer (2004). In the next section we detail the
simulation protocol and the parameters used to tackle these questions.
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2.3 The Simulations
The Ergodic Theorem from the theory of Markov chains allows the follow-
ing interpretation of the limit invariant distribution of a stationary Markov
chain: the fraction of time that the dynamic process spends at a speciﬁc
state converges to the weight given to that state by the limit distribution.
This has important consequences, and in particular opens the door for a
computational approach to study the limit distribution through the use of
simulations. Speciﬁcally, the Ergodic Theorem enables us to approximate
the limit distribution of a stationary Markov chain, in our speciﬁc case the
distribution over the monomorphic states mon(q) with q ∈ Γ, by time aver-
ages obtained via simulations. This is exactly the strategy pursued in this
section. In the following we will give a detailed description of the simulations
used to obtain approximations of the invariant distribution.
2.3.1 Simulation Protocol
In this section the Cournot oligopoly game described in Section 2.2 is trans-
formed into a simple agent-based simulation protocol mimicking the evo-
lutionary process underlying the theoretical results. The initial quantity
qi(0) ∈ Γ chosen by agent i at time t = 0 is randomly drawn according to
a uniform distribution on the grid Γ. In particular, we do not necessarily
start with a monomorphic state. Denote by Q(t) =
∑N
i=1 qi(t) the aggre-
gate quantity in period t. The payoﬀ of player i in period t is then given by
Πi(t) = P (Q(t))qi(t)−C(qi(t)). This determines the set of “best-performing”
strategies in the last K + 1 periods, BKt (ω), as deﬁned in (2.1).
Agents will adopt strategies from BKt , randomly (and uniformly) picking
one in case BKt is not a singleton. With probability (1− ε) agent i uses the
so-determined strategy, however, with probability ε (independently drawn
for each agent) she experiments with a new strategy chosen randomly ac-
cording to the uniform distribution on Γ. This process is then repeated for
a large number of periods. Since monomorphic states are the only absorbing
sets of the unperturbed dynamics, the time spent in non-monomorphic states
approaches zero as ε becomes small. Hence, we know that the system spends
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most of the time in monomorphic states (for small ε). For this reason, we only
record the distribution over those and aggregate all non-monomorphic states
in a residual, denoted res. Speciﬁcally, for each simulation (run) we record
the fraction of time spent in each of the monomorphic states mon(q), q ∈ Γ,
denoted by F (q), as well as the fraction of time spent in non-monomorphic
states, denoted by F (res). Formally, our main output is a probability dis-
tribution F over Γ ∪ {res}. The restriction of F to Γ gives us the desired
approximation of the limit invariant distribution. To further improve quality
of the approximation and to guarantee robustness we recorded 150 repeti-
tions (with diﬀerent initial conditions) and then took the average distribution
over those repetitions for our subsequent analysis.4
To facilitate later analysis and to ensure comparability of the results
across the various conﬁgurations we determined the grid Γ endogenously
in order to satisfy certain criteria: the scale (units) was normalized so that
Γ would be contained in [0, 1]; Γ should contain the quantities of interest qC
and qW ; the cardinality of Γ should only depend on the step size δ and not
on any other parameter; the smallest element in Γ should be “close to 0”,
meaning as close to zero as the discretization would allow.
We will conduct simulations for diﬀerent grid sizes. Grid coarseness will
be captured by the parameter M , which measures the number of steps in the
grid from qC to qW . The step size, i.e. the increment within the discrete grid,
is then given by δ = q
W−qC
M
. That is, the step size is determined relative to
the size of the interval [qC , qW ] as to ensure that the number of elements in
the grid that lie within the interval [qC , qW ] is M + 1. We take the grid size
to be a ﬁxed multiple of
∣∣qW − qC∣∣, speciﬁcally we set ν = 7M and hence
|Γ| = 7M + 1. The position of the grid within [0, 1] is speciﬁed as follows.
For a given starting point q0 ∈ R+ we set Γ(q0) = {q0, q0 + δ, . . . , q0 + νδ}.
We then determine the smallest element of the grid q0 such the criteria above
are met through an iterative procedure. Set q0 = q
C − ⌊ q
C
δ
⌋δ > 0. If qW ≤
q0 + 6Mδ, set Γ = Γ(q0) and end the procedure. If not, set q1 = q0 +Mδ. If
qW ≤ q1+6Mδ, set Γ = Γ(q1) and end the procedure, else set q2 = q1 +Mδ.
4Due to the presence of mutations, the simulated dynamics is ergodic, that is, long-run
predictions are independent of initial conditions.
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Table 2.1: Inverse-demand functions used in the simulations.
Inverse-Demand Function Properties
P1(Q) = max{1−Q
2, 0} strictly concave
P2(Q) = max{
log(2−Q)
log(2)
, 0} strictly concave
P3(Q) = max{
e
e−1
· (1− eQ−1), 0} strictly concave
P4(Q) = max{1−Q, 0} linear
P5(Q) = (
1
Q+1
)2 log-convex
P6(Q) = e
−Q convex, log-concave, isoelastic
P7(Q) = max{
log( 4
5
Q+ 1
5
)
log( 1
5
)
, 0} convex
P8(Q) = (24Q+ 1)
− 1
2 convex, (α, β)-biconcave for α, β ≤ 1
100
P9(Q) = 1Q≤1(1−Q
3
4 )
4
3 convex, (α, β)-biconcave for α, β ≤ 3
4
P10(Q) = max{
1+(1−2Q)3
2
, 0} non-concave, non-convex, S-shaped
P11(Q) = max{
1−arctan((2+tan(1))Q−2)
1−arctan(−2)
, 0} non-concave, non-convex, inverted S-shaped
P12(Q) =
2(1−Q
2)
2
non-concave, non-convex, inverted S-shaped
Proceed iteratively generating qk+1 = qk+Mδ until q
W ≤ qk+6Mδ and then
set Γ = Γ(qk). This procedure ensures that Γ satisﬁes all the criteria just
mentioned except the last one. In particular, we always have qC , qW ∈ Γ,
and that Γ exceeds qW by at least
∣∣qW − qC∣∣ so that neither qW nor qC is at
the border of the grid. Due to the large variance in the distance
∣∣qW − qC∣∣
across the diﬀerent conﬁgurations, sometimes the grid could not start just
above 0 because
∣∣qW − qC∣∣ was relatively small. Hence, “close to 0” means
“as close as possible without violating one of the other criteria”. As we will
mainly focus on values between the Walrasian and the Cournot quantities,
we view this as an acceptable simpliﬁcation.
2.3.2 The Simulation Parameters
Inverse-demand functions are taken from a set of twelve diﬀerent functions
designed to cover a wide spectrum of properties (e.g. linear, convex, concave,
log-concave, log-convex, S-shaped). The speciﬁc inverse-demand functions
used in the simulations and their properties are listed in Table 2.1 below. All
demand functions are normalized so that Pi(0) = 1 and qmax(Pi) = inf{q ∈
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Table 2.2: Cost functions used in the simulations.
Cost function Properties
C1(q) = 0.25q linear
C2(q) = 0.5q linear
C3(q) = 0.75q linear
C4(q) = 0.25q
2 convex
C5(q) = 0.5q
2 convex
C6(q) = 0.75q
2 convex
R+ | Pi(q) = 0} = 1 if this latter quantity is ﬁnite
5 for i = 1, . . . , 12. Note
that only P1, P2 and P3 satisfy the strict concavity assumption from Alós-
Ferrer (2004), and hence only those are covered by Theorem 1. We employ
a set of six cost functions, three linear ones and three quadratic ones. The
speciﬁc cost functions used are shown in Table 2.2.
The set of demand functions was determined as follows. The functions
P1, P2, and P3 are strictly concave demand functions that are normalized
versions of common examples in the literature (Anderson and Engers, 1992;
Amir and Lambson, 2000). We then included P4 as a very simple linear
demand function. Function P5 belongs to a class of log-convex functions used
by Amir (1996, Example 3.3). Functions P6 and P7 were chosen as examples
of convex demand functions with varying curvature. Functions P8 and P9
are examples of convex functions that are also biconcave (Ewerhart, 2014),
that is, they become concave after simultaneous monotone transformations
of price and quantity. Function P10 represents an example of an S-shaped
function that is concave below and convex above a certain value. On the
other hand, the functions P11 and P12 are examples of inverted S-shaped
functions, i.e. their ﬁrst part is convex, while they become concave above a
certain threshold. The three last functions were included as they are neither
always concave, nor always convex within the region of interest.
Each pair of inverse-demand and cost functions (P,C) deﬁnes a particular
5Demand functions P5, P6, P8, and P12 approach 0 asymptotically, hence qmax = ∞.
For these four functions, the normalization was such that Pi(1) was reasonably close to
zero.
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Table 2.3: Range of parameters used in the simulations.
Description Name Values
Inverse-Demand Function P P1, . . . , P12
Cost Function C C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6
Number of Firms N 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15, 20
Pr(Experimentation) ε 0.001, 0.005, 0.010
Grid Coarseness M 10, 20, 30, 40, 50
Memory Length K 1, 5, 10, 50
Notes: The inverse demand functions are as in Table 2.1. The cost functions are as in
Table 2.2.
Cournot oligopoly for a total of 72 diﬀerent conﬁgurations. For each conﬁg-
uration we calculated the Cournot and Walras quantities.6 Besides varying
the inverse-demand functions P , the cost functions C, and the coarseness of
the grid M , we also vary the number of ﬁrms N , probability of experimenta-
tion ε and the memory length K (K = 0 refers to the case without memory,
see Vega-Redondo, 1997). Table 2.3 summarizes the parameters used in the
simulations.
We therefore have a total of 30, 240 diﬀerent parameter combinations.
For each combination we ran 150 simulations for a total of 150 × 30, 240 =
4, 536, 000 (about 4.5 million) simulations. Additionally, we run 150× 7, 560
simulations for the no-memory case K = 0 in order to make sure that the
algorithms run correctly (of course, for all those convergence was as pre-
dicted in Vega-Redondo, 1997). We let each simulation run for a minimum
of 100, 000 periods and up to a maximum of one million periods.7
When dealing with limit results, naturally, one has to deal with the ques-
tion of how long is long enough (Ellison, 1993). As a ﬁrst indicator we can
compare the empirical distribution in the no-memory case K = 0 to the the-
6We used analytical solutions whenever feasible, and numerical solutions otherwise.
7We also implemented an endogenous stopping condition beyond a certain threshold to
save computing time. For any period t > 100, 000, the simulation stopped if the propor-
tion of occurrences of monomorphic states lying between the Cournot and the Walrasian
outcome exceeded 99%, i.e. whenever the condition ft([q
C , qW ])/(1 − ft(res)) > 0.99 was
fulﬁlled for some t > 100, 000 where ft : Γ∪{res} −→ [0, 1] is the relative frequency distri-
bution up to period t. Our large-scale simulations nevertheless took a signiﬁcant amount
of time on a Super Computer (in total about 8.5 CPU years).
52
Chapter 2 Cournot vs. Walras: A Reappraisal through Simulations
oretical distribution, which in this case places all weight on the Walrasian
outcome (Vega-Redondo, 1997). Indeed, for K = 0 the process spends on av-
erage about 80% of the time at the Walrasian quantity for low levels of noise
suggesting that the length of our simulations is suﬃcient to obtain a good
approximation of the limit distribution. For positive memory, the results
in Alós-Ferrer (2004) can be used (via a straightforward Radius-Coradius
approach following Ellison, 2000) to show that the expected time of ﬁrst ar-
rival in the interval [qC , qW ] is of order ǫ−1, which corresponds to (a constant
times) 100, 200, and 1000 periods for low, medium and high noise, respec-
tively. In our data the average time of ﬁrst arrival in the interval was 381,
691, and 3475 periods for low, medium and high levels of noise, respectively,
and hence well below the minimal simulation length of 100, 000 periods. For
the averaged data (across the 150 repetitions per parameter combination)
all monomorphic states within the interval were visited for each and every
parameter combination with the coarsest grid (M = 10). With the ﬁnest
grid (M = 50), still all monomorphic states within [qC , qW ] were visited for
90.3% of the parameter combinations.
In our analysis we will mainly use averages over the 150 repetitions for
each parameter combination, hence we have a total of 30, 240 “observations”
(data points) for our main variables of interest. The simulation was coded in
C++ and run on the high performance computing cluster CHEOPS (Cologne
High Eﬃcient Operating Platform for Science) at the University of Cologne.
The pseudo-code is given in Table 2.4.
2.4 Computational Results
In this section we present the results of our computational simulations.
Speciﬁcally, we show that the main result of Alós-Ferrer (2004) holds be-
yond the assumptions considered in that paper. We then proceed to a more
detailed analysis of the shape of the limit invariant distribution.
The objective of the simulations is to obtain estimates of the (limit)
invariant distribution µ∗ through the average time spent by the system at
each monomorphic state. Formally, µ∗ is a distribution over ΓN(K+1), i.e. over
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vectors of length K + 1, with each vector entry being a proﬁle of quantities
across ﬁrms. However, in practice the computational analysis can be greatly
simpliﬁed. Formally, the system evolves over states of length K + 1 (which
include what is available in memory), but of course each such system induces
a dynamics on the state of strategy proﬁles (q1, . . . , qN). In the limit, since
only monomorphic states can be observed a positive fraction of time, it is
immediate that the system spends a proportion r of the time in the K +
1-length state mon(q,K) if and only if the induced system evolving over
strategy proﬁles spends the same proportion r of the time in the proﬁle
mon(q). Hence, computationally, for the purposes of the approximation it is
enough to keep track of the proportion of time that the proﬁles mon(q) are
visited. In turn, the latter are one-to-one with quantities, that is, we can
consider the estimated invariant distribution as a mapping µ∗ : Γ −→ [0, 1].
Hence, our computational results below are referred to strategy proﬁles of
the form mon(q), indexed by the quantities q. This also allows us to avoid
introducing artiﬁcial diﬃculties in the comparison across diﬀerent values of
K.
2.4.1 Cournot, Walras, or Both?
Our ﬁrst objective is to investigate whether the full support prediction of
Theorem 1 still holds when the assumptions of strict concavity of P and
strict convexity of C are dropped. The theoretical prediction is that the in-
variant distribution µ∗ : Γ −→ [0, 1] has full support on [qC , qW ] and is iden-
tically zero outside of this interval (identifying each q with the corresponding
monomorphic state). Formally, µ∗(q) > 0 ∀q ∈ [qC , qW ] and µ∗([qC , qW ]) = 1.
Recall that using the Ergodic Theorem we can approximate µ∗ through the
time averages obtained in our simulations. Speciﬁcally, for ε small enough
the restriction of the relative frequency distribution f : Γ ∪ {res} −→ [0, 1]
to Γ converges to the theoretical limit distribution µ∗. Although our com-
putational results are based on low experimentation probabilities, this limit
result can of course not be obtained for non-vanishing ε as it is the case in
our simulations, hence we will have f([qC, qW ]) < 1.
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Table 2.4: Pseudo-code of the N -player learning model.
Set parameters: P , C, N , ε, M , and K.
Generate discrete grid Γ (with cardinality |Γ| = 7M + 1): Determine
step size as δ = q
W−qC
M
. For q ∈ R+ set Γ(q) = {q, q + δ, . . . , q + 7Mδ}. Set
q0 = q
C − ⌊ q
C
δ
⌋δ. For k ≥ 0: If qW ≤ qk + 6Mδ, set Γ = Γ(qk) and stop the
procedure. Otherwise, set qk+1 = qk +Mδ.
Period 0: An initial population proﬁle q(0) ∈ ΓN is selected where each
qi(0), i = 1, . . . , N , is randomly drawn from the uniform distribution over Γ.
Period t:
- Aggregate quantity is determined as Q(t) =
∑N
i=1 qi(t).
- Determine individual payoﬀs as Πi(t) = P (Q(t))qi(t)− C(qi(t)).
- Determine set of best-performing strategies in the last K + 1 periods as
BKt ={qi(k) | i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, k ∈ {t−K, . . . , t} and Πi(k) ≥ Πj(k
′)
∀j = 1, . . . , N, ∀k′ = t−K, . . . , t}.
- For each i = 1, . . . , N draw εi ∈ B(1, ε) (Bernoulli distribution).
- If εi = 0, agent i randomly imitates one of the strategies in B
K
t (uniform),
that is qi(t+ 1) ∼ U(B
K
t ).
- If εi = 1, agent i experiments and chooses a strategy at random (uniform)
from the whole grid Γ, that is qi(t+ 1) ∼ U(Γ).
- The population proﬁle for next period is q(t+ 1) = (qi(t+ 1))
N
i=1.
- If t+ 1 > 1, 000, 000 or if t > 100, 000 and ft([q
C , qW ])/(1− ft(res)) > 0.99
(where ft : Γ ∪ {res} −→ [0, 1] is the relative frequency distribution over
monomorphic states up to period t), then stop. Otherwise, increase the
period counter t and proceed to next period.
Notes: N -player learning model with memory K, grid coarsenessM , mutation probability
ε, cost function C, and inverse-demand function P .
The fraction of time spent at monomorphic states with quantities within
the interval [qC , qW ], formally deﬁned as
∑
q∈[qC ,qW ]∩Γ f(q) and denoted by
f([qC , qW ]), will serve us as a measure of convergence towards the theoretical
result. The closer the values of f([qC , qW ]) are to one the more likely it is
that the approximated distribution µ∗ will indeed have full support between
qC and qW . The left-hand part of Table 2.5 presents the average value of
f([qC , qW ]) across diﬀerent memory lengths and noise levels. For the right-
hand part we have calculated the average value of f([qC , qW ]) for each of the
55
Chapter 2 Cournot vs. Walras: A Reappraisal through Simulations
Table 2.5: Overview average and minimum fraction of time spent within the interval
[qC , qW ].
mean(f([qC, qW ])) min(P,C)f¯P,C([q
C , qW ])
K low ε med ε high ε low ε med ε high ε
1 .97134 .90418 .82716 .96578 .89475 .81348
5 .97445 .91769 .84797 .96880 .90508 .82969
10 .97445 .91731 .84429 .96919 .90587 .82667
50 .97417 .90076 .78764 .96912 .87468 .67634
Notes: Left-hand panel shows the average fraction of time spent within the interval
[qC , qW ] across all 30,240 simulation runs split by memory length K and experimenta-
tion probability ε. For the right-hand panel we computed for each (P,C) combination
the average proportion of time spent within the interval [qC , qW ] across runs and report
the minimum of those averages over all 72 (P,C) conﬁgurations. Low ε = 0.001, med
ε = 0.005, high ε = 0.010.
72 (P,C) combinations, denoted by f¯P,C([q
C , qW ]), and we report the mini-
mum of those averages, i.e. min(P,C) f¯P,C([q
C , qW ]), over the 72 (P,C) pairs
for diﬀerent memory lengths and diﬀerent probabilities of experimentation.
Our results clearly show that f([qC , qW ]) approaches one as the proba-
bility of experimentation decreases. For high, medium, and low levels of ε
we obtain average values of f([qC , qW ]) that are always above 0.97, 0.90, and
0.78, respectively. For low ε the minimal value of f([qC , qW ]) across all 72
combinations of inverse-demand and cost functions never drops below 0.96
independently of the length of memory. We interpret this as ﬁrst evidence
that the result of convergence towards full support on [qC , qW ] holds beyond
the case of strictly concave inverse-demand and strictly convex cost.
2.4.2 The Shape of the Invariant Distribution
We want to have a closer look at the shape of the estimated invariant distribu-
tion, in particular over quantities within the main range of interest between
the Cournot and the Walrasian outcomes. Of course, for the simulations the
process will still spend at least some time at non-monomorphic states, that
is f(res) > 0. Clearly a higher noise level leads to more experimentations,
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but the same is true for more ﬁrms (for a given level of ε) because each
ﬁrm experiments with the same probability, hence the likelihood for a single
experiment increases. Hence the weight placed on non-monomorphic states
f(res) will be increasing in ǫ and N due to an increased likelihood of muta-
tions. The consequence is a general level eﬀect, that is, non-monomorphic
states occur more often for larger values of ε and N . To control for this
eﬀect, we focus in our analysis on the restriction of the relative frequency
distribution to Γ, which we denote by F : Γ −→ [0, 1]. That is, we con-
sider the relative frequency of monomorphic states conditioning on the total
number of monomorphic states. As a second step, in order to aggregate the
relative frequency distributions, e.g. over diﬀerent pairs of (P,C), we nor-
malize F by identifying each quantity q ∈ Γ with its position within the grid
Γ relative to qC for a ﬁxed grid coarseness M . Speciﬁcally, for a given value
of M , we consider the set of indices {0, . . . , 2.5M + 1} where the ﬁrst M/2
indices are quantities below qC , the last M are quantities above qW , and the
remaining M + 1 correspond to the quantities qC , qC + δ, qC + 2δ, . . . , qW ,
where δ = q
W−qC
M
. To accomplish this, for each quantity q in the interval
[qC − q
W−qC
2
, qW + (qW − qC)] we assign the index ιM (q) =
M
2
+ k, where
k is such that q = qC + k q
W−qC
M
. Hence the quantities qC and qW always
have the indices M/2 and 3M/2, respectively. This allows us to compare
the so-obtained normalized relative frequency distribution, denoted by FˆM
(or abusing notation simply by Fˆ ), across diﬀerent values of P , C, δ, and
N , although the quantities of qC and qW clearly vary with all four of those
variables.
Of course, the exact shape of the distribution Fˆ and in particular Fˆ (qC)
and Fˆ (qW ) vary across P1 to P12 and C1 to C6. All individual plots, how-
ever, share a number of general features which can be illustrated by averaged
plots across appropriate subsets of simulations. Before we proceed to a formal
analysis of the data, it is worth to look at these illustrative representations.
Figures 2.1 to 2.3 plot the normalized relative frequency distribution FˆM av-
eraged over several subsamples split along the dimensions strictly concave
or not strictly concave inverse-demand function (dummy; Fig. 2.1a), linear
or quadratic cost function (dummy; Fig. 2.1b), memory (K; Fig. 2.2), and
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Figure 2.1: Effect of strict concavity of P and strict convexity of C.
0.0
0.1
R
el
at
iv
e 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
qC qW
P str. concave P not str. concave
(a) Effect of P strictly concave.
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(b) Effect of C linear.
Notes: Normalized relative frequency distribution Fˆ centered around [qC , qW ]. Subsamples
are limited to the ﬁnest grid with the highest number of steps M = 50.
number of ﬁrms (N ; Fig. 2.3). The normalized relative frequency distribu-
tions FˆM look qualitatively very similar across the diﬀerent grid coarseness
values M (compare, e.g., the two panels of Fig. 2.2), hence in several of the
ﬁgures we will present only the graphs for M = 50 (the regression analysis
will of course rely on the whole data set).
The ﬁrst observation is that the qualitative shape of the normalized rel-
ative frequency distribution is quite similar across the diﬀerent subsamples
(Fig. 2.1 to Fig. 2.3). In the unstable region outside the interval [qC , qW ] the
value of the distribution Fˆ is close to zero, while it is well above zero for
all values between the Cournot and the Walrasian quantities. In general the
process spends the largest amount of time at the Walrasian quantity across
all speciﬁcations, indicating that the Walrasian outcome is a robust long-
term prediction in the sense that it is stable independently of the length of
memory (as long as the latter is non-trivial), the number of ﬁrms, the speciﬁc
inverse-demand function, and the speciﬁc cost function used in the under-
lying oligopoly game. The general shape is bimodal and generally convex,
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Figure 2.2: Effect of memory.
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(a) Effect of memory K for M = 10.
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(b) Effect of memory K for M = 50.
Notes: Normalized relative frequency distribution Fˆ centered around [qC , qW ]. For the
left ﬁgure the subsample is limited to M = 10, while for the right ﬁgure it is limited to
M = 50.
with a large peak at the Walrasian quantity and another at or close to the
Cournot quantity.
The second observation concerns the stability of the prediction of The-
orem 1. Fig. 2.1a compares the frequency distributions of simulations with
strictly concave inverse demand functions and those with not strictly concave
ones. Fig. 2.1b compares the frequency distributions averaged across simu-
lations with strictly convex cost functions and those with linear ones. These
ﬁgures conﬁrm that Fˆ approaches a full support on [qC , qW ]. This obviously
had to be the case for the combinations (P,C) covered by Theorem 1, but
the result is also conﬁrmed for non-concave inverse-demand and quadratic
cost functions. That is, this general prediction seems unaﬀected by diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of P and C. This provides a further positive answer to the
question of whether the result of Alós-Ferrer (2004) holds beyond the class
of Cournot oligopolies considered in that work.
The third observation is that, even at this descriptive level, it can be
readily observed that changes in the key variables do inﬂuence the relative
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Figure 2.3: Effect of number of firms N .
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Notes: Normalized relative frequency distribution Fˆ centered around [qC , qW ]. Subsamples
are limited to the ﬁnest grid with the highest number of steps M = 50.
weights on qC and qW , although the general shape of the distribution re-
mains unaﬀected. As can be seen in Fig. 2.2, short memory (K = 1) clearly
favors the Walrasian outcome, while longer memory shifts weight towards
the Cournot quantity. This result conﬁrms the intuition that longer memory
makes intertemporal comparisons more important. Those comparisons es-
sentially rely on absolute payoﬀs, hence longer memory beneﬁts the Cournot
quantity. This ﬁgure also includes diﬀerent panels for M = 10 and M = 50
illustrating that the general characteristics of the distribution are not aﬀected
by the step size discretization.8
Another key variable is the number of ﬁrms, N . Fig. 2.3 plots the fre-
quency distributions as a function of N and shows that there is also a clear
eﬀect. In the duopoly case, a much larger weight is placed on the Cournot
quantity qC compared to the settings with N > 2. That is, coordination on
the Cournot equilibrium is more likely in the duopoly case, where strategic
complexity is lowest. For more than two ﬁrms, however, there is no clear
8There is, of course, a purely mechanical “level eﬀect:” for a smaller value of M , the
individual values of µ∗(q) will be higher, since they capture weight which will be spread
across several consecutive quantities for a larger M (ﬁner grid).
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Table 2.6: Overview average quantity and median quantity.
P C m(Fˆ ) med(Fˆ ) P C m(Fˆ ) med(Fˆ )
P1 C1 .675 .735 P7 C1 .675 .735
P1 C2 .676 .735 P7 C2 .678 .738
P1 C3 .676 .734 P7 C3 .680 .741
P1 C4 .687 .750 P7 C4 .685 .747
P1 C5 .689 .753 P7 C5 .693 .759
P1 C6 .687 .750 P7 C6 .705 .775
P2 C1 .672 .731 P8 C1 .671 .728
P2 C2 .672 .730 P8 C2 .671 .729
P2 C3 .674 .732 P8 C3 .676 .736
P2 C4 .686 .750 P8 C4 .847 .900
P2 C5 .681 .744 P8 C5 .854 .909
P2 C6 .694 .762 P8 C6 .852 .909
P3 C1 .673 .731 P9 C1 .674 .736
P3 C2 .673 .731 P9 C2 .678 .738
P3 C3 .670 .726 P9 C3 .679 .740
P3 C4 .687 .750 P9 C4 .687 .751
P3 C5 .680 .741 P9 C5 .708 .778
P3 C6 .693 .758 P9 C6 .706 .777
P4 C1 .686 .748 P10 C1 .673 .730
P4 C2 .684 .745 P10 C2 .675 .730
P4 C3 .688 .751 P10 C3 .677 .737
P4 C4 .681 .743 P10 C4 .675 .733
P4 C5 .701 .766 P10 C5 .684 .746
P4 C6 .697 .764 P10 C6 .692 .759
P5 C1 .670 .726 P11 C1 .670 .727
P5 C2 .674 .735 P11 C2 .673 .731
P5 C3 .681 .743 P11 C3 .676 .736
P5 C4 .759 .841 P11 C4 .677 .737
P5 C5 .772 .855 P11 C5 .692 .755
P5 C6 .778 .860 P11 C6 .693 .758
P6 C1 .669 .727 P12 C1 .671 .729
P6 C2 .675 .736 P12 C2 .684 .746
P6 C3 .682 .745 P12 C3 .673 .731
P6 C4 .729 .807 P12 C4 .695 .762
P6 C5 .743 .824 P12 C5 .706 .777
P6 C6 .758 .840 P12 C6 .721 .794
Notes: Average quantity m(Fˆ ) and median quantity med(Fˆ ) for the distribution Fˆ on the
subsamples corresponding to the 72 combinations of P and C. Inverse-demand functions
P are as in Table 2.1. Cost functions C are as in Table 2.2.
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pattern. The intuitive reason for a larger weight on qC in the duopoly case
is that, if there are just two ﬁrms, a downward transition within the stable
interval [qC , qW ] can readily be achieved by both ﬁrms simultaneously ex-
perimenting with a smaller quantity. Such a move yields a gain in terms of
absolute payoﬀ, and with only two ﬁrms there is no ﬁrm left at the original
quantity, hence at least one of the ﬁrms is also better oﬀ in relative terms.
For N > 2 a similar transition would require simultaneous mutations by at
least three ﬁrms and is therefore very unlikely in comparison. Whereas a
downward transition with only two mutations is also possible for N > 2, it is
more complex than in the duopoly case requiring a series of transitions each
involving simultaneous mutations by two ﬁrms.9 Although both transitions
occur with positive probability in the limit, our results show that this “dif-
ference in complexity” is reﬂected in the shape of the invariant distribution,
as demonstrated by the larger weight on qC for the duopoly.
We now shift to more analytical measures of the shape of the normalized
relative frequency distribution Fˆ , and of how it changes across the diﬀerent
combinations of (P,C). To this purpose, we construct two measures describ-
ing the main features of Fˆ , which we will also use in the regression analysis
below. First, we deﬁne the average quantity for a distribution Fˆ as
m(Fˆ ) =
∑
q∈[qC ,qW ](ι(q)− ι(q
C))Fˆ (q)
(ι(qW )− ι(qC))
∑
q∈[qC ,qW ] Fˆ (q)
where ι(q) is the index of q within the grid Γ. The value of m(Fˆ ) indicates
the position of the average quantity within [qC , qW ] weighted by its relative
frequency according to Fˆ . For higher values of m(Fˆ ) the distribution Fˆ
puts more mass on quantities closer to qW . For example m(Fˆ ) = 0 means
Fˆ (q) = 0 for all q ∈ (qC , qW ], i.e. full mass on qC , while m(Fˆ ) = 1 would
imply Fˆ (q) = 0 for all q ∈ [qC , qW ), i.e. full mass on qW . Second, we deﬁne
9Indeed the actual proof in Alós-Ferrer (2004) for the duopoly case was handled diﬀer-
ently than the case N > 2.
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the median quantity within [qC , qW ] for a distribution Fˆ as
med(Fˆ ) = ι(min{q ∈ [qC , qW ] |
∑
q′≤q
Fˆ (q′) ≥
1
2
∑
q∈[qC ,qW ]
Fˆ (q)}).
The median med(Fˆ ) is the index ι(q) of the smallest quantity q ∈ [qC , qW ]
such that at least half of the mass of Fˆ within [qC , qW ] is on values weakly
smaller than q. Table 2.6 summarizes the shape of the distribution Fˆ for
the 72 possible combinations of (P,C) by means of these two measures. It
illustrates that there is considerable variance with regard to the shape of
the distribution as m(Fˆ ) varies from a minimum of 0.669 to a maximum of
0.853 over the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of P and C. However, the most impor-
tant observation is that both m(Fˆ ) and med(Fˆ ) are consistently above 0.6.
This indicates that the distribution is highly skewed towards the Walrasian
outcome, conﬁrming the qualitative features observed in Fig. 2.1 to Fig. 2.3.
2.4.3 Regression Analysis
The shape of the relative frequency distribution is strongly inﬂuenced by the
choice of a speciﬁc pair (P,C). However, to obtain a systematic relation
describing the eﬀect of a change from a pair (P,C) to another pair (P ′, C ′)
one would need to order those along meaningful dimensions. In absence of
those, it is more instructive to focus on variables that come with a clear-cut
order and therefore can serve as an eﬀective means to guide our intuition on
how they inﬂuence the relative frequency distribution. We seek to investigate
how the shape of the distribution Fˆ is aﬀected by the following variables:
memory length K, number of ﬁrms N , concavity of P , and linearity of C.
Table 2.7 shows the results of a linear regression on the measures m(Fˆ )
and med(Fˆ ) including the aforementioned dimensions as independent vari-
ables. As Fig. 2.3 suggests a special role of the duopoly we also include a
dummy variable for the duopoly in the regression. The results indicate that
both mean quantity m(Fˆ ) and median quantity med(Fˆ ) are signiﬁcantly
decreasing in the length of memory K. This result is in line with the pre-
diction that longer memory K allows ﬁrms to focus more on intertemporal
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Table 2.7: Linear regressions on average and median quantity.
m(Fˆ ) med(Fˆ )
K −0.00066∗∗∗ −0.00091∗∗∗
(0.00002) (0.00003)
Duopoly −0.08491∗∗∗ −0.11758∗∗∗
(0.00124) (0.00164)
N −0.00109∗∗∗ −0.00275∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00009)
Psconcave −0.02281
∗∗∗ −0.02858∗∗∗
(0.00091) (0.00120)
Clinear −0.04354
∗∗∗ −0.05767∗∗∗
(0.00079) (0.00104)
ε 3.55312∗∗∗ 2.64964∗∗∗
(0.10738) (0.14149)
Observations 30240 30240
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.0001, ∗∗∗ p < 0.00001. Linear
regressions with dependent variables m(Fˆ ) and med(Fˆ ). Dummy variable Duopoly = 1 if
N = 2. Dummy variable Psconcave = 1 if P is strictly concave. Dummy variable Clinear = 1
if C is linear.
comparisons. Those rely more heavily on absolute payoﬀs, and hence the
distribution of outcomes is shifted in the direction of the Cournot quantity,
although most of the weight remains closer to the Walrasian one (recall Table
2.6).
The coeﬃcients for the duopoly dummy as well as for N show a signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect. For the duopoly the distribution places more weight on states
closer to the Cournot quantity compared to situations with more than two
ﬁrms, which conﬁrms the observation in Fig. 2.3 of a larger weight on qC for
the duopoly. In contrast, beyond the duopoly case increasing the number
of ﬁrms slightly shifts weight from Walras to Cournot. This eﬀect, however,
might simply be due to a higher level of noise. For a larger number of
ﬁrms the probability of simultaneous mutations increases (for a given level
of ε), and this results in an overall ﬂatter distribution. As the weight on
qW is generally larger than that on qC this “mechanical” ﬂattening of the
distribution can explain this weak negative trend beyond the duopoly.
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The dummies for strictly concave inverse demand functions and linear
cost functions are signiﬁcant and negative. This indicates that both classes of
functions place more weight on states closer to the Cournot outcome and thus
result in a distribution that is less skewed towards the Walrasian outcome.
That is, although the prediction from Theorem 1 holds beyond the class
of well-behaved oligopolies, it seems that, if inverse demand functions are
strictly concave or costs are linear, states closer to the Cournot outcome will
be observed more frequently.
Last, the regressions in Table 2.7 also control for the level of noise (ε ∈
{0.001, 0.005, 0.010}). The coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly positive, which in-
dicates that for vanishing noise, more weight is shifted in the direction of
the Cournot quantity. Fig. 2.4 clariﬁes this eﬀect. While the shape of the
distribution remains qualitatively unchanged, the spike at qC becomes larger
as ε becomes smaller. However, this eﬀect has to be understood in relative
terms: across all our simulations, the weight close to the Walrasian quantity
always remains larger than the weight close to the Cournot quantity.
We also seek to examine the eﬀects of memory length or the number of
ﬁrms in the market on convergence, as proxied by the percentage of time that
the system spends in the interval [qC , qW ], and on the invariant distribution’s
weights on qC and qW . Since those quantities are frequencies, we turn to
fractional logit regressions (see Papke and Wooldridge, 2008). Table 2.8
shows the results of fractional logit regressions. Dependent variables are
the normalized relative frequencies of qC and qW , the mass strictly between
qC and qW (excluding Fˆ (qC) and Fˆ (qW )), and the mass within the interval
[qC , qW ].
The fractional logit regressions conﬁrm again that violating the main as-
sumptions made in Alós-Ferrer (2004), namely strictly concave P or strictly
convex C, does not negatively aﬀect convergence towards full support on
[qC , qW ] as captured by Fˆ ([qC , qW ]). Allowing for non-concave inverse-demand
functions does not result in a signiﬁcant decrease on the average time the
process spends on quantities between Cournot and Walras. For linear cost
functions convergence even increases signiﬁcantly compared to quadratic cost
functions. Thus the prediction of Theorem 1 seems to hinge neither on the
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Figure 2.4: Effect of noise.
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(a) Effect of noise ε for M = 10.
0.0
0.1
R
el
at
iv
e 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
qC qW
ε=0.001 ε=0.005 ε=0.010
(b) Effect of noise ε for M = 50.
Notes: Normalized relative frequency distribution Fˆ centered around [qC , qW ]. For the
left ﬁgure the subsample is limited to M = 10, while for the right ﬁgure it is limited to
M = 50.
strict concavity of P nor on the strict convexity of C. However, as we have
already seen from Table 2.7 the characteristics of the inverse-demand func-
tion and the cost function aﬀect the shape of the invariant distribution, it is
less skewed towards qW for strictly concave P and linear C.
For linear cost functions the distribution shifts more weight towards the
Cournot outcome (see also Fig. 2.1b), while at the same time the weight on
the Walrasian quantity decreases slightly. We seek to identify what drives this
shift of weight fromWalras to Cournot. To that end, consider a monomorphic
state where all N ﬁrms produce the quantity q∗ < qW and a single mutant
ﬁrm experiments with a larger quantity, q, closer to the Walrasian quantity,
that is, q∗ < q < qW . The chance of success of such an upwards deviation
depends on whether the mutant fares better than the incumbents after the
deviation has occurred. Denote the proﬁt of a ﬁrm producing q when the
total output in the market is Q by Π(q|Q) = qP (Q) − C(q). Then, the
post-deviation payoﬀ of the mutant is Π(q | q + (N − 1)q∗), whereas the
post-deviation payoﬀ of the non-mutants is Π(q∗|q + (N − 1) + q∗). The
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Table 2.8: Fractional logit regressions.
Fˆ (qC) Fˆ (qW ) Fˆ ((qC , qW )) Fˆ ([qC , qW ])
K 0.00351∗∗∗ −0.00602∗∗∗ −0.00036 −0.00893∗∗∗
(0.00021) (0.00023) (0.00017) (0.00019)
Duopoly 0.85686∗∗∗ 0.08372∗∗∗ −0.33407∗∗∗ −0.15500∗∗∗
(0.01240) (0.01302) (0.00983) (0.01164)
N −0.02021∗∗∗ −0.01201∗∗∗ −0.02251∗∗∗ −0.08230∗∗∗
(0.00078) (0.00093) (0.00058) (0.00051)
Psconcave −0.00043 −0.21172
∗∗∗ 0.13788∗∗∗ 0.02762∗∗∗
(0.00986) (0.00943) (0.00676) (0.00608)
Clinear 0.07979
∗∗∗ −0.37862∗∗∗ 0.28314∗∗∗ 0.18333∗∗∗
(0.00879) (0.00882) (0.00626) (0.00612)
ε −50.89090∗∗∗ −5.33708∗∗ −52.48244∗∗∗ −192.65921∗∗∗
(1.25759) (1.21091) (0.88524) (0.92550)
Obs. 30240 30240 30240 30240
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.0001, ∗∗∗ p < 0.00001.
Dummy variable Duopoly = 1 if N = 2. Dummy variable Psconcave = 1 if P is strictly
concave. Dummy variable Clinear = 1 if C is linear. Fˆ ((q
C , qW )) =
∑
q∈(qC ,qW )∩Γ Fˆ (q) is
the mass that is strictly between qC and qW .
relative payoﬀ advantage of an upward deviation to q > q∗ is thus Π(q |
q+(N−1)q∗)−Π(q∗ | q+(N−1)q∗) = (q−q∗)P (q+(N−1)q∗)−(C(q)−C(q∗)).
In our simulations we used two types of cost functions, linear functions of
the form C(q) = aq and quadratic functions of the form C(q) = aq2 with the
same coeﬃcients (recall Table 2.2). As an illustration, a pairwise comparison
for a ﬁxed coeﬃcient a shows that a deviation upwards is more attractive
in relative terms for quadratic costs if a(q2 − (q∗)2) < a(q − q∗), which is
equivalent to q + q∗ < 1 (recall that we normalized qmax to 1). As a result a
ﬁrm experimenting with a larger quantity q > q∗ makes larger proﬁts than
the incumbent ﬁrms for both types of cost functions, however, for q + q∗ <
1 the increase in costs is larger for linear costs than for quadratic costs,
and thus dampens the additional proﬁts. Of course, for q + q∗ > 1 the
opposite holds, however, for our choices of P and C most values of qW are
below 1/2.10 Moreover, a similar argument shows that an upward deviation
10For our parameter combinations the Walrasian quantity qW is smaller than 1/2 for all
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towards qW is also more likely to generate an absolute payoﬀ advantage
compared to the previous period, which increases the likelihood that this
deviation is successful. Therefore deviations upwards in the direction of qW
are more attractive in both relative and absolute terms if C is quadratic,
which potentially explains the lower weight on qW for linear cost functions.
We can also conﬁrm our previous observation that the relative weight on
qC is increasing in memory length, while it has the opposite eﬀect on qW .
That is, longer memory shifts some weight within the invariant distribution
towards quantities closer to the Cournot one, although most of the weight
remains closer to the Walrasian equilibrium.
Regarding the eﬀect of the number of ﬁrms, the regressions show that
the time spent at both qC and qW is decreasing in N . However, for N > 2
the interior mass does not increase signiﬁcantly for higher N , but instead
it even decreases. This indicates that beyond the duopoly the eﬀect of N
on the weight on the Cournot and Walras quantities is rather mechanical:
as the number of ﬁrms increases, the probability of simultaneous, successful
deviations to quantities outside the interval [qC , qW ] is higher, leading to a
relative decrease of the weight on all states within the interval. However,
for the duopoly we observe larger weights on both qC and qW while, at the
same time, the interior mass Fˆ ((qC , qW )) decreases signiﬁcantly compared
to situations with more than two ﬁrms. This eﬀect on the relative weight is
especially pronounced for qC , which is in line with our previous observation
that for the duopoly the distribution shifts more weight towards the Cournot
quantity.
Last, the regressions also show that a larger level of noise increases the
weight on states outside the stable interval [qC , qW ] and decreases the weight
at all monomorphic states within [qC , qW ]. This is a trivial eﬀect: the
presence of higher noise increases the lower bound for the weight on ev-
ery monomorphic state (for positive epsilon the invariant distribution is ir-
reducible) resulting in a general ﬂattening of the distribution. As remarked
before, the predictions of stochastic stability refer to the vanishing-noise limit
and have to be tested with small values of ε. For larger values, all one can
but four cases, and only slightly above 1/2 in those four.
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learn is “noise in, noise out.”
2.5 Discussion
This paper makes two main contributions. First, using computational simu-
lations we show that the main prediction of Alós-Ferrer (2004) – full support
of the limit invariant distribution on [qC , qW ] for K > 0 – holds beyond the
set of well-behaved Cournot games used in that article. We provide evi-
dence that this result is more general than previously shown. Speciﬁcally,
our simulations suggest that the result holds for a wide spectrum of inverse-
demand and cost functions which do not necessarily satisfy the assumptions
of Alós-Ferrer (2004).
Second, we shed light on the exact shape of the limit distribution for im-
itative dynamics with memory in Cournot games, and how it is aﬀected by
diﬀerent variables such as memory length and the number of ﬁrms. It turns
out that the limit distribution is bimodal, with peaks at the Cournot and
Walras extremes, but highly skewed towards the Walrasian quantity. This
result is surprisingly robust across a large number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
Although longer memory increases the importance of the Cournot equilib-
rium the competitive outcome remains the dominant quantity. Throughout
all speciﬁcations the process spends most time on the Walrasian quantity.
Interestingly, the Cournot quantity is most attractive in a duopoly setting,
while for more than three ﬁrms the exact number of competitors apparently
has only minor inﬂuence on the relative weights on Cournot and Walras.
Overall, the main message of our analysis is that, even when one consid-
ers more realistic behavior than in Vega-Redondo (1997) and less restrictive
assumptions than in Alós-Ferrer (2004), relative-performance concerns and
imitative behavior in quantity-setting markets will generally lead to increased
competitiveness in market outcomes, even if the expected behavior is cap-
tured by a rich dynamics rather than a point prediction.
In summary, we have used simulations to numerically “prove” that the set
of stochastically stable states derived in Alós-Ferrer (2004) is unchanged for
more general Cournot oligopolies, while at the same time exploring a number
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of natural dimensions as the number of ﬁrms or the convexity of costs. Of
course, simulations do not provide analytical results and are not meant to
replace them. If analytical results are not feasible, however, simulations are
clearly an eﬃcient way to make progress and open new directions for theory
development. In this sense, we hope that the work presented here can serve
as an illustration of how computer simulations can serve as a useful tool for
the analysis of dynamic, stochastic learning models where agents are endowed
with behavioral rules.
70
Chapter 3
Cognitive Sophistication and Deliberation Times
3.1 Introduction
Cognitive capacities diﬀer among individuals. Inter-individual diﬀerences in
sophistication and cognitive eﬀort have been put forward as an explanation
for disparities in observed behavior, e.g. diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of in-
centives and diﬀerences in cognitive ability. This gave rise to a rich theoretical
literature that endows individuals with diﬀering degrees of strategic sophisti-
cation or reasoning capability. Prominent models, such as the level-k model
(Stahl, 1993; Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1995) and models of cognitive
hierarchies (Ho et al., 1998) are build on the assumption that heterogeneity in
depth of reasoning is the source of individual diﬀerences in behavior. These
models have proven to perform well in describing observed behavior, how-
ever, there is also some recent behavioral evidence (Goeree et al., 2016) that
is inconsistent with most models of iterative thinking. Reconciling behavior
in their experiment with a model of iterative thinking, such as level-k, would
require inordinate high levels compared to what is usually observed in the
literature. This, at least, casts some doubt on whether these models can be
understood as procedural, describing how decisions are arrived at, or whether
they should rather be understood as purely descriptive, outcome-based mod-
els. Studying this question requires an individually measurable correlate of
cognitive eﬀort, we argue that deliberation times can be purposefully used
as such a measure.
The use of response times is well-established in (cognitive) psychology
as a tool to help understand decision processes in the human brain, that
is, how decisions are made.1 A well-studied stylized fact in that literature
1For a recent discussion of the beneﬁts, challenges, and desiderata of response time
analysis in experimental economics see Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2017).
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is that the human ability to discriminate between two stimuli is a function
of the diﬀerence between the respective stimuli. With increasing diﬀerence
the mean response time decreases, or in other words, decisions closer to
indiﬀerence are found to be slower (Dashiell, 1937; Mosteller and Nogee, 1951;
Moyer and Landauer, 1967). It is important to note that response times in
that literature are usually very short (below one second), and hence have to
be distinguished from deliberation times (or decision times) in more complex
tasks, as the ones used to study iterative thinking. However, there is some
recent evidence that this distance-to-indiﬀerence eﬀect can also be found for
longer decision times, to which we refer as deliberation times (Krajbich et al.,
2014, 2015).
So far there has been little direct evidence that depth of reasoning (level
of thinking) corresponds to cognitive eﬀort. Most of the experimental liter-
ature has used observed choices to classify individuals in diﬀerent cognitive-
reasoning categories or types. This way, choice data is used to make infer-
ences regarding the processes that lead to a particular choice. The problem
with this approach is that the same choice is always attributed to the same
level, although it might very well be the result of completely diﬀerent deci-
sion rules. Choice data alone is not suﬃcient to distinguish such cases and,
hence, additional data is necessary to make better inferences regarding the
underlying processes. We argue that deliberation times can provide such
evidence.
There is a growing literature employing other sources of evidence sug-
gesting that individuals follow step-wise reasoning processes (e.g., Coricelli
and Nagel, 2009; Brañas-Garza et al., 2012; Gill and Prowse, 2016). Those
works show that reasoning in the beauty contest game (Nagel, 1995), which
is the workhorse in the literature on iterative thinking, correlates with neu-
ral activity in areas of the brain associated with mentalizing (Theory of
Mind network) and relate higher cognitive ability (as measured, e.g., by the
Cognitive Reﬂection Test or the Raven test) with more steps of reasoning.
Others have used click patterns recorded via MouseLab and eye-tracking to
obtain information on search behavior, which is then used to make inferences
regarding level-k reasoning (Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Crawford and Costa-
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Gomes, 2006; Polonio et al., 2015). Lindner and Sutter (2013) ﬁnd that
under time pressure behavior in the 11-20 game is, perhaps coincidentally,
closer to the Nash equilibrium. Recently, Alaoui and Penta (2016b) have
incorporated deliberation times into a model of endogenous depth of reason-
ing, with the key assumption being that each additional step of reasoning
increases deliberation times. Gill and Prowse (2017) use deliberation times
to measure strategic complexity in a repeated p-beauty contest game and
show that “overthinking,” that is, thinking longer than usual, is detrimental
to performance.
We provide a simple model linking cognitive sophistication and deliber-
ation times, taking into account stylized facts from the psychophysiological
literature on response times. In our model we view the total deliberation
time of an observed choice as the sum of “decision times” for a chain of
binary “hypothetical choices” as implicitly postulated in the literature on it-
erative thinking, and explicitly assumed in Alaoui and Penta (2016b). The
key assumption of the model is then that the time required for each step is a
decreasing function of the distance to indiﬀerence, as captured by the poten-
tial gain of conducting an additional step of reasoning. The model provides
empirically testable predictions regarding the relation of deliberation times,
choices and cognitive sophistication, as well as regarding the eﬀects of in-
centives on both the level of cognitive sophistication, as revealed by choices,
and the psychophysiological correlate embodied in deliberation times. We
then test the predictions in an experiment using two diﬀerent games com-
monly used to study iterative thinking: the beauty contest game (or guessing
game) (Nagel, 1995), which is the workhorse in that literature, and the 11-20
money request game, recently introduced by Arad and Rubinstein (2012),
in the graphical version of Goeree et al. (2016). In our experiment subjects
play diﬀerent variants of the 11-20 game, which allows us to vary the payoﬀ
structure, hence the incentives, without aﬀecting the underlying best-reply
structure. Using deliberation times as a proxy for cognitive eﬀort in these
strategic situations, we then argue that process data, such as deliberation
times, can provide additional evidence that the underlying decision processes
are indeed based on some form of step-wise reasoning.
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In the beauty contest game we ﬁnd longer deliberation times for choices
commonly associated with more steps of reasoning, conﬁrming the prediction
of our model that deliberation time is increasing in cognitive eﬀort. In three
variants of the 11-20 game, we show that deliberation times are longer for
higher-level choices, at least in situations where the payoﬀ structure is such
that following level-k type of reasoning is salient enough. However, when
iterative thinking is not natural or when a conﬂict with alternative decision
rules (e.g., based on the salience of high payoﬀs) is likely, we ﬁnd no system-
atic relation between higher-level choices and deliberation times. Rather, in
this situation we ﬁnd overall longer deliberation times suggesting a conﬂict
between competing decision rules. That is, features besides the best-reply
structure matter as well, but deliberation times can serve as a tool to identify
such situations. The second prediction of our model relates changes in the
incentives to deliberation times and predicts shorter deliberation times for a
given number of steps when the incentives are increased. This captures the
stylized fact that “decisions” closer to indiﬀerence require more deliberation.
In one treatment we ﬁnd overall shorter deliberation times when incentives
are increased, while at the same we observe more higher-level choices. This
might sound counterintuitive at ﬁrst, since intuitively more steps of reasoning
should increase deliberation times. However, our model predicts that at the
same time higher incentives decrease the time required for each single step,
which can explain this ﬁnding. Indeed, in that treatment we ﬁnd that when
incentives are increased the deliberation time per step decreases. Further, we
show that a decrease in incentives only leads to longer deliberation times and
can be explained by longer deliberation times per step, as predicted by our
model, if it is systematic and suﬃciently large. Further, we ﬁnd a systematic
eﬀect of incentives on the depth of reasoning, that is in line with previous
ﬁndings in the literature (Alaoui and Penta, 2016a).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces our model
and relates it to existing models in the literature. Section 3.3 describes
the experimental design. Section 3.4 presents the results of our experiment.
In Section 3.5 we presents additional analysis. Section 3.6 discusses and
summarizes our ﬁndings.
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3.2 The Model
We explicitly model decision making as a process of iterative reasoning as
put forward in the literature on iterative thinking (Nagel, 1995; Stahl, 1993;
Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Ho et al., 1998). Our model yields testable predic-
tions linking deliberation times to choices and incentives in a speciﬁc class
of strategic games.
Consider a symmetric, two-player game Γ = (π, S) with ﬁnite strategy
space S and payoﬀ function π : S × S −→ R. Assume that for any s ∈ S
there is a unique best-reply, denoted by BR(s), that maximizes π(·, s). The
best-reply structure of Γ for a starting point s0 ∈ S is a sequence (s
∗
k)k∈N such
that s∗0 = s0 and s
∗
k = BR(s
∗
k−1). Fix a best-reply structure (s
∗
k)k∈N with
starting point s0. We model a process of iterative thinking as a sequence of
binary “choices,” where in each step a player evaluates the current strategy
s∗k−1, reached after k− 1 steps of thinking, against strategy s
∗
k by comparing
π(s∗k−1, s
∗
k−1) against π(s
∗
k, s
∗
k−1). In other words, the player considers the
case where his opponent has also conducted k − 1 steps of thinking, hence
uses strategy s∗k−1, and then evaluates the potential gain from conducting
an additional step of thinking, that is π(s∗k, s
∗
k−1)− π(s
∗
k−1, s
∗
k−1). Note that
this last evaluation does not necessarily involve conscious calculations, but
should rather be understood as a proxy that determines whether to engage
in additional deliberation. For example, one way to think about is that this
evaluation happens automatically and that the controlled process of iterative
thinking only takes over when the payoﬀ is large enough. In addition, we
assume that each step of thinking comes with a cognitive cost. The cognitive
cost associated with the kth step of thinking is given by ci(k) with ci : N −→
R+ weakly increasing. Thus the maximal number of steps of thinking player
i is willing (or able) to conduct is given by Ti = min{k ∈ N | π(s
∗
k+1, s
∗
k) −
π(s∗k, s
∗
k) < ci(k)}.
Denote by uk = π(s
∗
k, s
∗
k−1) − π(s
∗
k−1, s
∗
k−1) the potential gain of the kth
step of thinking. We link this simple model of iterative thinking to delibera-
tion times via two basic assumptions. First, we assume that the deliberation
time for conducting k steps of thinking is the sum of the deliberation times
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required for each step. Second, we assume that the deliberation time for a
given step of thinking is larger the smaller the potential gain/loss for that
step. This models a well-established fact in psychology that “decisions” closer
to indiﬀerence are slower (Dashiell, 1937; Mosteller and Nogee, 1951; Moyer
and Landauer, 1967). The deliberation time of player i for choosing strategy
s∗k is given by
DTi(s
∗
k) =
k∑
i=0
fi(|ui|) with fi : R+ −→ R++ strictly decreasing and positive.
We say that a strategy s requires more cognitive effort compared to s′, if
it is the result of more steps of reasoning, that is s = s∗k and s
′ = s∗k′ with
k > k′. In that case, our model implies that DTi(s) > DTi(s
′) if s requires
more cognitive eﬀort than s′.
Prediction 1 (Cognitive Eﬀort). Deliberation time is increasing in cognitive
eﬀort.
This prediction is straightforward and is also a prediction of Alaoui and
Penta (2016b). The following prediction, however, is particular to our model
where we in addition assume that that deliberation time per step is a decreas-
ing function of the utility diﬀerences. This allows us to derive predictions on
how changing the incentives, that is, the payoﬀ structure of the game, aﬀects
deliberation times. Consider two symmetric, two-player games Γ = (π, S)
and Γ′ = (π′, S) with the same strategy space S and the same best reply
structure (s∗k)k∈N with starting point s0. We say that Γ
′ has higher payoff
differences than Γ for step k if u′k > uk where uk = π(s
∗
k, s
∗
k−1)−π(s
∗
k−1, s
∗
k−1)
and u′k = π
′(s∗k, s
∗
k−1) − π
′(s∗k−1, s
∗
k−1). Suppose Γ
′ has higher payoﬀ diﬀer-
ences than Γ for any step l ≤ k for some k, then DT ′i (s
∗
k) =
∑k
i=0 fi(|u
′
i|) <∑k
i=0 fi(|ui|) = DTi(s
∗
k) because f(|u
′
l|) < f(|ul|) for all l ≤ k.
Prediction 2 (Incentives). The deliberation time for a choice corresponding
to k steps of thinking is shorter (longer) if the payoﬀ diﬀerences for all steps
up to k are increased (decreased).
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For a ﬁxed number of steps of thinking our model predicts shorter de-
liberation times for higher payoﬀ diﬀerences, because a player requires less
time for each step. Note that this does not necessarily imply that one should
observe longer total deliberation times for higher payoﬀ diﬀerences. This is
because higher payoﬀ diﬀerences might increase the gain from conducting
another step of thinking as well, hence subjects potentially conduct more
steps of thinking, which in turn increases deliberation time.
It is conceivable that individual diﬀerences in cognitive ability aﬀect delib-
eration times. In our model cognitive ability could aﬀect deliberation times
in two ways: First, higher cognitive ability could translate into uniformly
lower cognitive costs of reasoning ci. In that case, players with higher cogni-
tive ability are likely to conduct more steps of reasoning, because Ti ≥ T
′
i if
ci(k) ≥ c
′
i(k) for all k ≤ Ti, which would increase overall deliberation time.
Second, higher cognitive ability could also translate into shorter deliberation
times per step, which would decrease deliberation times. However, that does
not mean that deliberation time for players with high cognitive ability will
generally be shorter (independently of the number of steps). This is because
higher cognitive ability might also result in more steps of reasoning requiring
additional deliberation time, so that the overall eﬀect on deliberation times
is indeterminate.
3.2.1 Related Models
In this subsection, we discuss related models that account for response or
deliberation times. The model closest to ours is Alaoui and Penta (2016b)
which extends the model of “Endogeneous Depth of Reasoning” in Alaoui and
Penta (2016a) to account for deliberation times. Alaoui and Penta (2016a)
provide a model of iterative thinking where the depth of reasoning is endoge-
nously determined and results from a cost-beneﬁt analysis. Alaoui and Penta
(2016b) discuss how this model can be used to make comparative statics pre-
dictions for deliberation times. Total response time for a given number of
steps of reasoning is the sum of the times required to attain the necessary
unit of understanding for each step. Hence their model also predicts (for
77
Chapter 3 Cognitive Sophistication and Deliberation Times
suﬃciently similar games) that response time is increasing in the depth of
reasoning. Like we do, they assume that the depth of reasoning is deter-
mined by the “value of reasoning” and the “cost of reasoning.” The former
is linked to the payoﬀ structure of the game, whereas the latter depends on
the complexity of the game. They assume that the value of reasoning has
a maximum gain representation (Alaoui and Penta, 2015), that is, it equals
the highest possible payoﬀ improvement that an agent could obtain by using
the “next step strategy” instead of the current one. The key diﬀerence to
our model is that we assume that deliberation time of a given step is de-
creasing in the utility diﬀerences. In their model the value of reasoning is
also related to diﬀerences in payoﬀs between alternatives, however, a higher
value of reasoning only aﬀects total deliberation times because it increases
the probability of conducting another step, but not the time required for a
given step, which is a key assumption in our model.
Chabris et al. (2009) study the allocation of time across decision prob-
lems. Their model is similar in spirit to ours in that it is motivated by the
closeness-to-indiﬀerence eﬀect. They also model response time as a decreas-
ing function of diﬀerences in expected utility. However, in contrast to our
model they focus on binary intertemporal choices and do not consider iter-
ative reasoning. They report empirical evidence that choosing among two
options whose expected utilities are close requires longer decision times than
when expected utilities are far apart, thus indicating an inverse relationship
between average response time and utility diﬀerences. They argue that their
results support the view that decision-making is a cognitive costly activity
that allocates time according to cost-beneﬁt principles, which is also in line
with the interpretation in Alaoui and Penta (2016b).
Echenique and Saito (2017) give an axiomatic characterization for when
data on choices and deliberation times is consistent with a monotonic re-
lationship between response time and diﬀerences in utility. Their model is
related to ours in that we also assume that there is a monotone relationship
between deliberation time and the utility diﬀerence between staying with
the current strategy or conducting an additional step of reasoning. However,
their model focuses on binary, discrete choices, while the focus of our model
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is iterative thinking of the level-k type.
3.3 Experimental Design
In the previous section we have introduced a simple model linking depth of
reasoning to deliberation times. In this section we report results from an
experiment which allows us to test the predictions of this model. Our main
objective is to study whether depth of reasoning can be linked to a sim-
ple measure of cognitive eﬀort, namely deliberation times. The motivation
for this is to use an independent measure as a potential validation of iter-
ative thinking. We use two games commonly employed to study cognitive
sophistication, the beauty contest game (Nagel, 1995), the workhorse model
of iterative thinking, and the 11-20 money request game, a more recent al-
ternative that was explicitly designed to study level-k behavior (Arad and
Rubinstein, 2012). We ask whether a higher level of reasoning is reﬂected
in higher cognitive eﬀort, or in other words, is there a direct link between
higher levels of reasoning and deliberation times? We use diﬀerent variations
of the 11-20 game, including a variant introduced in Goeree et al. (2016),
that vary the incentives for iterative thinking, but do not aﬀect the underly-
ing best-reply structure of the game. This allows us to study how behavior
and deliberation times react to systematic changes in the payoﬀ structure.
3.3.1 The Games
The Beauty Contest Game
The standard work horse for the study of cognitive sophistication is the
guessing game, or p-beauty contest game (Nagel, 1995). We use a standard,
one-shot p-beauty game with p = 2/3. In the (discrete) beauty contest
game a population of players has to simultaneously guess an integer number
between 0 and 100. The winner is the person whose guess is closest to p times
the average of all chosen numbers. The winner receives a ﬁxed price, which is
split equally among all winners in case of a tie. The beauty contest game is a
game with usually more than two players. Since our model is about bilateral
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A9 A8 A7 A6 A5 A4 A3 A2 A1 20
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Figure 3.1: Generalized 11-20 game.
interactions it cannot be directly applied to this situation. However, in the
beauty contest game a player’s payoﬀ depends only on the average number
chosen by all other players and iterative thinking in this game is typically
based on beliefs about an representative agent. Thus we can apply our model
by viewing this game as a two-player game against a representative agent,
who selects that average number.
In this game it is usually assumed that non-strategic (level-0) players pick
a number at random from the uniform distribution over {0, . . . , 100}, which
yields an expected average of 50. Hence, we assume that the starting point
for iterative thinking is given by s∗0 = 50. If all players choose s
∗
0, then the
average of all numbers chosen is 50 and hence the best-reply to s∗0 is to choose
s∗1 = 33, that is the integer closest to (2/3) · 50. Iterating, this deﬁnes the
best-reply structure of the beauty contest game (s∗k) where s
∗
k is the integer
closest to (2/3)k · 50. This game has two Nash equilibria at 0 and 1.
The 11-20 Game
The second part of our experiment focuses on variants of the 11-20 money
request game, that was introduced by Arad and Rubinstein (2012) as a
two-player game that is speciﬁcally well-suited to study iterative reason-
ing. Alaoui and Penta (2016a) used the 11-20 game to test their model of
endogenous depth of reasoning. Goeree et al. (2016) introduced a graphical
version of the 11-20 game that allows to vary the payoﬀ structure without
aﬀecting the underlying best-reply structure of the game. We now describe
a generalized version of this graphical 11-20 game. In what follows, we will
refer to this game (and variants thereof) simply as “11-20 game.”
Consider ten boxes horizontally aligned and numbered from 9 (far left)
to 0 (far right) as depicted in Figure 3.1. Each box b ∈ {1, . . . , 9} contains
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BASE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
EXTR 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 20
FLAT 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 20
Figure 3.2: Payoff structure for the different variants with low cost.
an amount Ab < 20 and the rightmost box contains the highest amount of
A0 = 20. There are two players, i = 1, 2 and each has to choose a box
bi ∈ {0, . . . , 9}. Each player receives the amount Abi in the box he chose
plus a bonus of R if he chose the box that is exactly one to the left of his
opponent’s box. That is, payoﬀs are given by
Πi(bi | b−i) =


Abi if bi 6= b−i + 1
Abi +R if bi = b−i + 1
.
A feature of this game is that choosing box 0 is the salient and obvious
candidate for a non-strategic level-0 choice, because it awards the highest
“sure payoﬀ” of 20 that can be obtained without any strategic considerations.
Thus, the rightmost box 0 is a natural anchor serving as a starting point
for iterative thinking. If the bonus R is large enough, that is, R > 20 −
min{Ab|b = 1, . . . 9}, then the best-reply structure for the salient starting
point s∗0 = 0 is (s
∗
k)k with s
∗
k = k for k = 1, . . . , 9.
2 In other words, for
a suﬃciently large bonus the best-reply is always to choose the box that is
exactly one to the left of your opponent (if there is such a box). Note that for
s∗0 = 0 the best-reply structure is independent of the speciﬁc payoﬀ structure
given by A9, . . . , A1 if R > 20−min{Ab|b = 1, . . . 9} and A0 = 20, that is, if
the bonus is large enough and the rightmost box contains the salient amount
of 20.
2Note that the best-reply to an opponent choosing box 9 is to choose box 0, hence for
k > 9 the best-reply structure cycles repeatedly from 0 to 9. For simplicity, we abstract
from this issue and focus only on steps 1-9. Alaoui and Penta (2016a) use a slightly diﬀerent
payoﬀ structure with an additional bonus in case of a tie that breaks this best-reply cycle.
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We use the three versions of the 11-20 game shown in Figure 3.2.3 The
sure payoﬀs given by the amounts A0, . . . , A9 diﬀer across versions, however,
they are always chosen such that they feature the best-reply structure just
described above. In the baseline version (BASE) the amounts are increasing
from the left box to the rightmost box, containing the highest amount of
20. BASE corresponds to the original version of Arad and Rubinstein (2012)
and to the baseline version of Goeree et al. (2016). In BASE there is a nat-
ural trade-oﬀ between the sure payoﬀs A1, . . . , A9 and the bonus, that can
be obtained by outsmarting ones opponent, with each incremental step of
reasoning being equally costly in terms of sure payoﬀ. The extreme version
(EXTR) was previously used in Goeree et al. (2016). In this version, the
amounts in the boxes are rearranged so that they are decreasing from left
to right with the second highest amount in the leftmost box. While this
rearrangement does not alter the underlying best-reply structure, it crucially
aﬀects the cost in terms of sure payoﬀ associated with diﬀerent levels of rea-
soning. Choosing box 1 is now disproportionately expensive, and further
increments come, in terms of sure payoﬀ, at no cost but instead at a gain.
Moreover, this asymmetry potentially opens the door for alternative heuris-
tics, such as choosing the highest amount that still grants the possibility for
a bonus, which in this case would imply choosing the leftmost amount. The
third version we use was introduced to remove the trade-oﬀ between higher
steps of reasoning and sure payoﬀ. This ﬂat cost version (FLAT) is a modiﬁ-
cation of BASE, where the ﬁrst iteration results in a ﬂat cost, but after that
all additional steps are identical and come at no further cost in terms of sure
payoﬀ. FLAT could be viewed as a modiﬁcation of Arad and Rubinstein’s
(2012) costless iterations version. In FLAT all boxes except the rightmost
box contain the same amount, which is by some ﬁxed amount lower than
the salient amount of 20. Thus, choosing any box except the rightmost gives
the same sure payoﬀ and, hence, after the ﬁrst step any additional step is
“costless.”
3For each of the three versions BASE, EXTR, and FLAT there is a unique
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. For the low cost and low bonus versions those
are given by (0, 0, 0, 0, 0.25, 0.25, 0.2, 0.15, 0.1, 0.05), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.15, 0.40, 0.45), and
(0, 0, 0, 0.10, 0.15, 0.15, 0.15, 0.15, 0.15, 0.15), respectively.
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BASE 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
EXTR 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 20
FLAT 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 20
Figure 3.3: Payoff structure for the different variants with high cost.
We varied these three versions of the 11-20 game along two additional
dimensions: First, for each treatment we have a “high cost” version, where for
BASE and EXTR the amounts A1, . . . , A9 range from 2 to 20 in increments
of 2 instead of from 11 to 20 in increments of 1, and for FLAT all amounts
other than 20 were set to 14 in the high cost version instead of 17 (see Figure
3.3). Depending on the treatment, the trade-oﬀ between bonus and sure
payoﬀ for an additional step of reasoning is decreased or increased under
high cost. Second, we vary the incentive to reason in that we change the size
of the bonus for choosing the box exactly one to the left of the other subject.
In the high bonus condition, subjects obtain R = 40 additional points for
the “correct” box, while in the low bonus condition they only get R = 20
additional points.
3.3.2 Design and Procedures
The experiment consisted of three parts during which subjects could earn
points with 10 points being worth e 0.25. First, each subject played a series of
diﬀerent versions of the money request game. Each treatment BASE, EXTR,
and FLAT was played four times, once for each bonus-cost combination.
Second, subjects participated in a single p-beauty contest with p = (2/3). In
the third part we collected several individual correlates intended to control for
cognitive ability, social value orientation, aversion to strategic uncertainty,
swiftness, and demographics. There was no feedback during the course of
the experiment, that is, subjects did not learn the choices of their opponents
nor did they get any information regarding their earnings until the very end
of the experiment. All decisions were made independently and at a subject’s
individual pace. In particular, subject’s never had to wait for the decisions of
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another subject except for the very end of the experiment, at that point they
had to wait until everybody had completed the experiment so that outcomes
and payoﬀs could be realized.
We now describe each part of the experiment in detail. For the 11-20
games, we randomly assigned the subjects within a session to one of four
randomized sequences of the games to control for order eﬀects.4 Subjects
were informed that for every game they would be randomly matched with
a new opponent to determine their payoﬀ for that round, hence preserving
the one-shot character of the interaction. Each of the three variants BASE,
EXTR and FLAT was played exactly four times, once for each possible com-
bination of cost (low/high) and bonus (low/high).
In the second part, subjects played a single p-beauty game with p = 2/3
among all 32 participants in the session. The winner, that is, the subject
whose guess was closest to 2/3 times the average of all choices, received 500
points. In case of a tie, that is, when there were multiple winners, the amount
was split equally among all winners.
In the ﬁnal part of the experiment, participants answered a series of
questions. First, subjects completed a combined version of the CRT with
nine items consisting of the classical three items from Frederick (2005), three
additional items taken from Toplak et al. (2014), and two further items in-
troduced by Primi et al. (2015).5 Subjects received 5 points for each correct
answer. Next, we elicited aversion to strategic uncertainty using the method
by Heinemann et al. (2009) with random groups of four. The task involves
measuring certainty equivalents, similarly to Holt and Laury (2002a)’s mul-
tiple price list method, for a situation where payoﬀs depend on the decision
of another subject, that is, strategic uncertainty. In ten situations subjects
have to choose between diﬀerent amounts of sure payoﬀs (5 to 50 points)
and a binary coordination game, in which they can earn 50 points if at least
4The exact sequences are provided in Table 3.9 in Appendix 3.A. Besides our main
treatments the sequences contained a further treatment with four additional games dis-
cussed in Section 3.5.2.
5Other studies (Cappelen et al., 2013; Gill and Prowse, 2016) have also used the Raven
test as a proxy for cognitive ability. Brañas-Garza et al. (2012) used the Raven test and
the CRT by Frederick (2005) in a series of six one-shot p-beauty games and ﬁnd that CRT
predicts lower choices (i.e. higher level), while performance in the Raven test does not.
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two other members of their group have also chosen the coordination game
and zero points otherwise. Subjects were randomly allocated into groups of
four, and for each group one of the decision situations was randomly selected
for payment. Finally, we collect a measure to control for diﬀerences in me-
chanical swiftness (Cappelen et al., 2013). To that end we recorded the time
needed to complete four simple demographic questions on gender, age, ﬁeld of
study, and native language. This part was integrated into a larger question-
naire, which also comprised questions regarding subjects’ understanding of
the tasks, their perception of its complexity, number of university semesters,
left- or right-handedness, average amount of money needed per month, and
previous attendance of a lecture in game theory.
To determine a subject’s earning in the experiment the payoﬀs from each
part were added up and converted to e at rate of e 0.25 for each 10 points. In
addition subjects received a show-up fee of e 4 for an average total renumera-
tion of e 15.67. A session lasted on average 60 minutes including instructions
and payment.
A total of 128 subjects (79 female) participated in 4 experimental ses-
sions with 32 subjects each. Participants were recruited from the student
population of the University of Cologne using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), ex-
cluding students of psychology, economics, and economics related ﬁelds, as
well as experienced subjects who already participated in more than 10 ex-
periments. The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for
Economic Research (CLER) and was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007).
3.4 Results
In Subsection 3.4.1 we analyze behavior and deliberation times in the beauty
contest game. Subsection 3.4.2 presents the results for the 11-20 games.
Results regarding the eﬀect of incentives in the 11-20 game are presented in
Subsection 3.4.3.
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Figure 3.4: Choices and deliberation times in the beauty contest game.
Notes: Left panel shows histogram of guesses (0-100) in the beauty contest game (N =
128). Right panel shows a scatter plot of guesses (0-100) vs associated deliberation time
(in s) in the beauty contest game and plots the result of a linear regression of choice on
deliberation times with 95% conﬁdence interval.
3.4.1 Results for the Beauty Contest Game
We ﬁrst explore the relation of depth of reasoning, as revealed by choices,
cognitive ability and deliberation times in the beauty contest game.
The left panel of Figure 3.4 depicts the distribution of choices in the
beauty contest game. Of the 128 subjects only 2 chose the Nash Equilibrium
strategy of 0, 23 chose a number close to 33 (level-1), 9 chose a number close
to 22 (level-2), 15 chose a number close to 15 (level-3), and 3 chose a num-
ber corresponding to higher levels. The target numbers in our four sessions
were 27, 28, 29 and 32 and the respective winning numbers were 28, 27, 30
and 32. Hence, the best-performing strategy (among the level-k strategies)
would have been the level-1 choice of 33. We classify all choices that are at
a distance of at most 2 from the level-k strategy as level-k.6 Overall behav-
ior is in line with previous results in the literature, that commonly observe
mostly one to three steps of reasoning and a signiﬁcant amount of unclassiﬁed
(random) choices usually thought of as level-0. The right panel of Figure 3.4
shows a scatter plot of subjects’ guesses and the corresponding time taken for
6Choices between 31 and 35 were classiﬁed as level-1, choices between 20 and 24 as
level-2, choices between 13 and 17 as level-3, choices between 8 and 12 as level-4, choices
between, 5 and 7 as level-5, and choices of 0 as Nash Equilibrium. There were no choices
between 1 and 5. Our results are unchanged for narrower classiﬁcations, e.g. where only
the level-k strategy ±1 are classiﬁed as level-k.
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Table 3.1: Linear regressions on log DT for the beauty contest game.
log DT 1 2 3
Level 0.1264∗∗ 0.1352∗∗
(0.0593) (0.0617)
CRTExtended 0.0017 −0.0173
(0.0316) (0.0323)
Swiftness −0.2836 −0.2780 −0.3225
(0.4463) (0.4306) (0.4399)
Female −0.2640∗ −0.2237 −0.2420∗
(0.1418) (0.1353) (0.1400)
Constant 3.1202∗∗∗ 3.0158∗∗∗ 3.1016∗∗∗
(0.2353) (0.1668) (0.2319)
Adjusted R2 0.0114 0.0468 0.0412
F-Test 1.4784 3.0456∗∗ 2.3422∗
Observations 126 126 126
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Two subjects
with very fast choices of 0 were excluded from the analysis. Our results are robust when
those choices are included and classiﬁed as level-0. Classiﬁcation of levels: Level 1 (31-35),
Level 2 (20-24), Level 3 (12-17), Level 4 (7-11), Level 0 (rest). There were no choices in
the range 1-6. CRTExtended (number of correct answers; 0-7); Swiftness (time needed to
answer 3 demographic questions); Female (dummy).
that choice. The slope of the regression line suggests a negative correlation
between deliberation times and “higher-level” choices. Hence, indicating that
choices corresponding to more steps of reasoning require longer deliberation
times.
Our model predicts that deliberation time is increasing in cognitive ef-
fort (Prediction 1), that is, we expect longer deliberation times for choices
associated with more steps of reasoning. We now test this prediction using a
series of three linear regressions with log transformed deliberation times (log
DT) as dependent variable and controls for gender and individual diﬀerences
in mechanical swiftness (Cappelen et al., 2013). The results of those regres-
sions are presented in Table 3.1. In model 1, we see that cognitive ability,
measured by the extended CRT, has no eﬀect on deliberation times. Recall
that in our model the overall eﬀect of cognitive ability on deliberation time is
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indeterminate because there are two possible eﬀects that might be counter-
vailing. Model 2 shows a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of higher-level choices on
deliberation time. Thus, we ﬁnd, in line with Prediction 1, that deliberation
time is increasing in cognitive eﬀort. This result remains robust when we
additionally control for cognitive ability (model 3).7
Performance in the CRT was previously found to be correlated with level
in the beauty contest (Brañas-Garza et al., 2012). Conducting an additional
linear regression with level as dependent variable on CRT, we ﬁnd a signif-
icant and positive coeﬃcient for CRT (β = 0.1462, p = 0.009). This result
indicates that, in line with previous results in the literature, subjects with
higher cognitive ability conduct more steps of reasoning.
3.4.2 Results for the 11-20 Games
In this section we analyze the relation between deliberation times, choices
and cognitive ability in the three versions of the 11-20 game.
We ﬁrst consider the observed behavior across the diﬀerent variants of
the 11-20 game.8 Choices in BASE closely resemble the behavioral patterns
found in Arad and Rubinstein (2012) and Goeree et al. (2016). Most subjects
selected one of the 3 rightmost boxes corresponding to levels 0 to 3. In EXTR,
behavior is comparable to that observed in Goeree et al. (2016) and vastly
diﬀerent from that observed in BASE. There is a large fraction of subjects
(between 38% and 62%) choosing the rightmost box containing the salient
amount of 20, but box 1 and 2 to its left are chosen very rarely compared to
BASE. Instead between 25% and 33% of subjects chose one of the leftmost
boxes 8 and 9, which were essentially not chosen at all in BASE. These choices
correspond to eight or nine steps of reasoning. In contrast, behavior in FLAT
is again very similar to that in BASE with most choices corresponding to not
more than three steps of reasoning. Compared to BASE there is a larger
7Throughout the paper we use the results from the 7-item CRT by Toplak et al. (2014)
as measure of cognitive ability. Subject’s also answered the two additional items proposed
by Primi et al. (2015). Our results do not change if we use their version or a combination
of both instead.
8Figure 3.6 in Appendix 3.B shows the distribution of choices across all instances of
the 11-20 game.
88
Chapter 3 Cognitive Sophistication and Deliberation Times
Table 3.2: Random effects log DT regressions on level (full sample).
log DT 1 2 3
Level 0.0385∗∗∗ 0.0272∗∗∗ 0.0282∗∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0060)
EXTR 0.1631∗∗∗ 0.1614∗∗∗
(0.0351) (0.0352)
FLAT −0.0309 −0.0308
(0.0337) (0.0338)
CRTExtended 0.0572∗∗∗
(0.0165)
Swiftness 0.2607 0.2626 0.4155∗
(0.2406) (0.2407) (0.2335)
Female 0.0943 0.0932 0.1654∗∗
(0.0744) (0.0744) (0.0738)
Period −0.0884∗∗∗ −0.0889∗∗∗ −0.0889∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Constant 2.5943∗∗∗ 2.5788∗∗∗ 2.2628∗∗∗
(0.0928) (0.0944) (0.1284)
R2 (overall) 0.3056 0.3132 0.3417
Wald-Test 1299.4016∗∗∗ 1371.6146∗∗∗ 1385.4388∗∗∗
Observations 1536 1536 1536
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. A choice of box
k ∈ {0, . . . , 9} is classiﬁed as level k; EXTR and FLAT are treatment dummies; CRTEx-
tended (number of correct answers; 0-7); Swiftness (time needed to answer 3 demographic
questions); Female (dummy); Period controls for position in the sequence of games.
fraction of level-0 choices in FLAT, which is most likely due to the ﬁrst step
being more costly in terms of sure payoﬀ. When playing against the empirical
distribution of choices the best-performing strategies for BASE, EXTR and
FLAT would correspond to level 2, level 1 and level 1, respectively.9
Table 3.2 shows a series of four GLS random-eﬀects regressions with log
DT as the dependent variable including as observations all 12 choices in
BASE, EXTR, and FLAT. In all models we control for mechanical swiftness,
gender and the position within the sequence of games (Period). We ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant and positive relation between deliberation times and depth of rea-
9Controlling for empirical payoﬀs does not aﬀect our results.
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soning. As predicted, choices associated with more steps of thinking require
more deliberation (model 1). This relation is unaﬀected when we include
the treatment dummies EXTR and FLAT in model 2. Further, we observe
a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient on EXTR indicating that choices in EXTR
generally required more deliberation time. In fact, the average deliberation
time in EXTR was 12.6 seconds, whereas the average deliberation time in
BASE and FLAT was only 9.9 seconds. Pairwise Wilcoxon signed rank tests
conﬁrm that the average deliberation time in EXTR is signiﬁcantly higher
compared to both BASE (N = 128, z = 4.6778, p < 0.001) and FLAT
(N = 128, z = 4.3746, p < 0.001). In model 3 we include performance in
the CRT, as measured by the number of correct answers, as an independent
variable to control for cognitive ability. The coeﬃcient of CRT is signiﬁcant
and positive, that is, subjects scoring higher on the CRT take more time to
make their decisions. More importantly, controlling for cognitive ability does
not alter the eﬀects of level and EXTR on deliberation times.
In a next step, we repeat the same exercise separately for each of the
three treatments BASE, EXTR and FLAT. To that end, we run separate
regressions considering only the four choices taken for each of the variants.
Table 3.3 presents the results of these regressions. The results conﬁrm our
previous ﬁndings, there is a positive signiﬁcant relation between deliberation
times and higher-level choices in all three variants of the game. There is no
eﬀect of cognitive ability on deliberation times in BASE, whereas we ﬁnd a
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect in EXTR and FLAT.
Considering the diﬀerent variants separately has the advantage that we
now can check for potential explanations for the previously observed relation
between deliberation times and higher-level choices. In all variants a choice
of the rightmost box is appealing for various reasons. First, it maximizes the
sure payoﬀ as the requested sure amount by selecting this box is 20 and thus
maximal. Second, it minimizes strategic uncertainty as it yields a payoﬀ of
20 independent of the choice of the other player, which is also what makes
it a salient level-0 strategy. To better understand how the diﬀerences in the
payoﬀ structure between the treatments aﬀect the relation of deliberation
times, choices and cognitive ability we ran additional regressions where we
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Table 3.3: Random effects log DT regressions on level.
BASE EXTR FLAT
log DT 1 2 3
Level 0.0449∗∗ 0.0277∗∗∗ 0.0532∗∗∗
(0.0182) (0.0079) (0.0152)
CRTExtended 0.0280 0.0848∗∗∗ 0.0628∗∗∗
(0.0186) (0.0207) (0.0186)
Swiftness 0.5335∗∗ 0.2254 0.4919∗
(0.2632) (0.2925) (0.2617)
Female 0.1313 0.1926∗∗ 0.1883∗∗
(0.0834) (0.0925) (0.0830)
Period −0.0878∗∗∗ −0.0843∗∗∗ −0.0934∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0053) (0.0050)
Constant 2.3286∗∗∗ 2.3157∗∗∗ 2.1742∗∗∗
(0.1511) (0.1649) (0.1497)
R2 (overall) 0.3298 0.3148 0.3621
Wald-Test 352.7159∗∗∗ 300.5368∗∗∗ 378.8169∗∗∗
Observations 512 512 512
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Models
are restricted to subsamples including only the four decisions in BASE, EXTR or FLAT,
respectively. A choice of box k ∈ {0, . . . , 9} is classiﬁed as level k; CRTExtended (number
of correct answers; 0-7); Swiftness (time needed to answer 3 demographic questions);
Female (dummy); Period controls for position in the sequence of games.
add further variables controlling for speciﬁc features of the payoﬀ structure.
First, to check whether choices of the rightmost box are particularly fast,
we include a dummy indicating those choices, denoted Rightmost20, in the
regressions. Further, in EXTR a choice of the leftmost box could also be
salient because it combines a high sure payoﬀ with a chance of getting the
bonus. We thus include another dummy, denoted LeftmostBox, into the
regression for EXTR. Table 3.4 shows the results of these regressions.
In BASE we still observe a clear positive relation between deliberation
time and level after controlling for choices of the rightmost box, which in
turn are not signiﬁcantly faster. In EXTR choices of the rightmost box are
signiﬁcantly faster and this explains most of the eﬀect of level on deliberation
times, in particular, level becomes insigniﬁcant when adding the dummy
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Table 3.4: Random effects log DT regressions with controls for the payoff structure.
BASE EXTR FLAT
log DT 1 2 3
Level 0.0658∗∗∗ −0.0164 0.0202
(0.0210) (0.0183) (0.0182)
Rightmost20 0.1634∗ −0.3438∗∗∗ −0.2356∗∗∗
(0.0835) (0.0991) (0.0728)
LeftmostBox 0.1010
(0.1201)
CRTExtended 0.0330∗ 0.0860∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗
(0.0189) (0.0207) (0.0183)
Swiftness 0.5424∗∗ 0.1841 0.4671∗
(0.2646) (0.2893) (0.2571)
Female 0.1359 0.1912∗∗ 0.2034∗∗
(0.0839) (0.0911) (0.0817)
Period −0.0862∗∗∗ −0.0845∗∗∗ −0.0921∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0053) (0.0050)
Constant 2.2255∗∗∗ 2.6161∗∗∗ 2.3138∗∗∗
(0.1605) (0.1881) (0.1534)
R2 (overall) 0.3294 0.3330 0.3785
Wald-Test 360.2338∗∗∗ 317.7823∗∗∗ 394.5066∗∗∗
Observations 512 512 512
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Models
are restricted to subsamples including only the four decisions in BASE, EXTR or FLAT,
respectively. A choice of box k ∈ {0, . . . , 9} is classiﬁed as level k; Rightmost20 (dummy
for choosing rightmost box); LeftmostBox (dummy for choosing leftmost box); CRTEx-
tended (number of correct answers; 0-7); Swiftness (time needed to answer 3 demographic
questions); Female (dummy); Period controls for position in the sequence of games.
Rightmost20. Also in FLAT we observe very fast level-0 choices, and no
further relation between deliberation times and level. In BASE iterative
thinking is associated with an increasing cost and in this variant we observe
the strongest link between deliberation times and level. This eﬀect also goes
beyond the observation that choices of the rightmost box containing the
salient amount of 20 are faster (in fact they are even slower in BASE). In
contrast, for EXTR and FLAT most of the eﬀect is explained by fast level-0
choices. In EXTR we ﬁnd no systematic relation between deliberation times
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and higher level choices. Also there is no eﬀect on deliberation times for
the leftmost box. This result suggests that iterative thinking might be less
dominant in EXTR than for example in BASE although they feature the
same best-reply structure. In FLAT the comparably large cost associated
with the ﬁrst step of reasoning results in a large fraction of subjects choosing
the rightmost box and these choices are faster. However, beyond that we
do not ﬁnd evidence for a similar relation between higher-level choices and
deliberation times in FLAT.
In summary, we ﬁnd generally longer deliberation times for higher-level
choices, which is in line with Prediction 1. But, this result has to be qual-
iﬁed. Although deliberation time increases with cognitive eﬀort in all three
treatments, we ﬁnd this relation to be strongest in BASE. In EXTR, we ﬁnd
that level-0 choices are signiﬁcantly faster, however, we ﬁnd no evidence that
there is a relation between cognitive eﬀort and deliberation times for higher-
level choices. In particular, choices of the leftmost box, while frequent, are
not accompanied by longer deliberation times. It is possible that the partic-
ular payoﬀ structure of EXTR renders the best-reply structure less salient,
which might explain why we ﬁnd only limited support for iterative thinking
in EXTR. Also in FLAT, most of the eﬀect of level on deliberation times is
explained by fast level-0 choices. However, in FLAT choices corresponding to
more than two steps of reasoning are very rare, which might explain the ab-
sence of a relationship for higher-level choices. This does not apply to EXTR
where a large fraction of choices corresponds to nine steps of reasoning.
3.4.3 Eﬀect of Incentives in the 11-20 Game
According to Alaoui and Penta (2016a) a higher bonus increases the value
of reasoning and hence leads to a higher depth of reasoning. Following this
argument, one would expect that the observed level is weakly higher for a
high bonus compared to a low bonus for all treatments. On the other hand,
choices should correspond to weakly lower levels for high cost for a similar
reason.
Table 3.5 shows the results of three random-eﬀects Tobit regressions, one
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Table 3.5: Random effects Tobit regressions of level with controls for bonus and
cost.
Level BASE EXTR FLAT
HighBonus 0.2811∗∗ 0.7425 0.2829
(0.1295) (0.8704) (0.1943)
HighCost −0.2485∗ −3.0640∗∗∗ −0.8270∗∗∗
(0.1292) (0.8871) (0.1947)
CRTExtended −0.0474 −0.4359 −0.0968
(0.0642) (0.3992) (0.0892)
StratUnc −0.0186 −0.0330 −0.0864
(0.0522) (0.3257) (0.0722)
Gametheory 0.1071 4.2876 0.5795
(0.4282) (2.6932) (0.5932)
Female −0.3388 0.6374 −0.7885∗∗
(0.2867) (1.8018) (0.3966)
Period −0.0185 −0.2085∗∗ −0.0334
(0.0137) (0.0954) (0.0209)
Constant 2.0234∗∗∗ 4.2326 2.7137∗∗∗
(0.4745) (2.9572) (0.6579)
Log likelihood −892.1128 −803.4438 −897.4692
Wald-Test 13.2723∗ 21.3988∗∗∗ 30.3227∗∗∗
Observations 512 512 512
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Models are
restricted to subsamples including only the four decisions in BASE, EXTR, or FLAT,
respectively. A choice of box k ∈ {0, . . . , 9} is classiﬁed as level k; HighBonus (dummy for
high bonus); HighCost (dummy for high cost); CRTExtended (number of correct answers;
0-7); StratUnc (number of B choices in the strategic uncertainty task; 0-10); Gamethe-
ory (previous knowledge of game theory; dummy); Female (dummy); Period controls for
position in the sequence of games.
for each treatment, where we control for the size of the bonus and the size of
the increment (cost). In treatment BASE there is a signiﬁcant and positive
eﬀect, with more high-level choices for a high bonus. For EXTR and FLAT
we ﬁnd no eﬀect of high bonus on level. For high cost, we consistently ﬁnd
that observed levels are lower in all three treatments. These results are
consistent with the eﬀect of changing incentives on the depth of reasoning
previously observed in Alaoui and Penta (2016a).
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Table 3.6: Random effects log DT regressions with interaction of level and bonus.
BASE EXTR FLAT
log DT 1 2 3 4 5 6
Level 0.0664∗∗∗ 0.0936∗∗∗ −0.0046 −0.0141 0.0224 0.0128
(0.0209) (0.0264) (0.0126) (0.0145) (0.0181) (0.0212)
HighBonus −0.1153∗∗ −0.0278 0.0272 −0.0294 0.1318∗∗∗ 0.0975
(0.0461) (0.0679) (0.0483) (0.0642) (0.0468) (0.0613)
Level × HighBonus −0.0536∗ 0.0171 0.0224
(0.0304) (0.0128) (0.0257)
CRTExtended 0.0326∗ 0.0329∗ 0.0887∗∗∗ 0.0891∗∗∗ 0.0574∗∗∗ 0.0575∗∗∗
(0.0189) (0.0185) (0.0205) (0.0203) (0.0183) (0.0184)
Rightmost20 0.1407∗ 0.1532∗ −0.3117∗∗∗ −0.3218∗∗∗ −0.2107∗∗∗ −0.2120∗∗∗
(0.0836) (0.0839) (0.0957) (0.0960) (0.0729) (0.0729)
Swiftness 0.5413∗∗ 0.5395∗∗ 0.2083 0.2079 0.4695∗ 0.4690∗
(0.2646) (0.2583) (0.2892) (0.2863) (0.2572) (0.2580)
Female 0.1363 0.1451∗ 0.1938∗∗ 0.1927∗∗ 0.2012∗∗ 0.2026∗∗
(0.0839) (0.0820) (0.0914) (0.0905) (0.0817) (0.0819)
Period −0.0876∗∗∗ −0.0874∗∗∗ −0.0838∗∗∗ −0.0839∗∗∗ −0.0908∗∗∗ −0.0907∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0050)
Constant 2.3001∗∗∗ 2.2481∗∗∗ 2.5451∗∗∗ 2.5815∗∗∗ 2.2234∗∗∗ 2.2369∗∗∗
(0.1631) (0.1634) (0.1837) (0.1846) (0.1565) (0.1577)
R2 (overall) 0.3352 0.3418 0.3310 0.3343 0.3850 0.3857
Wald-Test 371.3798∗∗∗ 370.6184∗∗∗ 317.6695∗∗∗ 318.7950∗∗∗ 409.2548∗∗∗ 410.3835∗∗∗
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 512
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Models
are restricted to subsamples including only the four decisions in BASE, EXTR or FLAT,
respectively. A choice of box k ∈ {0, . . . , 9} is classiﬁed as level k; HighBonus (dummy
for high bonus); CRTExtended (number of correct answers; 0-7); Rightmost20 (dummy
for choosing rightmost box); Swiftness (time needed to answer 3 demographic questions);
Female (dummy); Period controls for position in the sequence of games.
We now analyze the eﬀect of a change in the incentives resulting from an
increased bonus on deliberation times, separately for each treatment. Increas-
ing the bonus has a twofold eﬀect on deliberation times: First, it increases the
potential gain from an additional step of reasoning by 20 and thus increases
the payoﬀ diﬀerences for the ﬁrst nine steps. Hence, according to Predic-
tion 2 deliberation times per step should be shorter for a high bonus. On
the other hand, assuming that the cognitive cost is unaﬀected by a change
in the bonus, subjects potentially conduct more steps of reasoning, which
in turn increases overall deliberation time. As a consequence the aggregate
eﬀect on deliberation times is indeterminate. Controlling for the size of the
bonus and the interaction of level with bonus allows us to dissect these two
explanations.
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Table 3.6 shows the results of a series of random-eﬀects GLS regressions
of log DT on level, separately for each variant, where we additionally control
for the size of the bonus (models 1, 3 and 5) and the interaction of level
with bonus (model 2, 4 and 6). We have already seen in Subsection 3.4.2
that level-0 choices are signiﬁcantly faster and, being non-strategic, they are
likely not to be aﬀected by changes in the bonus. For that reason, we control
for non-strategic choices by including a dummy for the rightmost box. In
BASE, we ﬁnd shorter deliberation times when the bonus is high (model 1),
however, this eﬀect becomes non-signiﬁcant when we include the interaction
of level with high bonus (model 2). The coeﬃcient for the latter is signiﬁ-
cant with negative sign, that is, when the bonus is high subjects require less
additional deliberation time per step. We ﬁnd no evidence that bonus has
any systematic eﬀect on deliberation times in EXTR (model 3 and 4). In
FLAT, subjects overall deliberate longer in the high bonus condition (model
5), however, this eﬀect becomes non-signiﬁcant when we additionally control
for the interaction of level with bonus (model 6). The latter is not signiﬁ-
cant. Summarizing, we ﬁnd that increasing the bonus decreases deliberation
times in BASE, increases deliberation times in FLAT, and has no eﬀect on
deliberation times in EXTR. The decrease in BASE is a result of shorter de-
liberation times per step, as predicted by our model, which can also explain
why overall deliberation time decreases although observed levels are higher.
Next, we study the eﬀect of an increase in the cost, in terms of sure
payoﬀ, of an additional step of reasoning, again separately for each treatment.
The predicted eﬀect of an increase in cost diﬀers across treatments as it
depends on the particular payoﬀ structure. In BASE high cost has a twofold
eﬀect: First, the potential gain for conducting an additional step decreases
by 1 for high cost for the ﬁrst nine steps. Hence according to Prediction 2
we expect shorter deliberation times per step for high cost. However, the
decrease in payoﬀ diﬀerences is very small compared to the one resulting
from a change in the bonus, and hence this eﬀect is likely to be small. On
the other hand, because high cost implies smaller payoﬀ diﬀerences, subjects
potentially conduct less steps of reasoning (again assuming that cognitive
cost is unaﬀected), which would decrease overall deliberation time. The
96
Chapter 3 Cognitive Sophistication and Deliberation Times
Table 3.7: Random effects panel log DT regressions with interaction of level and
cost.
BASE EXTR FLAT
log DT 1 2 3 4 5 6
Level 0.0653∗∗∗ 0.0505∗∗ −0.0067 −0.0115 0.0233 0.0066
(0.0211) (0.0242) (0.0124) (0.0137) (0.0181) (0.0204)
HighCost −0.0179 −0.0781 0.1550∗∗∗ 0.1203∗ 0.1343∗∗∗ 0.0639
(0.0462) (0.0669) (0.0481) (0.0640) (0.0474) (0.0626)
Level × HighCost 0.0374 0.0105 0.0457∗
(0.0301) (0.0128) (0.0265)
CRTExtended 0.0330∗ 0.0338∗ 0.0898∗∗∗ 0.0895∗∗∗ 0.0571∗∗∗ 0.0585∗∗∗
(0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0183) (0.0182)
Rightmost20 0.1640∗∗ 0.1730∗∗ −0.3628∗∗∗ −0.3587∗∗∗ −0.2608∗∗∗ −0.2404∗∗∗
(0.0836) (0.0839) (0.0947) (0.0949) (0.0729) (0.0737)
Swiftness 0.5425∗∗ 0.5480∗∗ 0.2062 0.2024 0.4655∗ 0.4846∗
(0.2646) (0.2647) (0.2888) (0.2889) (0.2571) (0.2547)
Female 0.1357 0.1389∗ 0.1939∗∗ 0.1946∗∗ 0.2079∗∗ 0.2085∗∗∗
(0.0839) (0.0839) (0.0913) (0.0913) (0.0817) (0.0808)
Period −0.0860∗∗∗ −0.0855∗∗∗ −0.0857∗∗∗ −0.0856∗∗∗ −0.0933∗∗∗ −0.0927∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0050) (0.0050)
Constant 2.2338∗∗∗ 2.2469∗∗∗ 2.5255∗∗∗ 2.5429∗∗∗ 2.2581∗∗∗ 2.2659∗∗∗
(0.1619) (0.1622) (0.1792) (0.1805) (0.1544) (0.1532)
R2 (overall) 0.3296 0.3294 0.3413 0.3410 0.3856 0.3903
Wald-Test 321.5910∗∗∗ 327.7389∗∗∗ 367.0965∗∗∗ 369.0819∗∗∗ 356.5129∗∗∗ 365.6349
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 512
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Models
are restricted to subsamples including only the four decisions in BASE, EXTR or FLAT,
respectively. A choice of box k ∈ {0, . . . , 9} is classiﬁed as level k; HighCost (dummy
for high bonus); CRTExtended (number of correct answers; 0-7); Rightmost20 (dummy
for choosing rightmost box); Swiftness (time needed to answer 3 demographic questions);
Female (dummy); Period controls for position in the sequence of games.
payoﬀ structure in EXTR, does not allow for a clear-cut prediction for the
eﬀect of high cost on deliberation times. The reason is that for high cost,
the potential gain for the ﬁrst step decreases sharply, but the potential gain
for all further steps increases slightly. This would lead to longer deliberation
times for the ﬁrst step, and shorter deliberation times for all subsequent
steps. It is unclear, which of these countervailing eﬀects should dominate. In
FLAT, only the potential gain from the ﬁrst step is lower for high cost, while
the remaining steps are unaﬀected. Hence, we expect longer deliberation
times for the ﬁrst step. Again, the decrease in potential gain for the ﬁrst
step might lead to subjects conducting less steps of reasoning, which in turn
might increase overall deliberation time.
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Table 3.7 reports the results of a series of random-eﬀects GLS regressions
of log DT on level, separately for each variant, where we additionally include
a dummy for high cost (models 1, 3 and 5) and the interaction of level with
high cost (model 2, 4 and 6). Again we also control for fast level-0 choices. We
ﬁnd no eﬀect of high cost on deliberation time in BASE (model 1 and 2). This
is not surprising, since, as explained above, the resulting change in potential
gains per step is very small. In EXTR, deliberation times are longer for
high cost with no systematic eﬀect of the interaction with level. For FLAT,
model 5 indicates longer deliberation times for high cost. This eﬀect becomes
non-signiﬁcant when we additionally control for the interaction of level with
high cost (model 6). The coeﬃcient for the latter is signiﬁcant and positive,
as predicted by our model. Summarizing we ﬁnd overall longer deliberation
times in EXTR and FLAT for high cost, but not in BASE. The increase in
FLAT is a result of longer deliberation times per step, as predicted by our
model. That is, our model can explain why deliberation times in FLAT are
increasing for high cost although observed choices correspond to less steps of
reasoning.
3.5 Additional Observations
3.5.1 Other Level-0 Speciﬁcations in the 11-20 Game
Arad and Rubinstein (2012) argue that choosing 20 in the 11-20 game is a
natural anchor for an iterative reasoning process. A further appeal of the
original 11-20 game, which essentially corresponds to BASE, is that it is
fairly robust to the level-0 speciﬁcation. That is, choosing 19 in the original
11-20 game, or box 1 in BASE, is the level-1 strategy for a wide range of
level-0 speciﬁcations. This robustness of course depends on the particular
payoﬀ structure of the game and hence might be diﬀerent across the various
versions used in our experiment. In this subsection we explore the robustness
of BASE, EXTR and FLAT to the level-0 speciﬁcation.
Let σ0 = (pi)i∈{0,...,9} denote a level-0 speciﬁcation that assigns probability
pi to box i. Recall that box 0 always contains the salient amount of 20. We
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Table 3.8: Lower bounds on p0
BASE EXTR FLAT
bonus low high low high low high
low cost 5% 2.5% 45% 22.5% 15% 7.5%
high cost 10% 5% 90% 45% 30% 15%
want to study the range of speciﬁcations σ0 such that choosing box 1 is still
the unique level-1 strategy, that is, BR(σ0) = {1}. Since the sure payoﬀ
of box 1 is strictly smaller than 20, any such speciﬁcation has to satisfy
A1 + p0R > 20. If the probability of obtaining the bonus when choosing box
1 times the bonus can not compensate for the loss in sure payoﬀ by moving
away from box 0, giving 20 for sure, then choosing box 0 is weakly preferred
to choosing box 1. This already provides a lower bound p0 on the probability
assigned to the rightmost box. Table 3.8 gives an overview over the values of
p0 across BASE, EXTR and FLAT for each combination of bonus and cost.
Thus, we have identiﬁed p0 > p0 as a necessary condition. Note, however,
that in general this condition is not suﬃcient, because some box j 6= 0 might
be a best reply to σ0 if the probability pj+1 assigned to box j + 1 is high
enough. It turns out that as long as box 1 contains the second highest sure
amount, that is, A1 ≥ Aj for all j 6= 0, 1, and p0 > p0, it is suﬃcient that no
box j 6= 0 is assigned a probability larger than p0. This condition is satisﬁed
for BASE as long as box 0 is most probable under σ0 (note that p0 being
most probable already implies p0 > 10%, hence p0 > p0). For FLAT this
condition is satisﬁed if box 0 is most likely under σ0 and p0 is larger than the
corresponding lower bound p0 (similar to BASE, this latter condition is void
for high bonus and low cost). EXTR does not satisfy this condition because
box 1 contains the lowest sure amount, hence the probability assigned to
the rightmost box has to exceed the probability of any box j by more than
(Aj −A1)/R. This condition together with p0 > p0 is suﬃcient to make box
1 the unique best-response in EXTR.
We identiﬁed suﬃcient conditions on the level-0 speciﬁcation that ensure
that choosing box 1 is the unique level-1 strategy. The requirements for
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BASE are fairly weak, in particular they are satisﬁed when σ0 is assumed to
be uniform randomization, which is often done in games without a salient
strategy.10 Thus BASE can be considered robust to a wide range of level-0
speciﬁcations. The conditions for FLAT are slightly stronger, because the
lower bounds p0 are tighter. In particular, when σ0 is uniform randomization
the level-1 strategy remains to choose box 1 only for high bonus and low
cost, while it prescribes to stay with box 0 for the other conditions. The
same cannot be said with regard to EXTR. Here both, the lower bounds
and the additional condition are very demanding. In particular, choosing
the leftmost box that grants the second highest sure payoﬀ is the level-1
strategy for a relatively wide range of speciﬁcations that include uniform
randomization. We conclude that BASE and FLAT can be considered robust
to the level-0 speciﬁcation, but not EXTR. In EXTR, there is an alternative
level-1 strategy for a relatively wide range of alternative level-0 speciﬁcations.
In Section 3.4.2 we have assumed that the starting point in the 11-20 game
for our model of iterative thinking is to choose the rightmost box containing
the salient amount of 20. As just illustrated, the best-reply structure in BASE
and FLAT is robust for a wide range of alternative level-0 speciﬁcations.
Thus, even if, diﬀerent from our assumption, the starting point does not
assign probability one to choosing the rightmost box, the best-reply structure
and hence our results are unaﬀected as long as p0 is not too small. However,
this is not true for EXTR. Here, the best-reply structure is less robust to
changes in the level-0 speciﬁcation, and there is a clear alternative best-reply
structure where the leftmost box is the level-1 strategy.
To check for robustness we consider an alternative best-reply structure in
the following way: We assume that the level-0 speciﬁcation is mixed in such
a way that the best-reply is to choose the leftmost box, containing the second
highest sure payoﬀ, which we then classify as the level-1 strategy. The best-
reply to that is to choose the rightmost box containing the salient amount
of 20, now classiﬁed as level 2. From there the best-reply structure follows
the known pattern from right to left. We then repeat the complete analysis
10For high cost and low bonus, choosing box 1 is a best-reply, but not a unique one,
because it ties with choosing the rightmost box.
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conducted for EXTR in Section 3.4.2 for this alternative classiﬁcation. Com-
paring the so obtained results to those presented earlier for EXTR, we ﬁnd
no qualitative diﬀerence.11 Hence, we conclude that our results, presented in
the previous section, cannot be explained by diﬀerences in the robustness to
the level-0 speciﬁcation between treatments.
3.5.2 A Social Preference Variant - SOCP
Our experiment included an additional treatment to check for an alternative
explanation of the frequent “high-level” choices of the two leftmost boxes in
EXTR, as previously observed by Goeree et al. (2016). By choosing the
leftmost box in EXTR a subject can get the second highest sure amount,
while at the same time granting his opponent the chance to receive the bonus.
If a subject is motivated by some form of other-regarding preferences, then
choosing the leftmost box is very attractive because it grants somebody else
the chance to get a bonus that is relative large in comparison to the subject’s
own sacriﬁce in terms of sure payoﬀ. We thus added an additional treatment,
denoted SOCP, that is a variation of FLAT where the two rightmost boxes
contain both the salient amount of 20. Figure 3.5 shows both the low and
high cost version of SOCP. Here choosing the rightmost box guarantees the
highest safe amount of 20, while also, at least theoretically, granting the other
player the chance to obtain the bonus by selecting the second, inner box that
also contains 20. On the other hand, a purely self-interested individual should
never choose the rightmost box, since it is weakly dominated by the inner
20 for all possible beliefs. However, it is conceivable that an altruist would
select the rightmost alternative to grant his opponent the chance to get the
bonus by selecting the inner box with the second 20.12
As a proxy for prosociality we measured the social value orientation (SVO)
of each subject using a computerized version (Crosetto et al., 2012) of the
scale developed by Murphy et al. (2011). We used a scaled version of their
11We do not present these alternative regressions here. They are available from the
authors upon request.
12Note that this is also the most eﬃcient outcome in the sense that it maximizes joint
proﬁts.
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SOCP 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 20 20
SOCP 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 20 20
Figure 3.5: Payoff structure for SOCP in the low (top panel) and high (bottom
panel) cost version.
six primary items in which subjects were asked to choose among diﬀerent
allocations of points between themselves and a randomly selected partner.
For the SVO task one of the six items was randomly selected and paid out
using a ring matching procedure, that is, each subject received two payments
of up to 25 points, one as a sender and one as a receiver. A higher SVO score
indicates that a subject is more prosocial.
In SOCP 36 out 128 subjects chose the rightmost box at least once. To
explore whether behavior in SOCP is driven by other-regarding preferences,
we ﬁrst test whether subjects choosing the rightmost box have a higher SVO
score. Conducting separate Wilcoxon rank sum tests for each of the four in-
stances of SOCP we ﬁnd no diﬀerence in SVO score for subjects choosing the
rightmost box compared to those choosing another box. Next, we consider
the relative frequency of choosing the rightmost box across all four instances
of SOCP per subject. We run a fractional logit regression of this relative
frequency with the SVO score as a independent variable. The coeﬃcient of
social value orientation is positive but not signiﬁcant. Summarizing, we ﬁnd
no evidence that the prosocial motive of granting the opponent the chance
to obtain a bonus is a driver of behavior in the 11-20 game.
3.6 Discussion
In this work, we have introduced a simple model linking cognitive sophisti-
cation, incentives, and deliberation times, incorporating stylized facts from
the psychophysiological literature on response times. We model the total
deliberation time of an observed choice as the sum of the deliberation times
resulting from a sequence of binary hypothetical decisions that model steps
of reasoning. As an immediate consequence we obtain the prediction that
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exerting higher cognitive eﬀort, that is, conducting more steps of reasoning
implies longer deliberation times. They key assumption then builds on the
closeness-to-indiﬀerence eﬀect, that is, decisions take longer the smaller the
utility diﬀerence of the options. We assume that deliberation time for a
given step is a decreasing function of the potential gain (or loss) of that step.
This model provides empirically testable predictions regarding the relation
of deliberation times, cognitive sophistication, as revealed by choices, and
incentives.
We then test the predictions of our model using experimental data. We
ﬁnd longer deliberation times for choices associated with more steps of rea-
soning, conﬁrming our prediction that deliberation time is increasing in cog-
nitive eﬀort. This link is strongest, when the payoﬀ structure of the un-
derlying game is such that iterative thinking is salient. However, for games
without a salient iterative structure, there is no clear relation between de-
liberation times and cognitive eﬀort. That is, features besides the best-reply
structure matter as well, but deliberation times can serve as a tool to iden-
tify such situations. Further, we ﬁnd eﬀects of changes in the incentives
that systematically vary the utility diﬀerence of a step of reasoning which
are consistent with the predictions of our model. Hence, our results suggest
that our closeness-to-indiﬀerence account can serve as a helpful tool to better
understand processes of iterative thinking.
Overall, the answer to the question whether deliberation times support
level-k models is “yes, but.” If the underlying processes are clearly identiﬁed,
we observe a clear link between deliberation times and steps of reasoning
supporting level-k thinking. Additionally, however, deliberation times also
allow us to detect when other elements enter the picture, and hence are also
helpful for further theory development.
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Appendix 3.A: Sequence of Games
To control for order eﬀects we counter-balanced the order of the diﬀerent
11-20 games using the following four randomized sequences. We denote the
low cost, low bonus version of BASE, EXTR, FLAT, and SOCP by B, E,
F, and SP, respectively. Similarly for X ∈ {B,E, F, S} we use the notation
+X to indicate high cost, and X+ to indicate high bonus, e.g. +B+ denotes
BASE with high cost and high bonus.
Table 3.9: Pseudo-randomized sequences of the 11-20 games used in the experi-
ment.
Sequence 1 B F E S E+ B+ S+ F+ +F +S +B +E +S+ +E+ +F+ +B+
Sequence 2 +E +B +S +F +B+ +F+ +E+ +S+ S E F B F+ S+ B+ E+
Sequence 3 +F+ +S+ +B+ +E+ B+ F+ E+ S+ +S +E +F +B E B S F
Sequence 4 S+ E+ F+ B+ F S B E +E+ +B+ +S+ +F+ +B +F +E +S
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Appendix 3.B: Behavior in the 11-20 Games
Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of choices in our experiment across all 16
instances of the 11-20 game including the four instances of the additional
treatment SOCP described in Section 3.5.
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of choices in the 11-20 games.
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Institutional History, Leniency and Collusive Tax Evasion
4.1 Introduction
Corruption and tax evasion are among the most pervasive forms of illicit
behavior inducing negative externalities on both the economic and societal
level (Banerjee, 2016a; Slemrod, 2007). Understanding their drivers and im-
plementing suitable institutional measures to curb their severity has been
at the center of the past decade’s theoretical, empirical and experimental
research.
In this paper, we focus on the eﬀectiveness of providing legal immunity to
the bribe-giver for blowing the whistle as a measure to deter collusive bribery.
In our experiment corruption is embedded in a tax evasion framework, in
which underreporting taxes is only possible through collusive cooperation
among tax payers and public oﬃcials. We study the exchange of bribes as one
explicit collaboration-inducing mechanism. This has previously been found
to be eﬀective in sustaining illicit cooperation. This literature also highlights
the importance of studying the collaborative roots of deviant behavior due
to their inherent negative economic and societal externalities (Weisel and
Shalvi, 2015).
Our results shed light on the eﬀectiveness of leniency programs as a means
to distort collusive relationships between public oﬃcials and tax payers and
to reduce tax fraud. We consider a mechanism that oﬀers tax payers a “a
safe way out” by blowing the whistle on the corrupt public oﬃcial and co-
operating with the auditors. This mechanism resembles a leniency program
for tax evasion in which audited tax fraudsters can turn state’s evidence.
In many countries, the introduction of some form of leniency mechanism
represents an integral institutional feature aimed at suppressing criminal be-
havior, for example, in the context of collusion among ﬁrms (Buccirossi and
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Spagnolo, 2006; Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt, 2006; Bigoni et al., 2012). We
are interested in examining the eﬀects of a leniency program for tax payers
on collusive bribery and tax evasion. We contribute to the corruption and
tax evasion literature by shedding light on how collusive tax evasion is af-
fected by the speciﬁcs of the strategic interaction between a tax payer and an
intermediary, a dimension not present in a setting of individual tax evasion.
While most of the economic research in that literature has focused on
deterrence of income tax evasion or its related variants, other forms of tax
evasion, such as trade/import or custom taxes, where taxes are in some way
collected through the direct intermediation of a third party (for example
custom duties), have received little attention (Banuri and Eckel, 2012). This
is particularly true for the case of “corruption within tax evasion.” Existing
experimental studies have for example focused on the role of the fear of being
caught or public disclosure in deterring tax evasion (Orviska and Hudson,
2003; Bø et al., 2015).
In a related setting, Abbink and Wu (2017) study whether rewarding self-
reports is eﬀective in reducing collusive bribery. They ﬁnd this mechanism
to be eﬀective in some circumstances, especially in a context of repeated
interaction. However, they study diﬀerent mechanisms with a focus on re-
wards for reporting, whereas we focus on the shift of the risk of being caught
between two colluding parties. Further, in our experiment bribe-givers face
two decisions, whether and how much to bribe, and also how much taxes
to declare, which in turn determines the consequences of bribery. Christöﬂ
et al. (2017) study the possibility to cooperate with the authorities (princi-
pal witness) in combination with a leniency policy that oﬀers reduced ﬁnes
for cooperation in a setup where two bidders compete for a contract. They
ﬁnd a lower number of bribes when a leniency policy is present, while at
the same time oﬀering a bribe becomes more proﬁtable for a corrupt bidder.
Closely related to our work, Heinemann and Kocher (2013) study the eﬀects
of regime changes on tax compliance, however, they focus on changes in the
tax rate and consider neither corruption nor reforms that incentivize whistle-
blowing. By and large, the economics of whistleblowing are understudied and
have only recently attracted attention (see Spagnolo, 2004; Apesteguia et al.,
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2007; Spagnolo, 2006; Heyes and Kapur, 2009; Breuer, 2013; Schmolke and
Utikal, 2016). In particular, Butler et al. (2017) study the eﬀectiveness of ﬁ-
nancial rewards and public scrutiny as triggers to motivate employees to blow
the whistle against their managers. Their ﬁndings indicate that both ﬁnan-
cial rewards and public visibility increase the likelihood of whistleblowing (see
also Bartuli et al., 2016). The recent surge in cases of whistleblowing and the
lack of international institutional uniformity to achieve suﬃcient protection
for whistleblowers renders the importance to further study the economics of
whistleblowing (Dyck et al., 2010).
We use a controlled laboratory experiment modeling an income reporting
scenario that requires the interaction between two parties, a tax payer and a
tax oﬃcer, thus opening the door for collusive corruption. Our experimen-
tal design employs a collusive bribery game (Abbink et al., 2002) nested in
a tax evasion scenario, in which corrupt tax oﬃcers face little to no conse-
quences for accepting bribes and for providing assistance to the tax payer
in order to evade taxes. This mimics a situation where tax authorities do
not have the means to suﬃciently control the tax oﬃcers, for example due
to the institutional environment rendering enforcement of adequate conse-
quences impossible. Excessive costs of monitoring are among the reasons
why authorities might be unable to detect dishonest oﬃcers.
In the basic bribery game without leniency each tax payer receives a ﬁxed
income, taxed at a ﬁxed rate, that has to be reported to the authorities repre-
sented by a tax oﬃcer. A distinct feature of our design is that underreporting
requires the cooperation of the tax oﬃcer. Thus, the tax payer can oﬀer the
tax oﬃcer a bribe as reward for his assistance in evading taxes. Tax reports
are subject to audits with a known probability.1 Detection of tax evasion
during an audit results in a penalty for the tax payer, but not for the tax
oﬃcer. This game is then extended by adding an additional stage in the
spirit of a leniency mechanism. The resulting bribery game with leniency
1Our focus is on the eﬀectiveness of a leniency mechanism as a policy intervention,
thus we decided to keep a ﬁxed audit probability instead of implementing an endogenously
determined audit probability, e.g. by modeling the tax authority as an additional player.
For a theoretical analysis of endogenous audit probabilities see Landsberger and Meilijson
(1982) or Raymond (1999). For an experimental treatment see Alm et al. (1993).
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follows the same rules except for the situation when an audit occurs. In that
case a tax payer can report the corrupt tax oﬃcer and avoid the pending
penalty. Instead, now the reported tax oﬃcer incurs a ﬁne. This whistle-
blowing mechanism oﬀers a save way out for the tax payer and shifts the risk
of a being detected and ﬁned to the tax oﬃcer. Moreover, it renders the tax
oﬃcer formally responsible for engaging in collusive bribery as she now faces
the threat of a ﬁne as well.
The goals of this study are twofold: First, we seek to analyze collusive
bribery and its drivers under a regime with and without leniency for the
tax payer in a setting where corruption is feasible due to the interaction
between tax payers and tax oﬃcers. Second, we investigate the eﬀectiveness
of the introduction of such a mechanism and the consequences of its removal
on collusion, the frequency of bribe oﬀers and their size, the tax oﬃcers’
willingness to accept bribes as well as overall tax compliance.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. We ﬁnd that in the pres-
ence of a leniency mechanism successful collusion between tax payers and tax
oﬃcers is less frequent and this is mainly driven by a lower willingness of tax
oﬃcers to accept bribes. Further, we ﬁnd no support that leniency for tax
payers encourages them to oﬀer bribes, that is, there is no signiﬁcant increase
in the frequency of bribes being oﬀered. Thus, our results suggest that le-
niency is eﬀective in deterring tax oﬃcers from engaging in bribery and that
this translates into more taxes being collected. Our results regarding the role
of institutional changes also highlight the importance of institutional history
for the evaluation of policy measures. We show that the introduction of the
opportunity to blow the whistle decreases collusion, deters tax oﬃcers from
accepting bribes, as reﬂected in a lower acceptance rate of bribe oﬀers and
increases the tax yield collected, while at the same time it does not encour-
age bribe oﬀers. In contrast, the removal of the institutional mechanism does
not cause similar eﬀects in the opposite direction, which suggests a positive
spillover eﬀect of leniency that persists even after the mechanism has been
removed (see also d’Adda et al., 2017).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the experimental
design. Section 4.3 presents the analysis of our empirical results. In Section
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4.4 we discuss our results and conclude.
4.2 Experimental Design
Both of our institutional setups mimic a scenario where collusive bribery is
nested in a tax evasion framework. Taxes are collected through an intermedi-
ary, the tax oﬃcer. Hence, to successfully evade taxes the tax payer requires
the cooperation of the tax oﬃcer, for example by “looking the other way.”
We now give a detailed description of the two institutional frames used in
our experiment.
4.2.1 The Bribery Game with and without Leniency
The upper part of Figure 4.1 illustrates the bribery game (BG).2 A tax payer
(TP) receives an income of 80 Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and has
to submit a declaration of his income to the tax authorities. The tax oﬃcer
(TO), acting as an intermediary, is in charge of processing the tax report.
Declared income D is subject to a tax rate of 50%.3 The TP can decide
whether he wants to truthfully declare his full income of 80 or whether he
wants to evade taxes, that is, potentially declare a lower income D ≤ 80. In
order to evade taxes, the TP has to convince the TO to collude with him.
To that end, the TP can oﬀer a bribe b to the TO that can range from 0
to 30 ECU. The situation we have in mind is one, where the TP can vastly
increase the chance of his false tax declaration not being detected by colluding
with the TO, who is in charge of processing the report. For simplicity, we
assume that it is impossible for the TP to evade taxes without the TO’s
support. That is, declaring less than the full income is only possible if the
TO accepts the TP’s bribe oﬀer and hereby agrees to collude with the TP,
e.g. by manipulating the report. If a bribe is oﬀered, the TO observes the
2The TO only observes the bribe b but not the declared income D as indicated by the
dashed line. The stage below the dotted line is only available in the bribery game with
leniency. For the sake of a simpler exposition the tax oﬃcer’s ﬁxed wage of 50 is not
depicted.
3Subjects were informed that this tax rate is in line, according to a recent study of
Confcommercio, with the mean tax burden in Italy.
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Figure 4.1: Representation of the bribery game (with leniency).
amount that is oﬀered and can accept or reject it. It is important to note that
the TO cannot observe the amount of taxes declared prior to his decision,
hence cannot condition her decision on the amount of taxes evaded.4 Not
informing the TO about the exact amount the TP intends to evade allows
us to establish a minimal level of uncertainty regarding the TO’s payoﬀs,
which are fully determined (in the absence of whistleblowing) by the bribe
and the amount of taxes declared as described in more detail below. If the
TO rejects a bribe, then she refuses to collude with the TP, which forces the
TP to truthfully declare his full income of 80. Upon acceptance the TP is
able ﬁle the original report declaring D.5 Tax reports are audited by the
tax authorities with an exogenous probability of 20%. In case of an audit
4For example, imagine a situation where the TO does not know the actual income of
the TP, which is only known to the oﬃcial tax authority conducting the audits.
5Note that this diﬀers from Abbink and Wu (2017) in that the tax oﬃcer is not able
to pocket the bribe without delivering the corrupt favor of colluding with the tax payer.
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incorrect reports are detected and the TP has to pay both the evaded amount
of taxes 0.5(80 − D) and an additional ﬁne proportional to the amount of
evaded taxes.6 The ﬁne is set to 25% evaded taxes, hence the maximum
ﬁne is 10 ECU. The ﬁne rate of 25% was chosen such that together with the
upper bound (of 30) of bribe payments the TP can never incur a net loss.
Thus, the TP’s payoﬀ is his income minus taxes on the declared income D
and potentially the bribe and/or ﬁne paid. The TO’s payoﬀ consists of three
components: a ﬁxed wage of 50, a commission of 15% of the taxes collected,
and the amount of bribes accepted.7
The bribery game with leniency (BGL) is very similar to the bribery
game just described, but with one important diﬀerence. In the BGL we
add an additional stage to the BG intended to mimic a leniency program for
blowing the whistle.8 Decisions in BGL are identical to those in BG, however,
following detection of an incorrect tax report during an audit the TP now
has the opportunity to “blow the whistle” by reporting the TO. If the TP
chooses to report, he has to correct the (false) tax report and declare taxes
truthfully, however, he does not incur an additional monetary punishment,
that is, the ﬁne is waived. A TO that has been reported, on the other hand,
incurs a ﬁne for colluding with the TP to evade taxes. This ﬁne equals the
bribe received from the TP plus an additional penalty of 10 ECU.
In Appendix 4.A we analyze the one-shot bribery game with and without
a leniency mechanism assuming standard preferences based on maximization
of own payoﬀs. Under that assumption, attempting collusion, that is, bribing
the tax oﬃcer and evading taxes, is always optimal for a tax payer in the
bribery game with and without leniency. In the bribery game with leniency
the tax payer always reports the tax oﬃcer in equilibrium, resulting in a
6Proportional ﬁnes are an institutional feature often observed in developed countries
(Mittone, 2006).
7The introduction of a commission for the TO mimics something existing in reality. In
Italy for example the tax authority delegates inspections and audits to a private organi-
zation (Equitalia) and pays Equitalia with a percentage of the money collected.
8In the BG punishment can be viewed as asymmetric as only tax payers are running
the risk of being ﬁned, however, in BGL leniency shifts, at least partially, this risk towards
the tax oﬃcer, hence creating a situation that might be perceived as more symmetric. See
also Engel et al. (2013) for a discussion of symmetric vs asymmetric punishment regimes.
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higher bribe acceptance threshold on the side of the tax oﬃcer. As a result
optimal bribe oﬀers are higher when leniency is in place. Recall that the tax
oﬃcer is only able to observe the bribe but not the amount of taxes declared,
hence her exact acceptance threshold also depends on her belief regarding the
amount of taxes declared by the tax payer. The threshold is increasing in
her belief regarding the amount of taxes evaded, since this negatively aﬀects
her payoﬀ. As a consequence there are many equilibria involving diﬀerent
levels of tax compliance by the tax payer and beliefs by the tax oﬃcer. For
example there is one equilibrium in which the tax payer declares zero taxes
and the tax oﬃcer correctly anticipates this behavior, hence expects declared
taxes to be zero.
4.2.2 Treatments
One can to think of the introduction of a leniency mechanism as a stylized
situation where tax authorities decide to invest in establishing control mech-
anisms that allow for better monitoring of public oﬃcials. Hence, allowing
them to enforce legal consequences not only on tax payers but also on corrupt
tax oﬃcers, for example via improved monitoring. We mimic transitions of
that type by employing not only static treatments, where exactly one regime
is present for the whole duration of the experiment, but also dynamic treat-
ments involving a regime change from one to the other. This allows us to
study both the eﬀectiveness of either setup in isolation and how subjects re-
act to a change in either direction. For example, we are interested in whether
the transition from a scenario without the opportunity to blow the whistle to
a situation in which this is feasible can break collusive behavior established
during a earlier periods. If that is the case, then this would provide strong
evidence that such a measure can serve as a tool to reduce collusive corrup-
tion and tax evasion in a world where the absence of such a mechanism is
the status quo.
In our experiment subjects repeatedly played the bribery game and/or
its extended version (with leniency) over the course of a total of 20 rounds.
We ran four diﬀerent treatments. In treatment NoLEN, participants play
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the bribery game without leniency for 20 rounds. In treatment LEN subjects
play the bribery game with leniency instead, also for 20 rounds. These two
treatments allow a between-subject comparison of the role that leniency plays
with respect to collusive bribery and tax compliance. In addition, these
treatments represent a benchmark for treatments NoL-L and L-NoL in which
institutional shocks occur. These treatments were designed to study the
eﬀects of institutional transitions, e.g. potential spillover eﬀects from one
regime to another, since in those treatments the rules of the game change
unannounced midway through the experiment after round 10. In particular,
in treatment NoL-L subjects start with the basic bribery game and are then
transitioned into an environment in which reporting the tax oﬃcer becomes
feasible. Treatment L-NoL captures the same dynamics but in reverse order,
that is, ﬁrst the option to report is available and is then abolished after
round 10. These two treatments involve a regime change that allows us to
analyze the eﬀectiveness of both the introduction and the removal of leniency
relative to a “status quo,” that is, the regime present during the ﬁrst block
of 10 rounds. Table 4.1 summarizes the four treatments.
Table 4.1: Overview over the treatments and number of subjects assigned to each
treatment.
Treatment Round 1-10 Round 11-20 Tax Payers Tax Oﬃcers
NoLEN BG BG 30 10
LEN BGL BGL 36 12
NoL-L BG BGL 66 22
L-NoL BGL BG 42 14
4.2.3 Experimental Procedures
Subjects were randomly assigned either the role of a tax payer or the role of
a tax oﬃcer. Participants were randomly matched in groups of four consist-
ing of one tax oﬃcer and three tax payers, that is, each tax oﬃcer assigned
three tax payers to interact with simultaneously. There was no direct interac-
tion between diﬀerent tax payers in the same group. Groups remained ﬁxed
114
Chapter 4 Institutional History, Leniency and Collusive Tax Evasion
throughout the experiment, which consisted of 20 rounds. Subjects were
informed that the number of rounds was predetermined, but were not in-
formed about the exact number of rounds.9 In each period subjects played,
depending on the treatment, the bribery game with or without leniency.
For treatment NoLEN and treatment LEN no institutional change occurred.
In treatments NoL-L and L-NoL the participants were informed about a
change in the institutional setting after the 10th round via an announcement
on screen that provided a detailed description of the new institutional envi-
ronment. We emphasized that there would be no additional change of the
institution until the end of the experiment. Subjects were informed in the
instructions that the existing institution may be subject to change but no
information regarding the nature of the change was provided.10 Thus, we
use both within- and between-subject variations of the institutional setting
to study the eﬀect of leniency on corruption and tax compliance. Since ini-
tial tax declarations were not observable by the tax oﬃcer, we also elicited
the tax oﬃcer’s beliefs about the amount of taxes evaded by each of the
tax payers oﬀering a bribe. Beliefs were elicited in each round after the tax
oﬃcer’s decision to accept or reject a bribe oﬀer, but before any feedback
regarding the outcome of this round was provided. At the end of each round
tax oﬃcers were informed about whether they were reported, how much they
were ﬁned (if at all) and how much they earned from the tax yield collected.
Tax payers received information regarding whether their bribe was accepted,
whether they were audited and how much (if at all) they were ﬁned.
To make tax evasion more salient in the laboratory setting, we introduced
a third party that incurs a monetary damage as a result of tax evasion. All
participants were informed that the total tax yield collected would be used
to ﬁnance future research of doctoral students at the University of Trento.11
That is, tax evasion in the experimental laboratory translates into an actual
9We choose not to announce the number of rounds to avoid potential end-game eﬀects.
10Subjects in treatments NoLEN and NoL-L were provided with identical information
at the start of the experiment. The same holds for subjects in treatments LEN and L-NoL.
In particular, participants assigned to treatment NoLEN and LEN were informed about
the possibility of a change although, ultimately, they would not experience one.
11This is a common procedure in tax evasion experiments in order to link tax evasion
to a negative externality, for example see Fortin et al. (2007) or Coricelli et al. (2010).
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social welfare loss outside the lab (Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Lambsdorﬀ
and Frank, 2010).
The experiment was conducted at the Cognitive and Experimental Eco-
nomics Laboratory at the University of Trento. A total of of 268 undergrad-
uate students (46% females) participated in the experiment, each in exactly
one treatment. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of subjects over the four
experimental treatments. Sessions consisted of 20 rounds followed by an in-
centivized risk-elicitation task (Holt and Laury, 2002b) and a demographic
questionnaire. The ﬁnal payoﬀ of each subject was determined as the sum of
all earnings over the 20 rounds plus their earnings from the risk-elicitation
task, which were then converted to Euro at a rate of 100 ECU = e0.7. All
participants were paid their ﬁnal payoﬀ plus an additional show-up fee of e3
in cash at the end of the experiment. On average, a session lasted about 60
minutes and subjects earned e12 excluding the show-up fee of e3.
4.3 Results
An important feature of our experiment is that tax evasion is nested within
a corruption framework that requires collusive behavior for tax evasion to be
successful. We believe that this additional layer of interaction is important
to help us to better understand unethical behavior in situations in which
cooperation is necessary. This interaction possibly increases the impact of
behavioral factors such as psychological costs and uncertainty on tax com-
pliance and the willingness to engage in collusive bribery.
We structure our analysis in the following way: ﬁrst, we will discuss
the eﬀectiveness of leniency in aﬀecting collusive agreements between public
oﬃcials and tax payers. In a next step, we will break down the behavior
of tax payers and public oﬃcials individually. We employ a very cautious
approach in our data analysis. Following our design, we regard the behavior
of one group (consisting of one public oﬃcial and three tax payers) averaged
over all rounds, or over all rounds in the ﬁrst and second part, respectively,
as one independent observation. This allows us to conduct between- as well
as within-subject comparisons.
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4.3.1 Collusive Behavior
One of our main objectives is to study the eﬀectiveness of a leniency mecha-
nism as a means to hinder collusive corruption. The presence of the possibil-
ity to blow the whistle eﬀectively reduces the risk the tax payer faces when
evading taxes, while shifting responsibility to the tax oﬃcer, thus potentially
reducing the tax payer’s psychological costs. Intuitively, in the bribery game
with leniency the possibility to report the tax oﬃcer oﬀers the tax payer a
“safe way out”. Leniency eﬀectively allows the tax payer to avoid an addi-
tional ﬁne when evading taxes, and if the ﬁne is what is keeping a tax payer
from oﬀering a bribe and evading taxes this should encourage the tax payer
to engage in collusive bribery. On the other hand, leniency also aﬀects the
chances that an attempt to collude is successful, since this requires the co-
operation of the tax oﬃcer, who now faces the additional threat of being
reported. Thus, leniency is likely to decrease the tax oﬃcers willingness to
engage in collusive corruption. It is unclear which of these opposing eﬀects
will dominate.
In line with our primary interest to study the eﬀectiveness of leniency on
collusive arrangements, our experimental design allows us to approach this
question from two perspectives:
1. Is collusion generally diﬀerent in an environment where leniency exists?
2. How does an institutional change from an environment with (without)
leniency to an environment without (with) leniency aﬀect collusive be-
havior?
To address these two questions, we compare the rate of collusion between
NoLEN and LEN, between NoLEN and NoL-L, and between LEN and L-
NoL, respectively. We deﬁne collusion as the successful exchange of bribes
in return for the avoidance of taxes.
We ﬁrst analyze the eﬀect of leniency in absence of institutional history
by comparing treatments NoLEN and LEN. To that end, we calculated for
each group the collusion rate as the proportion of successful illicit agreements
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Figure 4.2: Average collusion in NoLEN and LEN.
relative to all rounds in which paying a bribe and evading taxes was possi-
ble. Figure 4.2 shows the average collusion rate for each treatment as well
as the evolution of the average collusion rate, calculated for each round. In
the NoLEN treatment, the average collusion rate per group was 52.3%. In
contrast, in the presence of a leniency mechanism the incidence of collusion
was only 34.6% in the LEN treatment. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant accord-
ing to a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test (N = 22, z = 2.1448, p = 0.0320)
indicating that collusion is less frequent in LEN compared to the NoLEN.
The right panel of Figure 4.2 suggests that collusion is increasing over the
course of the experiment in both treatments. To check whether this is indeed
the case we calculated for each group the average collusion rate for the ﬁrst
and second half of the experiment, separately. In the ﬁrst part of NoLEN
the average collusion rate is 43.7% and rises to 61% in the second half. This
diﬀerence is signiﬁcant according to a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (N = 10,
z = −2.6711, p = 0.0076). In LEN the collusion rate is 31.9% and 37.2% in
ﬁrst and second half of the experiment, respectively, with the diﬀerence not
being signiﬁcant (WSR, N = 12, z = −1.2183, p = 0.2231). With respect to
the ﬁrst question, we ﬁnd less collusion when a leniency mechanism is in place
compared to an environment without such a mechanism. Moreover, we ﬁnd
that collusion is increasing signiﬁcantly over time in the NoLEN treatment,
while there is no signiﬁcant increase in LEN when leniency is in place.
Next, we turn to our second question regarding the eﬀect of an institu-
tional change on collusion. Treatment NoL-L allows us to study the eﬀect
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of the introduction a leniency mechanism into a setting in which corrupt be-
havior has already been able to thrive in the absence of leniency. There is
some evidence that fear of being reported has a deterrent eﬀect, which might
decrease the tax oﬃcer’s acceptance rate (Engel et al., 2013; Abbink et al.,
2014). On the other hand, we are able to study whether a period in which
leniency was implemented aﬀects behavior even after it was removed, for ex-
ample because a successful relationship is harder to build after developing
mistrust in earlier periods. In treatment L-NoL subjects start under a regime
with leniency followed by its removal. Following the same logic one would
expect low acceptance rates in the ﬁrst part when facing the bribery game
with leniency, but an increased acceptance rate as a result of the removal of
the mechanism in the second part of treatment L-NoL.
The left panel of Figure 4.3 shows the average rate of collusion for each
part of treatment NoL-L and L-NoL. The right panel illustrates how collusion
evolves over the course of the experiment in each of the treatments. We
again observe that collusion is increasing over time, moreover, the graph
suggests that the introduction of a reporting option in NoL-L causes a drop in
collusion. Since collusion is increasing over time, we cannot simply compare
the means before and after an institutional change has occurred. Thus, we
evaluate the eﬀect of the introduction or removal of a leniency mechanism by
comparing the change in collusion rates resulting from the introduction or
removal of leniency to the corresponding change in the absence of an regime
change. Thus, we calculated the change of the collusion rate between the
ﬁrst and second half of the experiment for each group in all treatments. We
then compare the changes between NoLEN and NoL-L, and between LEN
and L-NoL, respectively. This diﬀerence in diﬀerences analysis is necessary
to account for the increase in collusion over time.
In treatment NoL-L the average collusion rate before and after a leniency
mechanism was introduced are 43.2% and 41.7%, respectively. Hence, the
introduction of a leniency mechanism in NoL-L results in a decrease of col-
lusion by 1.5 percentage points. Recall that in NoLEN there was an increase
in collusion by 16.3% from the ﬁst part to the second part. Comparing the
change from part one to part two between NoLEN and NoL-L reveals that the
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Figure 4.3: Average collusion in NoL-L and L-NoL.
introduction of leniency has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on collusion (MWW,
N = 32, z = 2.2249, p = 0.0261).
Similarly, we now consider the eﬀect of the removal leniency. In the ﬁrst
part of treatment L-NoL the collusion rate is 38.3% when leniency is present
and following its removal rises to 48.8% in the second part. Thus we observe
an increase in collusion by 10.5 percentage points in L-NoL compared to an
increase of 5.3 percentage points in LEN from part one to part two. There is
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the increase of collusion in LEN and L-NoL
(MWW, N = 26, z = −0.6978, p = 0.4853). Thus we ﬁnd no evidence that
the removal of the possibility to blow the whistle does lead to an additional
increase in collusion that goes beyond the gradual increase over time observed
in LEN in the absence of a regime change. In particular, there is no upwards
“jump” in the frequency of collusive cooperation following the removal of the
leniency mechanism.
Summarizing, our results suggest that the presence of a leniency mech-
anism indeed deters collusion. Interestingly, we also see some evidence for
an increase in successful collusive cooperation over time in the absence of
leniency, while under leniency we see no such eﬀect. This is in line with
the idea that leniency makes it more diﬃcult to reach a collusive agreement,
that is honored by both parties. Regarding the eﬀects of a regime change we
ﬁnd that the introduction of a leniency mechanism in treatment NoL-L has a
deterrent eﬀect on collusion. This result suggests that implementing such a
measure is likely to hinder collusive bribery. On the other hand, the removal
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of whistleblowing in L-NoL does not foster collusion. That is, collusion rates
show no signiﬁcant “jump” upwards after the mechanism is removed. This
points towards a potential positive spillover eﬀect from the ﬁrst part, where
a leniency mechanism was in place, that persists even after its removal. A
potential explanation for this spillover eﬀect is that leniency saws mistrust
between the tax oﬃcer and the tax payer, hence reduces the tax oﬃcer’s will-
ingness to cooperate also in later periods although reporting is not feasible
anymore.
4.3.2 What Are the Drivers of Collusion?
Collusion requires the cooperation of both, the tax payer and the tax oﬃcer.
In order to pin down the drivers of the eﬀects on collusion found in the
previous section we now analyze the behavior of tax payers and tax oﬃcers
separately. To that end, we ﬁrst consider the rate of collusion attempts
initiated by the tax payer, that is, the incidence of bribe oﬀers relative to
all relevant situations where oﬀering a bribe was feasible. Since collusion
requires the cooperation of the tax oﬃcer, in a second step we investigate
the bribe acceptance rate, that is, the fraction of bribes that were accepted
by the tax oﬃcer relative to the number of bribe oﬀers received. Clearly,
collusion is the result of a combination of both, the frequency of bribe oﬀers
and the fraction of bribe oﬀers that are accepted. Moreover, the size of the
bribes is likely to aﬀect the acceptance rate, since it is natural that tax oﬃcers
accept large bribes more often than small bribes. Hence, we also consider
the treatment eﬀects on the size of the bribes oﬀered by the tax payer and
how they aﬀect the acceptance rate.
In the absence of leniency the tax payers decision to collude with the
tax oﬃcer and evade taxes comes at the risk of being detected and ﬁned.
The presence of a reporting opportunity eﬀectively reduces this risk, while
shifting responsibility to the tax oﬃcer. This not only renders tax evasion
more proﬁtable, but also potentially reduces the tax payer’s psychological
cost associated with paying a bribe in order to evade taxes. Intuitively,
leniency oﬀers the tax payer a “safe way out” when getting caught, hence,
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they are likely to oﬀer bribes more frequently. On the other hand, accepting
a bribe is more risky for a tax oﬃcer when a leniency mechanism is in place,
since she now faces the threat of being reported and ﬁned. Thus, we expect
tax oﬃcers to reject more bribes when blowing the whistle is possible.
As in the previous section, we ﬁrst seek to understand the drivers of
collusion in treatments NoLEN and LEN, where there was no regime change.
In a second step we analyze the role of the institutional history, that is, the
eﬀect of the introduction of a leniency mechanism in NoL-L and the eﬀect of
the removal of such a mechanism in NoL-L.
Incidence of bribe offers and acceptance rate in NoLEN and LEN
We ﬁrst consider the behavior of the tax payer in that we analyze the inci-
dence of bribe oﬀers. The left panel of Figure 4.4 shows the dynamics of the
average frequency of bribe oﬀers per round over the course of the experiment.
Surprisingly, we see that bribe oﬀers are not more frequent but rather less
frequent in LEN compared to NoLEN. In fact, the average incidence of bribe
oﬀers per group over all rounds was 67.7% in NoLEN and 55.1% in LEN and
thus even lower in the presence of leniency. However, this diﬀerence fails
to reach signiﬁcance according to a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test (N = 22,
z = 1.4870, p = 0.137). Further, the graphs suggest that the frequency
of bribe oﬀers is increasing over time in NoLEN, whereas it appears to be
slightly decreasing in treatment LEN. According to Spearman rank order cor-
relations there is a positive trend in NoLEN (ρ = 0.3803, p < 0.001), whereas
the bribe oﬀers exhibit a negative trend in LEN (ρ = −0.2496, p < 0.001).
For both treatments we again calculated the average frequency of bribe oﬀers
for the ﬁrst and second half of rounds, separately. In NoLEN the average
incidence of bribe oﬀers is 68.3% in rounds 1-10 and 73.7% in rounds 11-20
with the diﬀerence not being statistically diﬀerent. In LEN the frequency of
bribe oﬀers is with 56.6% in the second half of the experiment slightly lower
than in the ﬁrst ten rounds, where it is 58.1%. Again this diﬀerence is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
In treatment LEN the tax payer not only faces less risk than in treatment
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Figure 4.4: Frequency of bribes offered and bribe acceptance rate in NoLEN and
LEN.
NoLEN but this risk is also eﬀectively shifted to the tax oﬃcer as leniency
exposes her to the possibility of being reported and ﬁned. In Appendix 4.A
we show that this raises the optimal bribe acceptance threshold in equilib-
rium. A failure of the tax payers to acknowledge this increased risk for the
tax oﬃcers is likely to result in more rejections of bribes. Next, we consider
the behavior of the tax oﬃcer, more precisely we look at the average fraction
of bribes accepted by tax oﬃcers. The right panel of Figure 4.4 shows the
evolution of the bribe acceptance rate over the 20 rounds for the two treat-
ments without a regime change. The graphs indicate a higher acceptance
rate in NoLEN compared to LEN and clearly show that the acceptance rate
is increasing in both treatments over time. The average acceptance rate in
LEN is 58.8% and thus lower compared to the average acceptance rate of
73.2% in NoLEN, however, this diﬀerence fails to reach signiﬁcance (MWW,
N = 22, z = 1.51657, p = 0.1294). Spearman rank order correlations con-
ﬁrm our observation of a signiﬁcant positive trend in both treatments that
is of about the same magnitude in NoLEN (ρ = 0.5245, p < 0.001) and
LEN (ρ = 0.5073, p < 0.001). Comparing the average acceptance rate for
the ﬁrst ten rounds with the average acceptance rate in the second part, we
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in NoLEN from 64.4% to 81.6% (MWW, N = 10,
z = −2.7557, p = 0.0059) as well as an signiﬁcant increase in LEN from
52.9% to 65.0% (MWW, N = 12, z = −2.353393). Thus, our results suggest
that the acceptance rate is increasing over time in both treatments without
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a regime change.
In combination these results suggest that the decrease collusion in LEN
compared to NoLEN is likely the result of both, the absence of an increase
in the number of bribes oﬀered by the tax payer (which are even slightly
less frequent, but not statistically signiﬁcant) and a reduced acceptance rate
by the tax oﬃcer in LEN, which, however, fails to reach signiﬁcance. The
increase in collusion over time seems to be mainly driven by an increase in
the acceptance rate of the tax oﬃcer, especially for LEN where the number of
bribes oﬀered is even slightly decreasing. In NoLEN there is a positive trend
also for the frequency of bribe oﬀers, which might explain why in NoLEN
collusion seems to be increasing more rapidly than in LEN.
Incidence of bribe offers and acceptance rate in NoL-L and L-NoL
We now study the eﬀects of the introduction and the removal of a leniency
mechanism that allows for whistleblowing on the frequency of bribe oﬀers
by the tax payer and on the bribe acceptance rate by the tax oﬃcer. The
left panel of Figure 4.5 shows the dynamics of the frequency of bribe oﬀers
in treatments NoL-L and L-NoL. We observe that there is an upward jump
in the frequency of bribe oﬀers after the introduction of leniency in NoL-L,
from that point on we see a steep decrease until the end of the experiment.
Overall bribe oﬀers seem to be more frequent in the presence of leniency for
both treatments, but more so for L-NoL. In the latter there is a positive
trend before and after the removal of the reporting option, but the frequency
of bribe oﬀers drops sharply.
In treatment NoL-L the average frequency of bribe oﬀers is 65.0% in the
ﬁrst part and rises by 5.5 percentage points to 70.5% in the second part when
a leniency mechanism is introduced. This increase is identical to the increase
observed in NoLEN where no regime change occurred. A Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon test comparing the increase in NoL-L to the increase in NoLEN
from part one to part two conﬁrms this observation (N = 32, z = 0.0001, p =
1.000). We conclude that the introduction of a leniency mechanism has no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the average incidence of bribe oﬀers. However, Figure 4.5
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Figure 4.5: Frequency of bribes offered and bribe acceptance rate in NoL-L and
L-NoL.
suggests that the introduction of whistleblowing aﬀects the dynamics of bribe
oﬀers over rounds. Spearman rank order correlations reveal that during the
ﬁrst part of NoL-L bribe oﬀers show no clear trend (ρ = 0.0369, p = 0.5859),
whereas there is a signiﬁcant negative trend following the introduction of a
reporting mechanism (ρ = −0.8924, p < 0.001).
We now turn to the eﬀect of the removal of leniency on bribe oﬀers. In
treatment L-NoL on average tax payers oﬀered bribes in about 72.5% of all
cases when whistleblowing was possible. This rate is 6.5 percentage points
higher than in the second part, where this number falls to 66.0% following
the removal of the mechanism. This change is very close to the decrease
by 1.5 percentage points observed in LEN and indeed the diﬀerence in the
eﬀects from the ﬁrst part to the second part between LEN and L-NoL is
not statistically signiﬁcant (MWW, N = 26, z = 0.7232, p = 0.4696). We
also observe from Figure 4.5 that there is a positive similar positive trend,
both before (ρ = 0.4075, p < 0.001) and after the removal of the leniency
mechanism (ρ = 0.4909, p < 0.001).
Next, we consider how the behavior of tax oﬃcers, as revealed by the
average acceptance rate of bribe oﬀers, is aﬀected by the introduction and
the removal of a leniency mechanism. The right panel of Figure 4.5 shows
the evolution of the acceptance rate of tax oﬃcers over the course of the
experiment for treatments NoL-L and L-NoL. The graphs suggest that tax
oﬃcers accept less bribes after the introduction of leniency, which is likely due
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to the potential risk of being reported and ﬁned. Our ﬁndings in treatment
NoL-L indicate that the average acceptance rate of bribes decreases from
64.4% to 59.7% following the transition to an institutional environment with
leniency. Recall that in NoLEN, where no such measure was introduced, we
have seen that the acceptance rate increases by 17.2 percentage points from
the ﬁrst part to the second part. The diﬀerence in the change between parts
across NoLEN and NoL-L is highly signiﬁcant (MWW, N = 32, z = 3.0910,
p = 0.0020). This result suggests that the introduction of a reporting option
is an eﬃcient deterrent for the tax oﬃcer as reﬂected by a stark negative
eﬀect in bribe acceptance rates. Moreover, the dynamic pattern in NoL-L
conﬁrms our earlier observation that acceptance rates are increasing over
time independently of the presence of a leniency mechanism.
The removal of the reporting mechanism in L-NoL appears to have a dif-
ferent eﬀect as revealed by the dynamics in the right panel of Figure 4.5.
Acceptance rates are increasing over time in a similar fashion as we have
observed in treatment LEN where the mechanism was not removed. Most
importantly, in treatment L-NoL the dynamics does not indicate any behav-
ioral change in acceptance rates from the ﬁrst to the second part, but only a
steady increase over time. The average acceptance rate increases from 52.2%
in part one where whistleblowing was possible to 74.2% in the second part
without such a mechanism. This increase is not statistically diﬀerent from
the increase observed in LEN (MWW, N = 26, z = −0.4115, p = 0.6807).
Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence that the removal of leniency signiﬁcantly increases
acceptance rates. Further, also in treatment L-NoL the dynamic pattern over
the course of the experiment conﬁrms that acceptance rates are increasing
as subjects gain more experience.
We ﬁnd no evidence that the introduction of leniency for the tax payer
has a strong eﬀect on bribe oﬀers, in particular that leniency encourages tax
payers to oﬀer bribes more frequently is not supported by our data. At most,
there is weak evidence for a temporary increase in bribe oﬀers following the
introduction of leniency, but this is coupled with a sharp and steady decrease
over later periods. On the other hand, our data suggests that the introduc-
tion of a whistleblowing mechanism, that renders the tax oﬃcer formally
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responsible, is able to discourage tax oﬃcers from accepting bribes. More-
over, we ﬁnd no evidence that the removal of such a mechanism triggers an
eﬀect in the opposite direction, that is, acceptance rates show no signiﬁcant
jump upwards when the threat of whistleblowing is removed, which indicates
a positive spillover eﬀect of whistleblowing. We ﬁnd consistent evidence for
a general increase of acceptance rates over time that is independent of the
presence of a leniency mechanism. Thus, our results identify a deterrent ef-
fect of leniency on tax oﬃcers as the driver behind the eﬀects on collusion
rates reported in Subsection 4.3.1. That is, tax oﬃcers reject more bribe
oﬀers after leniency is introduced and do not accept more bribes when it is
removed. Moreover, this eﬀect outweighs any potential encouragement for
tax payers to oﬀer more bribes under leniency, for which our data oﬀers only
limited support.
Effects of Bribe size, Reporting and Beliefs on the Bribe Acceptance Rate
Let us now consider the amount of bribes paid. Recall that in the bribery
game with leniency, the optimal bribe acceptance threshold is higher, hence
in order to sustain collusion the tax payer has to compensate the tax oﬃcer
for the additional risk with higher bribe payments. As shown in Appendix
4.A in equilibrium bribe payments are by about 3.7 ECU higher in the bribery
game with leniency compared to when it is absent. In line with these theo-
retical predictions we observe that average bribe payments are 14.4 ECU in
treatment NoLEN compared to 16.6 ECU in treatment LEN. Although this
diﬀerence is smaller than predicted we ﬁnd that the diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant (MWW, N = 22, z = −1.7808, p = 0.0749). Similarly, there is
a signiﬁcant upwards shift in the size of bribes paid following the introduc-
tion of a whistleblowing mechanism in treatment NoL-L from 13.2 ECU to
15.4 ECU (WSR, N = 22, z = −2.3538, p = 0.0186). Analogously, bribe
payments are 16.6 ECU during the ﬁrst part of treatment L-NoL, whereas
they decrease to 15.2 ECU following the removal of whistleblowing, however,
this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. Evidently, taxpayers acknowl-
edge the higher risk that public oﬃcials have to bear in the presence of a
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Figure 4.6: Bribe size over rounds across treatments.
leniency mechanism and as a consequence compensate them, at least par-
tially, with higher bribes. It is important to note that for a tax oﬃcer all
bribe payments above 6 ECU, respectively 8.16 ECU, are proﬁtable in the
presence, respectively absence, of leniency. Bribe oﬀers below the respective
threshold occurred only in about 10% of the cases in both treatments NoLEN
and LEN, hence those were relatively rare. Non-proﬁtable bribe oﬀers were
slightly more common but equally likely in treatments NoL-L and L-NoL
occurring in 15.5% and 16.3% of all cases, respectively. Hence, diﬀerences
in the frequency of non-proﬁtable bribe oﬀers cannot explain the eﬀects of
leniency on collusion and bribe acceptance rates.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the evolution of bribe payments over the course of
the experiment across treatments. In both NoLEN and LEN the size of bribe
payments remains fairly constant over time, apart from an initial adjustment
period during the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds of treatment LEN. In treatment NoL-L
bribe payments show some positive trend following the introduction of the
reporting option. There is a similar trend in treatment L-NoL, but also
only in the presence of leniency. In our setting, a tax payer’s decision on
whether to evade taxes goes hand in glove with the decision to pay a bribe
and make the tax oﬃcer look the other way. Ceteris paribus, higher bribe
payments should naturally lead to higher collusion rates. To test whether this
is indeed the case we ran a logistic panel regression with random eﬀects and
standard errors clustered at the group level for each treatment separately.
The dependent variable is whether a bribe was accepted or not, that is, any
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instance of a bribe oﬀer is one observation. We include the size of the bribe
oﬀer as an independent variable and for treatments NoL-L and L-NoL we
also include a dummy for the presence of a leniency mechanism and the
interaction with bribe size. Table 4.3 in 4.4 reports the results of these four
regressions. The regression results show that larger bribes are more likely to
be accepted by the tax oﬃcer across all treatments and independent of the
possibility to blow the whistle, which conﬁrms our intuition. The eﬀect of
bribe size appears to be smaller in the presence of a leniency mechanism, but
is still positive and signiﬁcant. This somewhat suggests that when reporting
is possible tax oﬃcers react to a lesser extend to the size of the bribe oﬀer,
possibly because some tax oﬃcers are suﬃciently deterred by the threat of
being reported that the size of the bribe becomes less relevant.
We brieﬂy discuss also the use of the whistleblowing mechanism among
tax payers. Tax payers made use of the possibility to report almost to the full
extent with an overall average propensity to report the tax oﬃcer of about
91.4%. Reporting was most frequently used in treatment L-NoL (98.6%), but
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the frequency observed in NoL-L (87.4%) and
LEN (90.0%). We thus do not ﬁnd any evidence for reciprocity among tax
payers and tax oﬃcers, which may partially be attributed to the fact that in
our setting tax payers who chose to report were granted partial anonymity.
Tax oﬃcers were only informed that and by how many tax payers they were
reported, but not exactly by whom. Hence, depending on the particular
situation tax oﬃcers were not able to determine whether a particular tax
payer did blow the whistle or not. This limits the scope for retaliation, for
example via withholding future cooperation, and hence may explain the high
rate of reporting decisions. In contrast it has been argued that betrayal,
such as reporting, is associated with a moral or psychological cost (see also
Coricelli et al., 2010), which is not supported by our data.
4.3.3 Eﬀects on Tax Evasion
Experimental evidence suggests that subjects’ tax compliance usually is well
above the theoretically optimal level, for example due to moral costs of en-
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Figure 4.7: Amount of taxes finally paid over rounds and across treatments.
gaging in illicit behavior.12 In our experiment tax payers had to make two
decisions: First, whether and how much to bribe the tax oﬃcer, and second,
how much taxes they wanted to declare. Since in our setup tax evasion is
nested within a framework of collusive bribery, the amount of taxes actual
paid is the result of a tax payer’s decision about the amount of taxes declared
as well as tax oﬃcer’s decision to accept or reject the report (and thus the
bribe oﬀered). We hence have to distinguish between attempted tax eva-
sion, as revealed by the amount of taxes declared, and actual tax evasion,
as revealed by the amount of taxes ﬁnally reported. Recall that following a
rejection by the tax oﬃcer, the tax payer is forced to truthfully report taxes.
While attempted tax evasion is also of some interest and can surely cause
moral damage to society as a whole, it is the actual amount of taxes evaded
what directly causes a negative externality on society. In this subsection we
therefore focus on actual tax evasion, that is, the amount of taxes ﬁnally
reported. The results for attempted tax evasion are very similar to those of
actual tax evasion and hence we omit them for brevity.
The average amount of taxes paid in NoLEN is 20.1 ECU and is thus
smaller than the average of 27.9 ECU observed in treatment LEN. This dif-
ference is statistically signiﬁcant (MWW, N = 22, z = −2.4397, p = 0.0147)
showing that the lower rate of collusion in LEN observed previously also
12It was shown in Banerjee (2016b) that a loaded frame that creates the right sense of
entitlement signiﬁcantly decreases corruption, suggesting that moral costs are indeed at
work.
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translates into a higher tax yield collected. As illustrated by Figure 4.7
the amount of taxes paid also shows a negative trend across all treatments
independent of the presence of a leniency mechanism. In fact, in NoLEN
the amount of taxes paid decreases from 23.9 ECU to 16.2 ECU from part
one to part two, whereas in LEN this decrease is smaller with average tax
payments of 29.7 ECU in part one and 26.2 ECU in part two. In treat-
ment NoL-L taxes paid show almost no decrease following the introduction
of whistleblowing being 26.1 ECU before and 24.8 ECU on average after the
mechanism was introduced, respectively. Comparing the changes in taxes
paid between NoLEN and NoL-L, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly smaller decrease in
treatment NoL-L (MWW, N = 32, z = −1.8093, p = 0.0704). Thus the in-
troduction of a whistleblowing mechanism has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on
the tax yield collected. In contrast, in treatment L-NoL paid taxes decrease
from 27.5 ECU on average in the ﬁrst part of the experiment to 23.4 ECU
on average in the second half of the experiment where leniency was removed.
This decrease is similar in size to the one observed in treatment LEN and a
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test conﬁrms that the removal of the reporting op-
tion has no signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the amount of taxes paid (N = 26,
z = 0.4115, p = 0.6807).
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion
Our results shed light on the eﬀects of a leniency mechanism on collusive
bribery in a tax evasion framework utilizing a controlled laboratory setting.
We nest collusive corruption in a tax evasion framework, in which tax payers
require the cooperation of a tax oﬃcer to evade taxes, thus opening the door
for collusive bribery. The leniency mechanism we consider oﬀers leniency to
tax payers for reporting corrupt tax oﬃcers. In our setup leniency not only
shifts the risk and negative consequences (ﬁnes) of collusive bribery from the
tax payer to the tax oﬃcer, who otherwise faces little to no consequences,
but also renders her formally responsible. Compared to most studies in the
tax evasion literature we add a dimension of strategic interaction that allows
us to capture a richer strategic environment, which is applicable to other
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domains, such as custom duties, that are understudied so far. Further, we
investigate the dynamics of institutional changes and their eﬀects on both
corruption and tax evasion by considering not only environments with and
without leniency, but also the introduction and the removal of such a policy.
By doing so we have identiﬁed a positive spillover eﬀect of the presence of
a whistleblowing mechanism present from the ﬁrst half of the experiment to
the second half of the experiment where it is no longer in place.
Comparing settings with and without leniency, in the absence of an in-
stitutional change, we found leniency to be eﬀective in combating collusive
bribery. When leniency for a tax payer is in place successful collusion be-
tween tax payer and tax oﬃcer is less frequent. Further, it eﬀectively deters
the tax oﬃcer from accepting bribes, while at the same time we ﬁnd no ev-
idence that leniency encourages the tax payer to oﬀer bribes. We identify a
lower willingness of the tax oﬃcer to accept bribes as the main driver behind
the observed eﬀects on collusion. We also ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of leniency
on tax compliance with more taxes being collected when such a mechanism
is in place. In addition, our results highlight the role of institutional changes
and its importance to the evaluation of policy measures. We show that the
introduction of the opportunity to blow the whistle is eﬀective in breaking up
already established collusive pattern by sowing distrust between the colluding
parties, which prevents collusive bribery and tax evasion to thrive further. In
contrast, the removal of the institutional mechanism does not cause similar
eﬀects in the opposite direction, which points towards a positive spillover
eﬀect of the particular institutional mechanism we consider. That is, the
positive eﬀects of oﬀering leniency to whistleblowers persists even after the
mechanism has been removed. This in in line, with some recent evidence
emphasizing the importance of spillover eﬀects (e.g., see d’Adda et al., 2017;
Engl et al., 2017).
We provide empirical evidence emphasizing that a political measure should
not be judged in isolation by disregarding the reference point provided by
the pre-reform system, since this might lead to an incomplete or even ﬂawed
assessment of its eﬀectiveness. It is therefore crucial to consider the history
of political or legal systems when deciding upon means to combat corrup-
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tion and tax evasion. The classical economic model of tax evasion does
not consider the fact that individuals are “born into” a certain legal system,
but exactly this status quo might determine whether a potential reform is
eﬀective or not. Taking this evidence into account will be crucial for un-
derstanding why sometimes reforms are highly eﬀective in a certain country
or cultural environment, while they are ineﬀective in others. This might be
related to the echo eﬀect found in Mittone (2006), that is, a change in the
audit sequence aﬀects behavior because subjects “learn” to be risk-averse or
risk-seeking through experiencing early or late ﬁrst audits. This indicates
that past experience can create some sort of reference behavior that cannot
easily be “unlearned,” and hence might enhance or hinder the eﬀectiveness
of a subsequent reform. Following that line of argument reforms can turn
out to be a one-way street, once implemented their eﬀects cannot simply be
undone by reestablishing the pre-reform regime. Hence rolling out reforms is
a process that ought to be taken with great caution by policy makers.
Appendix 4.A: Theoretical Analysis of the Bribery Game
Consider the bribery game with and without leniency described in Subsection
4.2.1 above as one-shot interaction between a TP and a TO, both assumed
to be rational in the sense of being risk-neutral expected payoﬀ-maximizers.
Assuming the rational model of crime (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) we
now derive theoretical predictions regarding tax compliance and bribe ex-
change. Our analysis shows that predicted tax compliance of the TP is the
same for both institutional frames. On the other hand, the optimal bribe
payment is higher in the BGL where reporting is possible. Moreover, bribe
exchange (collusion) is optimal under both regimes. Denote the amount of
taxes declared by D and the bribe oﬀered by b.
In the BG a rational TO will accept any bribe b that is (weakly) above
the expected foregone commission of 15% from the taxes declared, that is
7.5% of the declared income D. Since the TO does not observe the income
declared by the TP we assume that she holds a belief µ : {0, . . . , 80} −→ [0, 1]
over D. The expected amount of declared income given this belief µ is then
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D(µ) =
∑
µ(D)D. Hence, the TO will accept a bribe if she beliefs that the
bribe is larger than her foregone commission, that is if and only if
b ≥ 4.8− 0.06D(µ).
The bribe acceptance threshold, which we denote by bBG(µ), depends only
on the expected amount of declared income D(µ). For example, if the TO
expects the TP to declare zero taxes, that is D(µ) = 0, then only bribes of at
least 4.8 are accepted. Note that the threshold is strictly increasing in D(µ).
On the other hand, if the TP oﬀers a bribe b and the TO accepts (which is
the case for b ≥ bBG(µ)), the TP’s expected payoﬀ for reporting an amount
of D is
ΠTP(D, b | accept) = 70− b− 0.375D.
Note that ΠTP is decreasing in D and b, hence a rational TP will optimally
declare an income of D = 0 and pay the smallest bribe that is accepted by
the TO, which is b = 4.8− 0.06D(µ).
In the BGL leniency introduces the possibility for a TP to report a cor-
rupted TO following an audit. In the one-shot scenario it is optimal for the
TP to report the TO when being audited, in which case the TP now has an
expected payoﬀ of
ΠTP(D, b, report | accept) = 72− b− 0.4D.
This payoﬀ is still decreasing in D and b, and thus the TP prefers to declare
zero taxes and pay the smallest bribe that is accepted by the TO. However,
the bribe threshold in the BGL is not the same as in the BG. To see this,
suppose the TO anticipates that the TP will always report her when audited,
then a rational TO will accept a bribe if and only if
b ≥ 8.5− 0.075D(µ).
We denote this threshold by bBGL(µ). Intuitively, now the TP has to com-
pensate the TO not only for his forfeited (expected) salary, but also for the
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risk of being reported and its consequences.
The game described above is a game of imperfect information (the TO
does not observe D) and as such it has many equilibria. We use Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as our solution concept of choice. Given a point
belief µ with µ(0) = 1 and µ(D) = 0 for D 6= 0 there is a PBE of BG where
the TP declares exactly D = 0 and oﬀers a bribe b = bBG(µ), which the TO
accepts. Similarly, given the same belief there is a PBE for BGL where the
TP declares D = 0, oﬀers a bribe b = bBGL(µ), which the TO accepts, and
always reports the TO when audited. In both, BG and BGL, collusion is
an equilibrium of the one-shot game. However, since bBGL(µ) > bBG(µ) for
any µ, the bribe acceptance threshold in BGL is higher compared to BG. It
is important to note that for both games the bribe acceptance threshold is
decreasing in the mean of the TO’s belief µ.
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Appendix 4.B: Summary Statistics
Table 4.2 provides an overview of the behavior in all four treatments. We
report the frequency of successful bribe exchange (collusion), the frequency
of bribe oﬀers, the amount of bribes paid, the proportion of bribes accepted
by the tax oﬃcer, tax compliance, both attempted and eﬀective, and the
propensity of tax payers to report tax oﬃcers when given the chance.
Table 4.2: Summary statistics across treatments.
Treatment NoLEN LEN NoL-L L-NoL
Rounds 1-20 1-20 1-10 11-20 1-10 11-20
Collusion (in %) 52.3 34.6 43.2 41.7 38.3 48.8
BribeOﬀered (in %) 71.0 57.3 65.0 70.5 72.4 66.0
BribeSize (in ECU) 14.4 16.6 13.1 15.4 16.6 15.2
AccRate (in %) 73.1 58.8 64.5 59.7 52.2 74.2
TaxDeclared (in ECU) 13.9 20.6 20.2 14.9 18.1 18.3
TaxPaid (in ECU) 20.1 27.9 26.8 24.8 27.5 23.4
Reporting (in %) - 85.5 - 91.5 98.7 -
Note: Collusion denotes the incidence of successful bribe exchange (bribe oﬀered and ac-
cepted); BribeOﬀered denotes the incidence of a bribe being oﬀered relative to all situation
where this was possible; BribeSize is the average size of the oﬀered bribes (0-30 ECU);
AccRate denotes the fraction of bribe oﬀers that were accepted by tax oﬃcers; TaxesDe-
clared denotes the amount of taxes initially reported (0-40 ECU); TaxesPaid denotes that
taxes actually paid according to the ﬁnal, accepted report (0-40 ECU); Reporting denotes
the fraction of reporting decision by tax payers when audited.
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Appendix 4.C: Additional Analysis
Table 4.3: Logistic panel regression with random effects of acceptance on bribe
size.
Accepted NoLEN LEN NoL-L L-NoL
BribeSize 0.3987∗∗∗ 0.1613∗∗∗ 0.2434∗∗∗ 0.2403∗∗∗
(0.1219) (0.0445) (0.0501) (0.0578)
Leniency −0.1954 −2.5350∗
(0.5717) (1.3143)
Leniency × BribeSize −0.0607∗∗ 0.0229
(0.0296) (0.0750)
Constant −4.1264∗∗ −2.1187∗∗∗ −2.1590∗∗∗ −1.9292∗
(1.8780) (0.7271) (0.7008) (1.0607)
Linear combination test 0.1828∗∗∗ 0.2632∗∗
BribeSize + Leniency × BribeSize (0.03703) (0.1142)
Observations 426 413 894 581
Note: Standard errors clustered at the group level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p <
0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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5.1 Introduction
Governments all over the world use substantial resources to keep society safe
and punish people for criminal acts. Annually, the US spends approximately
$75 billion on incarceration (not including costs for courts, trials, etc.). Thus,
it is hardly surprising that extensive research has been done to understand
the determinants of deviant behavior and shed light on alternative deterrence
mechanisms. Existing economic literature not only stresses the relevance of
institutional environments in shaping prosperity and growth (La Porta et al.,
1999; Acemoglu et al., 2005), but also their importance in eﬀectively deter-
ring criminal and immoral behavior in ways that include staﬀ rotations in
public administration, crown witness regulations, and changes in punishment
regimes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Abbink, 2004; Abbink et al., 2014; Engel
et al., 2016). Due to the inherent methodological challenges of studying de-
viant behavior, where reliable observational data is unavailable, economists
have turned to controlled experiments to address these pressing questions
(Abbink, 2006). We follow this methodological approach in our paper.
There is vast literature on criminal deterrence that focuses on the rele-
vance of the certainty and severity of punishment in deterring deviant be-
havior (see e.g. Becker, 1968; Baker et al., 2004; DeAngelo and Charness,
2012; for a recent review of economic research see Chalﬁn and McCrary,
2017 and for a cross-disciplinary discussion of experimental work see Engel,
2016). However, the swiftness of punishment (often referred to as celerity),
frequently mentioned alongside certainty and severity (Bailey, 1980; Howe
and Brandau, 1988; Yu, 1994; Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001, 2004), has been
under researched by those in the economic ﬁeld. Understanding the mecha-
nisms underlying deterrence of deviant behavior yields important policy im-
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plications. Given the high costs involved in increasing punishment’s certainty
(e.g. costs for an executive body) or punishment’s severity (e.g. incarcer-
ation costs), we argue that the timing of conviction and punishment, that
is, their delay with respect to the transgression in question, can potentially
serve as a powerful tool for deterrence that is often available at a relatively
low cost.
The classic theoretical approach towards the deterrence of criminal ac-
tivity (e.g. Becker, 1968) is based on the assumption that potential oﬀenders
mainly weigh the potential gains against the potential adverse consequences
of an oﬀense. In the standard framework of discounted expected utility,
delayed punishment should reduce deterrence due to a discounting eﬀect,
whereas the timing of resolution of uncertainty should have no eﬀect on
behavior. Starting with the seminal paper of Loewenstein (1987), several
theories propose that anticipation of future events is an important determi-
nant of inter-temporal utility (see e.g., Wu, 1999; Lovallo and Kahneman,
2000; Caplin and Leahy, 2001; Dillenberger, 2010; Strzalecki, 2013; Golman
and Loewenstein, 2015). These models are based on the idea that a non-
negligible proportion of the overall consequences from future consumption
(be it negative or positive) is already consumed in the form of so-called antic-
ipatory utility before actual consumption takes place. While there is growing
theoretical literature supporting anticipatory utility theory and its implica-
tions, there is little empirical work being done and even less experimental
investigation. 1
The goal of the present paper is to experimentally test the implications of
anticipatory utility in the context of institutional deterrence mechanisms. In
particular, we are interested in how the timing of sanctions (be it conviction
or sentencing) and the timing of the resolution of uncertainty surrounding
these sanctioning mechanisms aﬀects deterrence. We systematically vary the
celerity of a sanction within a new, stylized, experimental paradigm along
the following two dimensions: ﬁrst, we vary the delay between oﬀense and
1Two recent exceptions are Falk and Zimmermann (2016), who experimentally tested
the implications of anticipatory utility in the context of information preferences and Kogler
et al. (2016), who showed that delayed resolution of a tax audit results in higher tax
compliance.
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detection/conviction; second, we vary the delay between oﬀense and sanc-
tioning. Our main objective is to better understand the role of celerity, in
our opinion, an important dimension of most deterrence mechanisms, that
has received surprisingly little attention in previous literature. We argue
that celerity could potentially serve as a useful tool for policy makers to
design more eﬃcient and/or less expensive institutional deterrence mecha-
nisms. However, delayed punishment is not necessarily less deterrent (due
to discounting) if utility from anticipation is taken into account. Addition-
ally, we study the role of the timing of resolution of uncertainty. We vary the
point in time when the information about whether or not a transgression was
detected is revealed to subjects. We show that in theory, depending on the
impact of anticipatory utility, delayed resolution of uncertainty may increase
deterrence.
Our experimental analysis is based on a simple guessing game where sub-
jects may cheat in some periods to increase payoﬀs. After these periods there
is an investigation such that cheaters will be detected and ﬁned with a given
probability. In the single treatments, we vary both the timing of the potential
ﬁne, as well as, the timing of the resolution of uncertainty, i.e. when the par-
ticipants learn the results of the investigation. We analyze behavior alongside
two dimensions: total cheating behavior and recidivism (conditional cheat-
ing). Our results show that delayed resolution has no systematic impact on
cheating. With respect to the relation between the delay of punishment and
deterrence, we observe an inverted U-shape relationship where deterrence is
lowest for a short delay of punishment and signiﬁcantly lower for either no
delay or a long delay when combined with a late resolution of uncertainty.
This result is at odds with discounted expected utility and theories of
anticipatory utility, but can be explained by the recent model of Baucells
and Bellezza (2016). They extended anticipatory utility by a reference point,
a utility of recall and a magnitude eﬀect in discounting. We conclude that
in order to increase the deterrence of sanctioning mechanisms, punishment
should either be swift or suﬃciently delayed and paired with the psychological
dread of uncertainty.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief review
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of the theoretical and empirical background on the relation between celerity
and deterrence. Section 3 details our experimental procedures and discusses
the hypotheses we aim to test. Results are presented in Section 4. The ﬁnal
section discusses our results and derives some conclusions.
5.2 Theoretical and Empirical Background
The beneﬁts of criminal behavior are usually immediate. Any proceeding
detection, conviction, and implementation of legal consequences are gener-
ally delayed and stochastic. This poses an inter-temporal decision problem
under uncertainty. Classically, celerity meant only the temporal delay of a
potential sanction following a transgression. We will adopt a wider deﬁnition
of celerity, using it as a catch-all phrase for the timing of the various facets of
a deterrence mechanism. There are several prominent economic theories of
inter-temporal decision making. Here we want to focus on two. First, theories
of temporal discounting suggest that future costs or beneﬁts receive a lower
weight than immediate ones; this weight decreases as one moves further into
the future (Frederick et al., 2002). The implications are simple. If a poten-
tial oﬀender discounts delayed legal consequences, then deterrence decreases
the longer the delay. As a consequence, higher celerity (less delay) would
increase the eﬃciency of legal sanctions, which is the classical hypothesis in
criminological literature (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2004; Paternoster, 2010).
Second, theories of anticipatory utility that incorporate anticipatory feel-
ings such as excitement, fear or dread into classical expected utility theory
suggest that one might want to bring forward an unpleasant event to shorten
the period of dread (or delay a positive event to enjoy the excitement for
a longer period of time). The idea is that future events inﬂuence current
utility. More precisely, negative (positive) future events cause negative (pos-
itive) utility today the further away the event is (at least up to a certain
point). Caplin and Leahy (2001) extend Loewenstein’s model by allowing for
uncertainty and point toward the importance of anticipatory feelings prior
to the resolution of uncertainty. However, anticipatory emotions, such as
anxiety, are often predicated on an uncertain future. Thus, they are mainly
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relevant prior to the resolution of uncertainty. This suggests that the point in
time at which uncertainty is resolved is particularly important. For example,
Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Kocher et al. (2014) show that preferences over
temporal lotteries also depend on the point in time when the uncertainty is
resolved. That is, agents can show a preference for earlier or delayed resolu-
tion of uncertainty. Further evidence comes from consumer literature. An-
ticipatory emotions, compared with outcome-based emotions, are central in
prospective consumption situations. Furthermore, the uncertainty associated
with anticipatory emotions negatively aﬀects intentions (Bee and Madrigal,
2013). Psychological learning theories (Skinner, 1963; Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1986; Ehrlich, 1996; Hackenberg, 2009) second the argument that the
time between a transgression and the punishment and the uncertainty that
is associated with the punishment are driving forces for eﬀective behavioral
changes. If this is indeed the case, then the classical interpretation of celerity
as the time between committing an oﬀense and the actual punishment (e.g.
ﬁne or imprisonment) should be complemented by the time the uncertainty
is resolved, thus, the time of sentencing.
The implications of the timing of a sanction on deterrence derived from
anticipatory utility theory could oppose those suggested by temporal dis-
counting. Clearly this is an important point that has to be taken into con-
sideration for the design of legal institutions. A systematic study of the
role of celerity for deterrence poses a serious empirical challenge, because
changing the celerity of an enforcement mechanism would most likely impact
existing institutional structures on multiple levels. For that reason, isolating
the impact of such an intervention is hardly possible in the ﬁeld. In addi-
tion, it is unclear whether an actual or would-be oﬀender is aware of this
change or not, making identiﬁcation almost impossible. Thus, a systematic
study of celerity calls for a highly controlled environment that allows for the
isolation of the direct eﬀect of institutional changes varying celerity on be-
havior. Fortunately, the experimental laboratory provides such a controlled
environment.
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5.3 Design and Hypotheses
5.3.1 Experimental Design
We use a simple guessing game that is played repeatedly by our subjects. In
certain rounds subjects are presented with the option to “cheat.” Cheating
guarantees them the maximum possible payoﬀ for that round. Our goal was
to design a simple game where the option to cheat was not integral; we wanted
the game to be easy-to-understand, but meaningful regardless of whether or
not the option to cheat was presented. Speciﬁcally, we wanted to make sure
that cheating was not considered part of the game, but a clear violation of said
games rules. In our guessing game a card is randomly drawn from a deck of 32
cards and subjects have to guess which card was drawn. A subject received
10 Experimental Currency Units (ECU) for a correct guess and 4 ECU for an
incorrect guess. In some rounds participants are given the option to cheat. By
cheating, participants are allowed to uncover the randomly drawn card before
making one’s guess, ensuring a correct answer and the maximum payoﬀ of 10
ECU less a possible ﬁne if detected.2 Participants were informed that each
instance of cheating would be followed by an “investigation” that would detect
cheating with a ﬁxed probability of 25%. Hence, cheating exposes them to
the risk of being caught. If caught the consequences are two-fold. First, the
subject has to pay a ﬁne of 10 ECU. Second, the subject is suspended from
the game for one round, is not allowed to make any decision and cannot earn
any ECU. Furthermore, suspended participants are forced to wait 60 seconds
before they are allowed to continue in the next period. We deliberately chose
suspension as part of the sanctioning mechanism to increase salience with
regard to the timing of sanctions. While one might argue that a delayed
ﬁne in a laboratory context where all “actual” payments are realized at the
very end of the experiment decreases the result’s robustness, such concerns
do not apply to the suspension as it is clearly linked to the particular round
2When subjects decide to cheat, we automatically implement the “right guess” for them.
Subjects are informed about this procedure in the instructions. We implement this forced
guess to avoid “second thoughts” where a subject cheats, views the drawn card, but chooses
a diﬀerent card.
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Figure 5.1: Timeline of the experiment for each treatment.
1
RIR−ND
RIR−SD
2
PIR−ND
3
RDR−SD
RDR−KD
4
PDR−SD
PIR−SD
5 6
PDR−LD
Notes: P and R indicate the timing of resolution of uncertainty and timing of punishment
for each of the treatments IR-ND, IR-SD, DR-SD, and DR-LD, respectively.
a subject is suspended.
In order to make the moral dimension of cheating more salient in our
laboratory context we introduce a third party, represented by a charity, that
incurs a monetary damage as a result of cheating. Speciﬁcally, for each ex-
perimental session there is a charity pool of 250 ECU (worth $25) from which
50 ECU is deducted each time a particular subject decides to cheat.3 At the
end of the experiment one subject is randomly selected whose decisions de-
termine the charity pool, the remainder of which will be donated to “Doctors
without Borders.”
In our experiment, we vary the timing along the following two dimensions:
the timing of punishment and the timing of the resolution of uncertainty.
Punishment is either immediate, delayed by two rounds or delayed by four
rounds. In addition, the resolution of uncertainty regarding whether cheating
is detected (and hence whether there are sanctions) is either immediate or
delayed by two periods. Figure 5.1 illustrates the timeline for each treatment.
All treatments consist of 28 rounds: four training rounds followed by
four blocks of six rounds each. In the ﬁrst four rounds participants play
the guessing game without cheating to familiarize themselves with the game
and the interface. In the ﬁrst round of each block subjects can cheat. In
the remaining rounds of a block (rounds 2-6) they play the guessing game
without the option to cheat. Using blocks of 6 rounds allows us to vary
both the timing of the resolution of uncertainty, as well as, the timing of
3For each subject there are exactly four cheating opportunities, all in the ﬁrst round
of a “block” of six rounds. That is, in rounds 5, 11, 17 and 23 subjects are given the
opportunity to cheat. Subjects are informed that “occasionally” they will be presented
with the option to cheat, but not about the exact timing and frequency of this option.
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Table 5.1: Overview of timing of resolution of uncertainty and punishment in the
different treatments.
Treatment Timing of resolution of uncertainty Timing of punishment
IR-ND immediate no delay
IR-SD immediate short delay (2 rounds)
DR-SD delayed (2 rounds) short delay (2 rounds)
DR-LD delayed (2 rounds) long delay (4 rounds)
punishment without an overlap with subsequent cheating decisions.
Table 5.1 summarizes the four treatments. In treatment IR-ND, we have
immediate resolution of uncertainty and no delay of punishment. Subjects
receive immediate feedback within the same round about whether cheating
was detected and there is no delay in punishment. That is, the ﬁne (if due) is
deducted and a potential suspension is implemented immediately for the next
period.4 In treatment IR-SD, resolution of uncertainty is again immediate,
but now there is a short delay in punishment of two periods; when cheating
in period t the uncertainty will be resolved immediately, but the potential
ﬁne and suspension are executed only in period t+ 3 (as opposed to t+ 1 in
IR-ND). We will also refer to IR-SD as immediate resolution of uncertainty
and short delay of punishment. In treatment DR-SD, the investigation into
cheating does not conclude immediately, but lasts for two additional periods.
Only after that is the participant informed about whether his cheating was
detected or not. As in IR-SD, there is a short delay of punishment. We
hence refer to DR-SD as delayed resolution of uncertainty and short delay of
punishment. Finally, in treatment DR-LD resolution is again delayed, but
now punishment is delayed for four periods rather than two. That is, cheating
in period t results in resolution of uncertainty in period t + 2, followed by
the actual punishment (if due) in period t + 5.
4Clearly punishment cannot precede the resolution of uncertainty which determines
whether a subject was detected and hence will have to face a punishment.
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5.3.2 Experimental Procedures
We conducted 32 experimental sessions at the Decision Science Lab at Har-
vard University. Participants were recruited vie e-mail invitation from the
laboratory’s database which contains students, as well as, non-students. A to-
tal of 296 subjects (out of which 46.6 % were males) participated in the exper-
iment split between treatments as follows: 66 subjects in IR-ND, 85 subjects
in IR-SD, 69 subjects in DR-SD and 76 subjects in DR-LD. The experiment
was programmed and run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).5 Within each ses-
sion participants were randomly assigned to a computer booth in which they
would participate in the experiment anonymously. The consent forms and in-
structions for the corresponding treatment were distributed. Upon agreeing
to the informed consent page the participants were given suﬃcient time to
read the instructions carefully. Before the start of the experiment subjects
had to answer a series of comprehension questions in order to check their
understanding of the game and its payoﬀ structure. Subjects then played
28 periods after which they were informed of their total earnings via a de-
tailed summary screen. One subject was randomly drawn to determine the
charity pool and all participants were informed about the ﬁnal amount left
in the pool to be donated to “Doctors without Borders.”6 At the end of the
experiment subjects completed a questionnaire containing questions on per-
sonal characteristics (demographics, education, income, age), risk-attitudes
(SOEP), consideration of future consequences (Strathman et al., 1994) and
self-control (Tangney et al., 2004).
Sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes excluding the time for payment.
A participant’s payoﬀ was determined by the sum of his earnings over all 28
rounds. The total payoﬀ in ECU was then converted to dollars at a rate of
5It is worth noting that we observed an inﬂux of disproportionately older participants
due to a bug in the recruitment software in our ﬁrst sessions. This was quickly resolved.
Participants of 41 years and older represent around 11% of our data set. Unless noted
otherwise, our results are robust with respect to this subgroup.
6Prior to the experiment subjects received a short description of the work of “Doctors
without Borders.” Although we cannot know for sure that all participants endorse their
work, we wanted to enforce a minimal level of common knowledge to increase salience. A
receipt of the amount actually donated was made available to all participants via email.
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10 ECU = $1. The average payment was $14.29 which includes a show-up
fee of $2.50.
5.3.3 Hypotheses
In this section, we further detail our main hypothesis on how deterrence
could be aﬀected by the delay of punishment and the timing of resolution
of uncertainty. In the standard discounted expected utility (DEU) model,
optimal decisions do not depend on the timing of resolution of uncertainty.
In our model a delay of punishment should decrease deterrence. The utility
of not cheating (NC) is identical in all treatments and is given by
DEU(NC) =
31
32
4 +
1
32
10 (5.1)
where we assume for convenience a linear utility function.7 In what follows
we denote DEU(NC) by u¯NC . We restrict attention to a single block con-
sisting of six periods, where cheating was possible in the ﬁrst round of that
block. Further, we only consider the utility generated from the decision about
cheating in the ﬁrst period of such a block in all our analyses. The remaining
utility components within a block are identical across treatments. In IR-ND,
detected cheaters are ﬁned (10 ECU plus one round suspension) directly in
the next period. For a discount factor δ < 1, the utility of cheating (C)
amounts to
DEU(C, IR-ND) = 10−
1
4
δ(10 + u¯NC) (5.2)
as cheating is not possible in the next period. Compared to IR-ND, pun-
ishment is delayed by two further periods in IR-SD. The same is true for
DR-SD. As the timing of resolution of uncertainty is immaterial under DEU,
we get
DEU(C, IR-SD) = DEU(C,DR-SD) = 10−
1
4
δ3(10 + u¯NC). (5.3)
7While risk aversion modeled by a concave utility function certainly inﬂuences the deci-
sion between cheating and not cheating, it does not imply diﬀerences between treatments.
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Finally, we have
DEU(C,DR-LD) = 10−
1
4
δ5(10 + DEU(NC)). (5.4)
as punishment is delayed by a total of four periods in DR-LD. Since
DEU(C, IR-ND) < DEU(C, IR-SD) = DEU(C,DR-SD) < DEU(C,DR-LD)
where the utility of not cheating is independent of the treatments, we get the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Increasing the delay of punishment decreases deterrence,
leading to more violations in IR-SD compared to IR-ND and in DR-LD
compared to DR-SD.
Hypothesis 2. The timing of resolution of uncertainty does not aﬀect behav-
ior, implying that violations in treatments IR-SD and DR-SD are identical.
Hypothesis 3. Since the timing of resolution of uncertainty does not change
deterrence and increasing the delay of punishment decreases deterrence, we
will have more violations in DR-SD than in IR-ND and more violations in
DR-LD than in IR-SD.
Following Loewenstein (1987) negative future outcomes can cause imme-
diate disutility through negative anticipatory emotions such as fear, dread or
anxiety. DEU fails to take this into consideration. Suppose you were cheat-
ing in treatment IR-ND. Then you dread in the ﬁrst period that you will be
ﬁned in the next one, i.e. you dread a loss of 10 + u¯NC . For a discount rate
γ which measures the degree to which current utility is inﬂuenced by antici-
pated emotions from consumption in the next period, the utility of cheating
is given by
UAE(C, IR-ND) = 10−
1
4
(δ + γ)(10 + u¯NC) (5.5)
where UAE denotes utility with anticipated emotions. We now consider IR-
SD where there is a short delay of punishment by two periods. Note that
the utility from anticipation is discounted with discount factor δ. While the
discounting eﬀect in (5.3) increases utility compared to IR-ND, anticipation
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leads to decreasing utility as dread is now experienced in more than one
period. More speciﬁcally, we get
UAE(C, IR-SD) = 10−
1
4
δ3(10+ u¯NC)−
1
4
(γ3+ δγ2+ δ2γ)(10+ u¯NC) (5.6)
Comparing (5.5) and (5.6), it may well be that the utility of cheating is
lower in IR-SD than in IR-ND if γ is suﬃciently high. Since the utility of
not cheating is identical across treatments, we get the following hypothesis
as alternative to Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1*. If the eﬀect of anticipation is suﬃciently high, delaying
punishment increases deterrence leading to less violations in IR-SD compared
to IR-ND and in DR-LD compared to DR-SD.
Anticipated emotions in the model of Loewenstein (1987) refers to future
consumption under certainty. In treatments DR-SD and DR-LD resolution
of uncertainty is delayed which may alter anticipatory emotions. While in
IR-SD a detected cheater may feel dread in periods 1-3 due to anticipating
the punishment in period 4, in DR-SD a cheater may experience the anxiety
of being detected in the later investigation. Following Caplin and Leahy
(2001) the anxiety experienced one period before resolution should depend
on the probability of being detected and the size of the ﬁne. As all these
parameters are identical in treatments DR-SD and DR-LD we simply use
the terms A to denote the anxiety of a cheater one period before resolution.
We now introduce a third discount rate α, such that anxiety experienced t
periods before resolution is given by αtA. This yields the following utility of
cheating in DR-SD:
UAE(C,DR-SD) = 10−
1
4
δ3(10+ u¯NC)−(α+δα
2)A−
1
4
δ2γ(10+ u¯NC) (5.7)
Typically, it is observed that people prefer early resolution of uncertainty for
negative outcomes. In our model this is the case if
(α2 + δα)A >
1
4
(γ3 + δγ2)(10 + u¯NC) (5.8)
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and leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2*. Delayed resolution of uncertainty increases deterrence lead-
ing to less violations in DR-SD compared to IR-SD.
Obviously, if the resolution of uncertainty should be delayed in order to
increase deterrence, punishment has to be delayed as it cannot precede the
resolution of uncertainty. The combined eﬀect of delayed resolution and de-
layed punishment can be grasped by comparing DR-SD to IR-ND. If both
delaying punishment according to Hypothesis 1* and delaying resolution ac-
cording to Hypothesis 2* increases deterrence, our model implies the follow-
ing:
Hypothesis 3*. If delaying punishment increases deterrence due to dread
and delayed resolution also increases deterrence due to anxiety, then the
combined eﬀect of delaying punishment and resolution results in less cheating
and, therefore, less violations in DR-SD compared to IR-ND.
Let us ﬁnally consider the utility of cheating in DR-LD. Here we get
UAE(C,DR-LD) = 10−
1
4
δ5(10+ u¯)−
1
4
(γ3+δγ2+δ2γ3+δ3γ2+δ4γ)(10+ u¯)
(5.9)
The cheater experiences anxiety prior to the resolution of uncertainty as
in DR-SD, but there is also an extended period where he may experience
dread due to delayed punishment. The second component is similar to the
dread experienced in IR-SD, additionally discounted as the experience starts
two periods later. Assuming (5.8), a comparison of (5.9) and (5.6), reveals
that the utility of cheating in DR-LD will be smaller than that of cheating in
IR-SD under the conditions of Hypothesis 1*. This results in the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4*. If (5.8) holds and the eﬀect of anticipation is suﬃciently
high (γ is large enough), then delayed resolution combined with delaying pun-
ishment results in less cheating leading to less violations in DR-LD compared
to IR-SD and less violations in DR-LD compared to IR-ND.
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5.4 Results
Here, we present our results using parametric and non-parametric compar-
isons,8 as well, various regression techniques to analyze diﬀerences in cheat-
ing behavior, as motivated by our hypotheses. Please note that not only
the number of cheating opportunities (4) were the same in all treatments,
but also their timing (always in the ﬁrst round of each block). Hence, any
diﬀerence in behavior can only result from our systematic variation in the
timing of punishment and the timing of resolution of uncertainty.
First, we look at the mean diﬀerences in total cheating across all treat-
ments as outlined in the theory part of our paper. Total cheating is deﬁned
as the total number of individual cheating incidences across all rounds. We
calculate the percentage as the ratio of actual individual cheating decisions
to the maximum possible number of cheating opportunities (4). We present
the test results in Table 5.2 and a graphical illustration in Figure 5.2. Results
illustrate that the amount of cheating is 15 percentage higher in IR-SD when
compared to cheating in IR-ND (BSM, p = 0.03). Cheating is 13 percentage
lower in DR-LD compared to DR-SD (BSM, p = 0.07). Furthermore, cheat-
ing is 12 percentage lower in IR-ND than in DR-SD (BSM, p = 0.09) and
roughly 15 percentage lower in DR-LD than in IR-S (BSM, p = 0.02). We
test the theoretical predictions derived from our two theoretical frameworks
(DEU and UAE) in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, respectively. This can be found
in Appendix 5.A. Overall, our hypotheses are partially supported by both
theoretical approaches. We discuss the implications in greater detail in the
next section.
In order to check for robustness, we ran a series of regressions to analyze
the behavioral motivations that result in cheating and the total amount of
cheating that took place. Treating decisions across rounds in the fashion of
8We follow Moﬀatt (2015) and employ the bootstrap two-sample t-test method (here-
after BSM) with 9999 replications to analyze mean diﬀerences of average return behavior.
This has the advantage that we can retain the rich cardinal information in the data with-
out making any assumptions about the distribution. Unless noted otherwise, the use of
non-parametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (hereafter MWW) tests yields results that are
in line with our bootstrap approach.
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Figure 5.2: Average Total Cheating.
panel data, our dependent variable in Table 5.2 is a count variable adding up
the total amount of cheating decisions across blocks.We present two types of
regressions. The ﬁrst analyzes behavior by timing (models 1 and 2), while
the second analyzes behavior across treatment speciﬁcations (model 3 and
4). This allows us to dissect the impact of the timing of punishment from
the timing of resolution of uncertainty, as well as, the eﬀect of their inter-
action on total cheating behavior. To this end, we use IR-SD with a short
delay of punishment and no delayed resolution of uncertainty as our reference
category. The extended form regressions (column 2) include a battery of rele-
vant covariates (gender, age, number of correct card guesses, experience with
punishment from past cheating, round indicator, risk tendencies, awareness
of future consequences, self-control, and a dummy indicating a participant’s
previous participation in economic experiments).
Our analysis in Table 5.2 suggests that, relative to a short delay of pun-
ishment, both swifter and more delayed punishment renders individual cheat-
ing decisions signiﬁcantly less likely. The introduction of delayed uncertainty
resolution itself does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect cheating behavior. A direct com-
parison of our treatments mirrors this ﬁnding, indicating that higher deter-
rence can be achieved by either implementing swift punishment (IR-ND) or
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Table 5.2: Total Cheating using GLS Random Effects Regressions
Analysis by timing Analysis by treatment
TotalCheating (1) (2) (3) (4)
No Delay −0.3066∗∗ (0.1560) −0.3277∗∗ (0.1566)
Long Delay −0.2849∗ (0.1577) −0.2813∗ (0.1582)
Uncertainty −0.0212 (0.1615) −0.0437 (0.1643)
IR-ND −0.3066∗∗ (0.1560) −0.3277∗∗ (0.1566)
DR-SD −0.0212 (0.1615) −0.0437 (0.1643)
DR-LD −0.3062∗∗ (0.1527) −0.3250∗∗ (0.1523)
Male 0.4020∗∗∗ (0.1147) 0.4361∗∗∗ (0.1252) 0.4020∗∗∗ (0.1147) 0.4361∗∗∗ (0.1252)
Age −0.4847∗∗∗ (0.1671) −0.4800∗∗∗ (0.1816) −0.4847∗∗∗ (0.1671) −0.4800∗∗∗ (0.1816)
GuessCorrect −0.0668 (0.0681) −0.0510 (0.0693) −0.0668 (0.0681) −0.0510 (0.0693)
Punishment 0.3404∗∗∗ (0.1157) 0.2881∗∗∗ (0.0689) 0.3404∗∗∗ (0.1157) 0.2881∗∗∗ (0.0689)
Round 0.4263∗∗∗ (0.0242) 0.4263∗∗∗ (0.0242)
Risk −0.0625 (0.0624) −0.0625 (0.0624)
FutCons −0.0249 (0.0610) −0.0249 (0.0610)
SelfControl −0.0692 (0.0595) −0.0692 (0.0595)
ExpParticipation 0.1472 (0.1204) 0.1472 (0.1204)
Constant 1.1450∗∗∗ (0.1373) −0.0318 (0.1545) 1.1450∗∗∗ (0.1373) −0.0318 (0.1545)
Observations 1184 1184 1184 1184
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the individual level. ∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p <
0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Reference categories are Short Delay and IR-SD, respectively. Age is
1 for participants older than 40 years. Higher values for Risk, Future Consequences, and
Self-Control depict higher willingness to take risks, to be forward-looking and to exhibit
higher self-control, respectively. These values are standardized. Total Punishment relates
to the overall frequency of inﬂicted punishment on the individual if caught cheating.
through the combination of delayed uncertainty resolution and signiﬁcantly
delayed punishment (DR-LD). Post estimation tests yield no diﬀerence be-
tween the coeﬃcients of IR-ND and DR-LD (p = 0.88), suggesting that
the eﬀectiveness of deterrence is comparable in both cases. It is worth not-
ing that we observe substantial gender heterogeneity indicating that males
cheat signiﬁcantly more than females. The results also suggest that de-
viant behavior increases with punishment inﬂicted for caught cheating. This
ﬁnding indicates that individuals try to make up for incurred losses by in-
creasing the frequency of cheating and taking larger risks, thus being more
risk-seeking in losses. Additionally, a participant’s age is inversely and sig-
niﬁcantly correlated with cheating, while our other covariates cannot explain
deviant behavior in our sample. Noteworthy, the amount of correct guesses
in non-cheating rounds, which are the driving force behind wealth accumu-
lation in our setting, has no signiﬁcant predictive power for cheating. This
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Figure 5.3: Conditional Cheating.
indicates that potential wealth eﬀects cannot explain cheating behavior. All
this suggests that swifter punishment or delayed punishment in combination
with delayed resolution of uncertainty signiﬁcantly increases the deterrence
of deviant behavior. The delay of uncertainty alone remains non-eﬀective.
We conclude that both very eﬃcient (no delays of punishment) and very
ineﬃcient (long delays of punishment in combination with long uncertainty
about the status of discovery) punishment institutions are equally eﬀective
in deterring deviant behavior.
It is worth noting that one could also plausibly assume the presence of
learning eﬀects. A large body of existing literature suggests that the learning
eﬀects that emerge through experience are shaped by the timing of rewards
and punishments. Due to this, they aﬀect subsequent behavior (cf. Camp
et al., 1967; Parke and Deur, 1972). This is of particular importance in the
punishment context, because such learning eﬀects would directly speak to
the occurrence of recidivism among former felons. Following this logic, the
experience of uncertainty and punishment following transgressive behavior
could lead to diﬀerences in subsequent transgressions. We call this Condi-
tional Cheating. Conditional Cheating is deﬁned as the number of individual
cheating decisions that proceed the ﬁrst cheating decision (which can oc-
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Table 5.3: Conditional Cheating using OLS
Analysis by timing Analysis by treatment
ConditionalCheating (1) (2) (3) (4)
No Delay −0.1666∗∗ (0.0742) −0.1757∗∗ (0.0743)
Long Delay −0.2129∗∗ (0.0844) −0.1932∗∗ (0.0851)
Uncertainty −0.0782 (0.0709) −0.0871 (0.0717)
IR-ND −0.1666∗∗ (0.0742) −0.1757∗∗ (0.0743)
DR-SD −0.0782 (0.0709) −0.0871 (0.0717)
DR-LD −0.2911∗∗∗ (0.0785) −0.2803∗∗∗ (0.0789)
Male 0.0881 (0.0570) 0.1178∗ (0.0625) 0.0881 (0.0570) 0.1178∗ (0.0625)
Age −0.1298 (0.1033) −0.1362 (0.1083) −0.1298 (0.1033) −0.1362 (0.1083)
GuessCorrect −0.0831∗∗ (0.0348) −0.0830∗∗ (0.0360) −0.0831∗∗ (0.0348) −0.0830∗∗ (0.0360)
Punishment 0.0759 (0.0738) 0.0684 (0.0736) 0.0759 (0.0738) 0.0684 (0.0736)
Risk −0.0185 (0.0306) −0.0185 (0.0306)
FutCons 0.0343 (0.0313) 0.0343 (0.0313)
SelfControl −0.0151 (0.0320) −0.0151 (0.0320)
ExpParticipation 0.0691 (0.0627) 0.0691 (0.0627)
Constant 0.7549∗∗∗ (0.0587) 0.6975∗∗∗ (0.0762) 0.7549∗∗∗ (0.0587) 0.6975∗∗∗ (0.0762)
Observations 189 189 189 189
Note: Odds ratio reported. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on the individual
level. ∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Reference categories are Short Delay and
IR-SD, respectively. Age is 1 for participants older than 40 years. Higher values for
Risk, Future Consequences, and Self-Control depict higher willingness to take risks, to
being forward-looking and to exhibit higher self-control, respectively. These values are
standardized. Total Punishment relates to the overall frequency of inﬂicted punishment
on the individual if caught cheating.
cur at the beginning of any of the ﬁrst three blocks). The idea behind this
measure is to understand whether experiencing the drain of uncertainty of
punishment following their ﬁrst cheating decision will aﬀect the individual’s
subsequent propensity to cheat. Our results do not indicate that any such
learning eﬀect exists. In fact, cheating behavior following the experience of
uncertainty and punishment is congruent to our previous ﬁndings on general
cheating behavior. We present a graphical illustration in Figure 5.3.
In order to shed light on this mechanism, we employ a series of OLS
regressions. Through these regressions we look to analyze the total amount
of cheating that took place following the individual’s ﬁrst cheating decision
and any resulting punishment that he or she incurred. In our attempt to
proxy recidivism, our dependent variable measures the amount of cheating
that occured after one’s ﬁrst cheating decision. The less frequent or the later
participants recidivise, the lower the value of our dependent variable.
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Our results for conditional cheating are consistent with our previous ﬁnd-
ings, suggesting that the recidivism of individuals is lowest when punishment
is either immediate or late when paired with uncertainty. The delay of uncer-
tainty alone is non-eﬀective. In particular, relative to immediate resolution
and immediate punishment, a short-term delay of punishment (IR-SD) leads
to a signiﬁcant increase in deviant behavior, while the additional introduc-
tion of uncertainty (DR-SD) alone does not aﬀect cheating rates relative to
IR-ND. We again ﬁnd an inverted U-shape relationship; when combining the
long delay of punishment with uncertainty of resolution, cheating rates re-
turn to levels similar to those found when immediate punishment is paired
with no uncertainty resolution (IR-ND). In support of this, post estimation
tests show that the drop in cheating rates in DR-LD is signiﬁcant compared
to cheating in IR-SD (p < 0.01) and DR-SD (p = 0.02). In contrast to
total cheating behavior, we do not observe robust gender heterogeneity or a
traceable impact of age, self-control or experienced punishment. The latter
ﬁnding indicates that it is not the experience of punishment that aﬀects re-
cidivism rates, but the combined initial experience of uncertainty and timing
of punishment.
In summary, we can conclude that the same institutional settings that
are capable of reducing recidivism are also the ones deterring deviant be-
havior in the ﬁrst place. Our results demonstrate that swift or suﬃciently
delayed punishment, where the latter is accompanied by an extensive dread
of uncertainty regarding one’s detection, reduces future criminal behavior.
5.5 Discussion and Conclusion
We investigate along two dimensions how timing can impact the eﬀectiveness
of sanctions. We use a controlled laboratory experiment designed to study
the eﬀect of delayed punishment and delayed resolution of uncertainty on
deterrence. Our experimental ﬁndings show that the timing of resolution of
uncertainty has no eﬀect on deterrence. For the delay of punishment, we
observe the following inverted U-shape relationship: deterrence is highest
for no delay or a large delay of punishment and lowest for a short delay of
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punishment.
The observed inverted U-shape is at odds with both discounted expected
utility theory and anticipatory utility theory. According to the ﬁrst theory,
deterrence should decrease monotonically with the delay of punishment. Ac-
cording to the second, there should also be a monotonous relation between
deterrence and delay which would be the inverse of that in the previous case if
the eﬀect of anticipation is suﬃciently high. Recently, Baucells and Bellezza
(2016) proposed a new theory of inter-temporal decision making. They ex-
tend the existing models of anticipatory utility by a reference point which
adjusts. It does so during the anticipation phase by altering a utility of re-
call in the periods succeeding the consumption and changing the magnitude
eﬀect in discounting. In this theory it is possible that the utility maximizing
timing of an unpleasant event is somewhere in the middle of the time horizon,
i.e. ﬁnes in earlier or later periods hurt more and should, therefore, lead to
higher deterrence. While our experiment was not designed to test the theory
of Baucells and Bellezza (2016) it is the only theory which is compatible with
the ﬁndings of our experiment.
It is important to note that the eﬀects of the treatments on the total
cheating behavior can be obtained by two diﬀerent, possibly simultaneously
operating processes. First, the variations in the experimental treatments
could have aﬀected anticipatory reasoning in the participants about how a
possible punishment would impact them. If the impact is anticipated to
be severe, this could lead to no or delayed cheating. Second, learning pro-
cesses may have aﬀected cheaters (who at least once underwent the respective
treatments) diﬀerently by experiencing the (non)waiting for a resolution of
uncertainty and the potential execution of an immediate or delayed pun-
ishment. This may have inﬂuenced their likelihood to cheat again in the
future. Inspecting the results for conditional cheating (i.e. future cheating
upon having cheated before) shows that they closely mirror the results of
the total cheating behavior. Even if some experience for the treatments to
become eﬀective would be needed, basic learning theories (e.g. Azrin, 1956;
Banks and Vogel-Sprott, 1965) are at odds with the inverted U-shaped re-
lation between deterrence and delay of punishment which is also observed
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for conditional cheating. Arguably, the highly eﬀective deterrence of deviant
behavior in DR-LD could be interpreted in one of the following two ways:
one, only an extensive delay of punishment, and not the existence of uncer-
tainty resolution, is responsible for the decrease in cheating; two, it is the
combination of both the extensive delay in punishment and the existence of
uncertainty that imposes additional dread and, thus, the interaction of both
is driving the strength of deterrence. Our regression analysis and theoretical
foundation suggests that it is most likely the former. We consider this as a
promising venue for future research.
Our ﬁndings yield important insights for optimally designing sanctioning
schemes in legal systems. Existing deterrence literature has almost exclu-
sively focused on the role of severity and certainty of legal consequences in
deterring proscribed actions. Our study shows that celerity, the timing of
sanctions through sentencing, may also be a crucial component of an eﬀec-
tive legal system. Our results imply that punishment should either follow
the criminal act quickly or be suﬃciently delayed if deterrence is to be max-
imized. As immediate punishment may be relatively costly, an optimally
delayed punishment could be the most eﬃcient solution.
Our study provides a ﬁrst step into analyzing the eﬀects of deterrence in a
sanctioning system. In order to make conclusions for an optimal policy in the
real world, future research needs to tackle several limitations of our study. In
particular, it seems necessary to study celerity when the delay of punishment
extends to the real payout of subjects. Also, the optimal delay may be very
sensitive to the type of punishment, e.g. the optimal delay may be rather
diﬀerent for monetary ﬁnes than for imprisonment. Despite these limitations
we think that our study highlights the role of celerity in designing optimal
sanctioning systems and points to fruitful avenues for future research.
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Appendix 5.A: Overview Predictions
Table 5.4: Predictions for Total Cheating under DEU
Hypothesis Predictions Conﬁrmed? Sign. Level
H1 IR− SD > IR−ND Yes **
DR− LD > DR− SD No -
H2 IR− SD = DR− SD Yes Not rejected
H3 DR− SD > IR−ND Yes **
DR− LD > IR− SD No -
Note: Signiﬁcance levels are the result of one-sided t-tests examining the direction of mean
diﬀerences based on the theoretical predictions.
Table 5.5: Predictions for Total Cheating under UAE
Hypothesis Predictions Conﬁrmed? Sign. Level
H1* IR− SD < IR−ND No -
DR− LD < DR− SD Yes **
H2* DR− SD < IR − SD No -
H3* DR− SD < IR−ND No -
H4* DR− LD < IR− SD Yes ***
DR− LD < IR−ND No -
Note: Signiﬁcance levels are the result of one-sided t-tests examining the direction of mean
diﬀerences based on the theoretical predictions.
159
References
Abbink, K. (2004): “Staﬀ Rotation as an Anti-Corruption Policy: an Ex-
perimental Study,” European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 887–906.
——— (2006): “14 Laboratory experiments on corruption,” in The In-
ternational Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, ed. by S. Rose-
Ackermann, Edward Elgar, 418–438.
Abbink, K., U. Dasgupta, L. Gangadharan, and T. Jain (2014):
“Letting the Briber Go Free: an Experiment on Mitigating Harassment
Bribes,” Journal of Public Economics, 111, 17–28.
Abbink, K. and H. Hennig-Schmidt (2006): “Neutral Versus Loaded
Instructions in a Bribery Experiment,” Experimental Economics, 9, 103–
121.
Abbink, K., B. Irlenbusch, and E. Renner (2002): “An Experimental
Bribery Game,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 18, 428–
454.
Abbink, K. and K. Wu (2017): “Reward Self-Reporting to Deter Corrup-
tion: An Experiment on Mitigating Collusive Bribery,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior & Organization, 133, 256–272.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson (2005): “The Rise of
Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth,”
The American economic review, 95, 546–579.
Agastya, M. (1999): “Perturbed Adaptive Dynamics in Coalition Form
Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 89, 207–233.
Alaoui, L. and A. Penta (2015): “Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis in Reasoning,”
Mimeo: University of Wisconsin.
160
——— (2016a): “Endogenous Depth of Reasoning,” The Review of Economic
Studies, 83, 1297–1333.
——— (2016b): “Endogenous Depth of Reasoning and Response Time, with
an application to the Attention-Allocation Task,” Mimeo: Universitat
Pompeu Fabra.
Allingham, M. G. and A. Sandmo (1972): “Income Tax Evasion: A
Theoretical Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323–338.
Alm, J., M. B. Cronshaw, and M. McKee (1993): “Tax Compliance
with Endogenous Audit Selection Rules,” Kyklos, 46, 27–45.
Alós-Ferrer, C. (2004): “Cournot vs. Walras in Oligopoly Models with
Memory,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22, 193–217.
Alós-Ferrer, C. and A. B. Ania (2005): “The Evolutionary Stability of
Perfectly Competitive Behavior,” Economic Theory, 26, 179–197.
Alós-Ferrer, C. and G. Kirchsteiger (2010): “General Equilibrium
and the Emergence of (Non) Market Clearing Trading Institutions,” Eco-
nomic Theory, 44, 339–360.
——— (2015): “Learning and Market Clearing: Theory and Experiments,”
Economic Theory, 60, 203–241.
Alós-Ferrer, C., G. Kirchsteiger, and M. Walzl (2010): “On the
Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox,” Eco-
nomic Journal, 120, 215–243.
Alós-Ferrer, C. and N. Netzer (2015): “Robust Stochastic Stability,”
Economic Theory, 58, 31–57.
Alós-Ferrer, C. and F. Shi (2012): “Imitation with Asymmetric Mem-
ory,” Economic Theory, 49, 193–215.
Alós-Ferrer, C. and S. Weidenholzer (2014): “Imitation and the
Role of Information in Overcoming Coordination Failures,” Games and
Economic Behavior, 87, 397–411.
161
Amir, R. (1996): “Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular
Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 15, 132–148.
Amir, R. and V. E. Lambson (2000): “On the Eﬀects of Entry in Cournot
Markets,” Review of Economic Studies, 67, 235–254.
Anderson, S. P. and M. Engers (1992): “Stackelberg versus Cournot
Oligopoly Equilibrium,” International Journal of Industrial Organization,
10, 127–135.
Apesteguia, J., M. Dufwenberg, and R. Selten (2007): “Blowing the
Whistle,” Economic Theory, 31, 143–166.
Arad, A. and A. Rubinstein (2012): “The 11–20 Money Request Game:
A Level-k Reasoning Study,” The American Economic Review, 102, 3561–
3573.
Arifovic, J. (1994): “Genetic Algorithm Learning and the Cobweb Model,”
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 18, 3–28.
Arifovic, J. and M. K. Maschek (2006): “Revisiting Individual Evo-
lutionary Learning in the Cobweb Model – an Illustration of the Virtual
Spite-Eﬀect,” Computational Economics, 28, 333–354.
Azrin, N. H. (1956): “Some Eﬀects of Two Intermittent Schedules of Im-
mediate and Non-Immediate Punishment,” The Journal of Psychology, 42,
3–21.
Bailey, W. C. (1980): “Deterrence and the Celerity of the Death Penalty:
A Neglected Question in Deterrence Research,” Social Forces, 58, 1308–
1333.
Baker, T., A. Harel, and T. Kugler (2004): “The Virtues of Uncer-
tainty in Law: An Experimental Approach,” Iowa Law Review, 89, 443.
Banerjee, R. (2016a): “Corruption, Norm Violation and Decay in Social
Capital,” Journal of Public Economics, 137, 14–27.
162
——— (2016b): “On the Interpretation of Bribery in a Laboratory Corrup-
tion Game: Moral Frames and Social Norms,” Experimental Economics,
19, 240–167.
Banks, R. K. and M. Vogel-Sprott (1965): “Eﬀect of Delayed Pun-
ishment on an Immediately Rewarded Response in Humans,” Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 70, 357.
Banuri, S. and C. Eckel (2012): “Experiments in Culture and Corrup-
tion: A Review,” New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption,
15, 51.
Bartuli, J., B. Djawadi, and R. Fahr (2016): “Business Ethics in Orga-
nizations: An Experimental Examination of Whistleblowing and Person-
ality,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 10190.
Baucells, M. and S. Bellezza (2016): “Temporal Proﬁles of Instant
Utility during Anticipation, Event, and Recall,” Management Science, 63,
729–748.
Becker, G. S. (1968): “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,”
Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169–217.
Bee, C. C. and R. Madrigal (2013): “Consumer Uncertainty: The Inﬂu-
ence of Anticipatory Emotions on Ambivalence, Attitudes, and Intentions,”
Journal of Consumer Behaviour, 12, 370–381.
Bergin, J. and D. Bernhardt (2004): “Comparative Learning Dynam-
ics,” International Economic Review, 45, 431–465.
——— (2009): “Cooperation through Imitation,” Games and Economic Be-
havior, 67, 376–388.
Bigoni, M., S.-O. Fridolfsson, C. Le Coq, and G. Spagnolo (2012):
“Fines, Leniency, and Rewards in Antitrust,” The RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 43, 368–390.
163
Blume, L. (1993): “The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction,”
Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 387–424.
Bø, E. E., J. Slemrod, and T. O. Thoresen (2015): “Taxes on the
Internet: Deterrence Eﬀects of Public Disclosure,” American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy, 7, 36–62.
Brañas-Garza, P., T. García-Muñoz, and R. H. González (2012):
“Cognitive Eﬀort in the Beauty Contest Game,” Journal of Economic Be-
havior and Organization, 83, 254–260.
Breuer, L. (2013): “Tax Compliance and Whistleblowing: The Role of
Incentives,” The Bonn Journal of Economics, 2, 7–44.
Buccirossi, P. and G. Spagnolo (2006): “Leniency Policies and Illegal
Transactions,” Journal of Public Economics, 90, 1281–1297.
Butler, J., D. Serra, and G. Spagnalo (2017): “Motivating Whistle-
blowers,” Mimeo: Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2970551.
Camp, D. S., G. A. Raymond, and R. M. Church (1967): “Temporal
Relationship Between Response and Punishment,” Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 74, 114.
Caplin, A. and J. Leahy (2001): “Psychological Expected Utility Theory
and Anticipatory Feelings,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 55–79.
Cappelen, A. W., K. O. Moene, E. Ø. Sørensen, and B. Tungod-
den (2013): “Needs versus Entitlements—An International Fairness Ex-
periment,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, 574–598.
Chabris, C. F., C. L. Morris, D. Taubinsky, D. Laibson, and J. P.
Schuldt (2009): “The Allocation of Time in Decision-Making,” Journal
of the European Economic Association, 7, 628–637.
Chalfin, A. and J. McCrary (2017): “Criminal Deterrence: A Review
of the Literature,” Journal of Economic Literature, 55, 5–48.
164
Christöfl, A., U. Leopold-Wildburger, and A. Rasmußen (2017):
“An Experimental Study on Bribes, Detection Probability and Principal
Witness Policy,” Journal of Business Economics, forthcoming.
Coricelli, G., M. Joffily, C. Montmarquette, and M. C. Villeval
(2010): “Cheating, Emotions, and Rationality: An Experiment on Tax
Evasion,” Experimental Economics, 13, 226–247.
Coricelli, G. and R. Nagel (2009): “Neural Correlates of Depth of
Strategic Reasoning in Medial Prefrontal Cortex,” Proceedings of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, 106, 9163–9168.
Costa-Gomes, M., V. P. Crawford, and B. Broseta (2001): “Cog-
nition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study,”
Econometrica, 69, 1193–1235.
Crawford, V. and M. Costa-Gomes (2006): “Cognition and Behav-
ior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American
Economic Review, 96, 1737–1768.
Crosetto, P., O. Weisel, and F. Winter (2012): “A Flexible z-Tree
Implementation of the Social Value Orientation Slider Measure (Murphy
et al. 2011),” Jena Economic Research Paper.
d’Adda, G., V. Capraro, and M. Tavoni (2017): “Push, Don’t Nudge:
Behavioral Spillovers and Policy Instruments,” Economics Letters, 154,
92–95.
Dashiell, J. F. (1937): “Aﬀective Value-Distances as a Determinant of
Aesthetic Judgment-Times,” American Journal of Psychology, 50, 57–67.
DeAngelo, G. and G. Charness (2012): “Deterrence, Expected Cost,
Uncertainty and Voting: Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 44, 73–100.
Dillenberger, D. (2010): “Preferences for One-Shot Resolution of Uncer-
tainty and Allais-Type Behavior,” Econometrica, 78, 1973–2004.
165
Dyck, A., A. Morse, and L. Zingales (2010): “Who Blows the Whistle
on Corporate Fraud?” The Journal of Finance, 65, 2213–2253.
Echenique, F. and K. Saito (2017): “Response Time and Utility,” Jour-
nal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 139, 49–59.
Eckel, C. and P. Grossman (1996): “Altruism in Anonymous Dictator
Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 16, 181–191.
Ehrlich, I. (1996): “Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Oﬀenses,” The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 43–67.
Ellison, G. (1993): “Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination,”
Econometrica, 61, 1047–1071.
——— (2000): “Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the
Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution,” Review of Economic Studies, 67, 17–45.
——— (2006): “Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization,” in Ad-
vances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, ed. by
R. Blundell, W. K. Newy, and T. Persson, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 142–180.
Engel, C. (2016): “Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions
from Law, Economics and Criminology,” Mimeo.
Engel, C., S. J. Goerg, and G. Yu (2013): “Symmetric vs. Asymmetric
Punishment Regimes for Bribery,” Mimeo.
——— (2016): “Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Collu-
sive Bribery,” American Law and Economics Review, 18, 506–556.
Engl, F., A. Riedl, and R. A. Weber (2017): “Spillover Eﬀects of Insti-
tutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences and Beliefs,” IZA Discussion
Paper No. 10781.
Evans, R. (1993): “Observability, Imitation and Cooperation in the Re-
peated Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Working Paper, University of Cambridge.
166
Ewerhart, C. (2014): “Cournot Games with Biconcave Demand,” Games
and Economic Behavior, 85, 37–47.
Falk, A. and F. Zimmermann (2016): “Beliefs and Utility: Experimental
Evidence on Preferences for Information,” .
Fischbacher, U. (2007): “z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-Made Eco-
nomic Experiments,” Experimental Economics, 10, 171–178.
Fortin, B., G. Lacroix, and M.-C. Villeval (2007): “Tax Evasion and
Social Interactions,” Journal of Public Economics, 91, 2089–2112.
Frederick, S. (2005): “Cognitive Reﬂection and Decision Making,” The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 25–42.
Frederick, S., G. Loewenstein, and T. O’Donoghue (2002): “Time
Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 40, 351–401.
Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine (1998): The Theory of Learning in Games,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Gabaix, X. and D. Laibson (2006): “Shrouded Attributes, Consumer
Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 121, 505–540.
Gill, D. and V. Prowse (2016): “Cognitive Ability, Character Skills, and
Learning to Play Equilibrium: A Level-k Analysis,” Journal of Political
Economy, 124, 1619–1676.
Gill, D. and V. L. Prowse (2017): “Using Response Times to Mea-
sure Strategic Complexity and the Value of Thinking in Games,” Mimeo:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2902411.
Goeree, J. K., P. Louis, and J. Zhang (2016): “Noisy Introspection in
the ‘11–20’ Game,” Economic Journal, forthcoming.
167
Golman, R. and G. Loewenstein (2015): “The Demand For, and Avoid-
ance of, Information,” Mimeo.
Greiner, B. (2015): “Subject Pool Recruitment Procedures: Organizing
Experiments with ORSEE,” Journal of the Economic Science Association,
1, 114–125.
Hackenberg, T. D. (2009): “Token Reinforcement: A Review and Analy-
sis,” Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 91, 257–286.
Hamilton, W. (1970): “Selﬁsh and Spiteful Behavior in an Evolutionary
Model,” Nature, 228, 1218–1220.
Heinemann, F. and M. G. Kocher (2013): “Tax Compliance under Tax
Regime Changes,” International Tax and Public Finance, 20, 225–246.
Heinemann, F., R. Nagel, and P. Ockenfels (2009): “Measuring
Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games,” The Review of Economic
Studies, 76, 181–221.
Heyes, A. and S. Kapur (2009): “An Economic Model of Whistle-Blower
Policy,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 25, 157–182.
Ho, T.-H., C. Camerer, and K. Weigelt (1998): “Iterated Dominance
and Iterated Best Response in Experimental ‘p-Beauty Contests’,” The
American Economic Review, 88, 947–969.
Holt, C. A. and S. K. Laury (2002a): “Risk Aversion and Incentive
Eﬀects,” American Economic Review, 92, 1644–1655.
——— (2002b): “Risk Aversion and Incentive Eﬀects,” American Economic
Review, 92, 1644–1655.
Howe, E. S. and C. J. Brandau (1988): “Additive Eﬀects of Certainty,
Severity, and Celerity of Punishment on Judgments of Crime Deterrence
Scale Value,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 18, 796–812.
168
Huck, S., H.-T. Normann, and J. Oechssler (2004): “Through Trial
and Error to Collusion,” International Economic Review, 45, 205–224.
Kandori, M., G. J. Mailath, and R. Rob (1993): “Learning, Mutation,
and Long Run Equilibria in Games,” Econometrica, 61, 29–56.
Karlin, S. and H. M. Taylor (1975): A First Course in Stochastic Pro-
cesses, 2nd Ed., San Diego: Academic Press.
Klaus, B. and J. Newton (2016): “Stochastic Stability in Assignment
Problems,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 62, 62–74.
Kocher, M. G., M. Krawczyk, and F. van Winden (2014): “‘Let Me
Dream on!’ Anticipatory Emotions and Preference for Timing in Lotter-
ies,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 98, 29–40.
Kogler, C., L. Mittone, and E. Kirchler (2016): “Delayed Feedback
on Tax Audits Aﬀects Compliance and Fairness Perceptions,” Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 124, 81–87.
Krajbich, I., B. Bartling, T. Hare, and E. Fehr (2015): “Rethinking
Fast and Slow Based on a Critique of Reaction-time Reverse Inference,”
Nature Communications, 6, 7455.
Krajbich, I., B. Oud, and E. Fehr (2014): “Beneﬁts of Neuroeconomic
Modeling: New Policy Interventions and Predictors of Preference,” The
American Economic Review, 104, 501–506.
Kreps, D. M. and E. L. Porteus (1978): “Temporal Resolution of Un-
certainty and Dynamic Choice Theory,” Econometrica, 46, 185–200.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny
(1999): “The Quality of Government,” The Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organization, 15, 222–279.
Lambsdorff, J. G. and B. Frank (2010): “Bribing versus Gift-Giving –
an Experiment,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 31, 347–357.
169
Landsberger, M. and I. Meilijson (1982): “Incentive Generating state
Dependent Penalty System: The Case of Income Tax Evasion,” Journal of
Public Economics, 19, 333–352.
Lindner, F. and M. Sutter (2013): “Level-k Reasoning and Time Pres-
sure in the 11–20 Money Request Game,” Economics Letters, 120, 542–545.
Loewenstein, G. (1987): “Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Con-
sumption,” The Economic Journal, 97, 666–684.
Lovallo, D. and D. Kahneman (2000): “Living with Uncertainty: At-
tractiveness and Resolution Timing,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Mak-
ing, 13, 179.
Mandel, A. and H. Gintis (2014): “Stochastic Stability in the Scarf
Economy,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 67, 44–49.
Mittone, L. (2006): “Dynamic Behaviour in Tax Evasion: An Experimen-
tal Approach,” The Journal of Socio-Economics, 35, 813–835.
Moffatt, P. G. (2015): Experimetrics: Econometrics for Experimental
Economics, Palgrave Macmillan.
Mosteller, F. and P. Nogee (1951): “An Experimental Measurement
of Utility,” Journal of Political Economy, 59, 371–404.
Moyer, R. S. and T. K. Landauer (1967): “Time Required for Judge-
ments of Numerical Inequality,” Nature, 215, 1519–1520.
Murphy, R. O., K. A. Ackermann, and M. J. J. Handgraaf (2011):
“Measuring Social Value Orientation,” Judgment and Decision Making, 6,
771–781.
Nagel, R. (1995): “Unraveling in Guessing games: An Experimental
Study,” The American Economic Review, 85, 1313–1326.
Nagin, D. S. and G. Pogarsky (2001): “Integrating Celerity, Impulsiv-
ity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence:
Theory and Evidence,” Criminology, 39, 865–892.
170
——— (2004): “Time and Punishment: Delayed Consequences and Criminal
Behavior,” Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 20, 295–317.
Nax, H. H. and B. S. R. Pradelski (2015): “Evolutionary Dynamics and
Equitable Core Selection in Assignment Games,” International Journal of
Game Theory, 44, 903–932.
Newton, J. (2012): “Recontracting and Stochastic Stability in Cooperative
Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 147, 364–381.
Orviska, M. and J. Hudson (2003): “Tax Evasion, Civic Duty and the
Law Abiding Citizen,” European Journal of Political Economy, 19, 83–102.
Papke, L. E. and J. M. Wooldridge (2008): “Panel Data Methods for
Fractional Response Variables with an Application to Test Pass Rates,”
Journal of Econometrics, 145, 121–133.
Parke, R. D. and J. L. Deur (1972): “Schedule of Punishment and Inhi-
bition of Aggression in Children,” Developmental Psychology, 7, 266.
Paternoster, R. (2010): “How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal
Deterrence?” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 765–824.
Polonio, L., S. Di Guida, and G. Coricelli (2015): “Strategic Sophis-
tication and Attention in Games: An Eye-Tracking Study,” Games and
Economic Behavior, 94, 80–96.
Primi, C., K. Morsanyi, F. Chiesi, M. A. Donati, and J. Hamilton
(2015): “The Development and Testing of a New Version of the Cogni-
tive Reﬂection Test Applying Item Response Theory (IRT),” Journal of
Behavioral Decision Making.
Raymond, M. (1999): “Enforcement Leverage when Penalties are Re-
stricted: a Reconsideration under Asymmetric Information,” Journal of
Public Economics, 73, 289–295.
171
Riechmann, T. (2006): “Cournot or Walras? Long-Run Results in
Oligopoly Games,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,
162, 702–720.
Samuelson, L. (1997): Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Sandholm, W. H. (2010): Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Schaffer, M. (1989): “Are Proﬁt-Maximisers the Best Survivors?” Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 12, 29–45.
Schmolke, K. U. and V. Utikal (2016): “Whistleblowing: Incentives
and Situational Determinants,” Mimeo: FAU.
Shi, F. (2015): “Long-run Technology Choice with Endogenous Local Ca-
pacity,” Economic Theory, 59, 377–399.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1993): “Corruption,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 108, 599–617.
Skinner, B. F. (1963): “Operant Behavior,” American Psychologist, 18,
503.
Slemrod, J. (2007): “Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion,”
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21, 25–48.
Spagnolo, G. (2004): “Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programs,”
Mimeo: CEPR.
——— (2006): “Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust,” in Handbook
of Antitrust Economics, ed. by P. Buccirossi, Cambridge, Massachusetts:
MIT Press.
Spiegler, R. (2006): “Competition Over Agents with Boundedly Rational
Expectations,” Theoretical Economics, 1, 207–231.
172
Spiliopoulos, L. and A. Ortmann (2017): “The BCD of Response Time
Analysis in Experimental Economics,” Experimental Economics, forthcom-
ing.
Stahl, D. O. (1993): “Evolution of Smart n Players,” Games and Economic
Behavior, 5, 604–617.
Stahl, D. O. and P. W. Wilson (1995): “On Players’ Models of Other
Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence,” Games and Economic Be-
havior, 10, 218–254.
Strathman, A., F. Gleicher, D. S. Boninger, and C. S. Edwards
(1994): “The Consideration of Future Consequences: Weighing Immediate
and Distant Outcomes of Behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 66, 742.
Strzalecki, T. (2013): “Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Recursive
Models of Ambiguity Aversion,” Econometrica, 81, 1039–1074.
Tangney, J. P., R. F. Baumeister, and A. L. Boone (2004): “High
Self-Control Predicts Good Adjustment, Less Pathology, Better Grades,
and Interpersonal Success,” Journal of personality, 72, 271–324.
Toplak, M. E., R. F. West, and K. E. Stanovich (2014): “Assessing
Miserly Information Processing: An Expansion of the Cognitive Reﬂection
Test,” Thinking & Reasoning, 20, 147–168.
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1986): “Rational Choice and the Fram-
ing of Decisions,” Journal of business, S251–S278.
Vallée, T. and M. Yıldızoğlu (2009): “Convergence in the Finite
Cournot Oligopoly with Social and Individual Learning,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior & Organization, 72, 670–690.
——— (2013): “Can They Beat the Cournot Equilibrium? Learning with
Memory and Convergence to Equilibria in a Cournot Oligopoly,” Compu-
tational Economics, 41, 493–516.
173
Vega-Redondo, F. (1997): “The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior,” Econo-
metrica, 65, 375–384.
Vriend, N. J. (2000): “An Illustration of the Essential Diﬀerence Between
Individual and Social Learning, and Its Consequences for Computational
Analyses,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 24, 1–19.
Weisel, O. and S. Shalvi (2015): “The Collaborative Roots of Corrup-
tion,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America, 112, 10651.
Wu, G. (1999): “Anxiety and Decision Making with Delayed Resolution of
Uncertainty,” Theory and Decision, 46, 159–199.
Young, H. P. (1993): “The Evolution of Conventions,” Econometrica, 61,
57–84.
——— (1998): Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Princeton, New Jer-
sey: Princeton University Press.
Yu, J. (1994): “Punishment Celerity and Severity: Testing a Speciﬁc Deter-
rence Model on Drunk Driving Recidivism,” Journal of Criminal Justice,
22, 355–366.
174
